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13 May 1980

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No. 1576

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## GROUND FORCES 1980 INFRASTRUCTURE BUDGET DETAILED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Mar 80 pp 151-152

[Article by Emmanuel Gepeyre]

[Text] The 1980 appropriations bill has earmarked for the army's infrastructure a total budget of 1.5634 billion francs which represents 11.41 percent of the credits provided under Title V of the ground forces section.

Although this represents an increase of about 17 percent in relation to that [sic] of 1979, the possibilities of availment are practically identical with the preceding year, considering the rise in construction costs.

The apportionment of this budget by building categories maintains standard balance, with, however, a slight adjustment for services.

#### Service Infrastructure

Over 60 percent of the credits are devoted to the purchase of durable goods. These mainly involve:

- technical equipment of buildings (3.3 million francs) for Ordnance;
- bakery, icebox, lift truck and varied equipment (4 million francs for the Finance Department);
- telegraph, telephone, hertzian equipment earmarked for the radio relay systems of the North and Northeast (115.7 million francs) for signals infrastructure which are the principal recipients.

With respect to works, the construction planned for 1980 fits into the framework of the master plan for the reorganization of the services.

It concerns:

- the inauguration of the Douai interservice complex and of the Draguignan regional equipment building;
- the construction or renovation of technical installations in several other buildings;

- the construction of about 12,000 m<sup>2</sup> of flooring in supply buildings or in clothing stores;
- the carrying out of important works for data processing centers.

#### Quartering and Operational Infrastructure

This chapter groups all construction concerning the army with the exception of the above-mentioned services buildings and signals infrastructure.

The allotment by district shows a certain priority granted this year to needs related to the increased power of the 3rd Army Corps and to continuing the effort begun in 1978 on behalf of French forces stationed in Germany [FFG] which need improved infrastructure and new installations in order to handle the delivery of modern equipment.

A) More than 1.200 billion francs will be devoted in 1980 to upgrade infrastructure in the mainland.

The construction of barrack quarters or new schools will be accelerated compared with preceding years. The 1980 budget should make it possible to begin, expand or finish the construction of about 10 regiment barrack quarters or schools and to carry out certain preliminary construction studies.

The upgrading of national camps will be actively pursued according to planning provided in the Marty plan. In 1980, the effort will involve four camps and the construction of several artillery ranges.

In respect to schools, the major operations will involve continuing restructuring works in seven of them.

Lastly, the modernization of old barrack quarters will absorb this year 50 percent of credits devoted to infrastructure in the mainland.

Without going into detail, the 1980 budget should make it possible to continue the renovation of troop living installations in nearly 800 barrack quarters and the preparation of installations necessary for the placing of modern equipment in about 30 barrack quarters.

B) The relatively poor state of barrack quarters of the forces stationed in Germany has led to continuing the maintenance of increased funding of infrastructure credits provided them.

The programs for the improvement of troop living conditions and for the adaptation to the organization and the outfitting of forces with modern equipment will be continued.

All total, credits provided for the barrack quarters of the FFG amount to 85.5 million francs.

C) Overseas, 1980 will witness the continuation of actions undertaken several years ago, principally in the Reunion, in the Antilles-Guyana and in New Caledonia.

## AMX-10-RC TO REPLACE PANHARD TANK

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Mar 80 pp 119-151

[Article by Emmanuel Gepeyre]

[Text] The AMX-10-RC is gradually going to replace the Panhard armored reconnaissance vehicle (EBR) which has been used for many years to equip the armored cavalry reconnaissance regiments. The first one was officially delivered, 20 December last, to the 2d Hussar Regiment of Sourdun, near Provins, during a ceremony presided over by the minister of defense, who was accompanied by the army chief of staff.

Commenting on the entry into service of this new armored vehicle, whose program involves 403 units scheduled for completion in 1986, the minister declared that "with this armored vehicle the French Army has at its disposal a machine which outperforms any other in its class today."

This advent of the AMX-10-RC fits into a group of new equipment procurements which, since 1976, has very considerably altered the face of the French army. This effort carried out concurrently with the reorganization of the army has especially taken shape with the setting in place of the AMX-10-P and tracked PC, of which 500 are already in service of the 760 provided for by the programming law; by the equipping of units with the anti-tank Milan (800 already in service) and with HOT rockets mounted on SA 341 helicopters, rockets which are also slated to equip advanced armored vehicles (VAB); with the adoption of the self-propelling 155 AUF 1 gun, of the tractor-drawn 155 and the perfection of the system of automatization of firing and artillery liaison (ATILA); with the delivery of the Famas, which was reported in our issue of last January, and with the increase of anti-aircraft firepower brought about by the entry into service of the Hawk-Hip, of the Roland and of the 20 mm self-defense gun.

The AMX-10-RC is a reconnaissance vehicle and a combat vehicle. Highly mobile, its 105 gun and its automatic predictor enable it to perform in anti-tank warfare almost like a battle tank up to 2,000 meters. A vehicle on wheels, it offers great cruising range and good road speed. Being protected against light infantry weapons and shell splinters, capable of fighting in contaminated atmosphere, amphibious, highly maneuverable on a variety of terrains, it is at home on the battlefield.



Mobility tests have been carried out by the army technical section over almost 30,000 kilometers on sandy, muddy, rocky and snow-covered terrain. Its amphibious capacity has been tested as well as its fitness for use in hot climates. Its firing capacity has been verified by firing over 500 volleys on the shooting range against fixed and mobile targets in various configurations. The tests have made it possible to verify that the barrel and fire control made possible performance equivalent to that of a tank up to 2,000 meters.

The AMX-10-RC is a six-wheel rear drive vehicle with a low-streamlined shape. It steers like a tracked vehicle. Unlike other AMX-10 equipment, the power unit is in the rear of the casing.

There is a crew of four:

- the driver forward left of the casing;
- the vehicle commander and gunner in the turret to the right;
- the radio operator left.

#### Specifications

--total combat-ready weight .....	15.8 tons
--casing length .....	6.35 m
--overall length gun pointing forward .....	9.13 m
--overall width .....	2.86 m
--overall height .....	2.68 m
--ground clearance variable from 0.20 to 0.60 meters (4 positions)	
--specific output .....	17.7 ch/t
--fuel tank .....	520 l diesel
--gas mileage .....	60 l/100 km
--average road speed .....	65 km/h
--maximum road speed .....	85 km/h
--road cruising range .....	800 km
--amphibious use with no required preparation, maximum water speed with hydrojets .....	2 m/s
--ramp clearance .....	60 percent
--vertical clearance .....	40 percent

#### Weaponry

The AMX-10-RC turret is equipped with a 105-mm gun with great initial velocity (1,120 m/s for a hollow charge shell), governed by an ultramodern fire control which makes possible a "bulls-eye" on the first shot up to within 2,000 meters. This 105-mm gun is equipped with a muzzle brake coupled with an automatic bore sight device. It fires finned shells with a very low initial rotation speed. The stock consists of 38 105-mm rounds of which 12 are immediately available in the turret. There are three types of shells: hollow charge, explosive, training. Auxiliary weaponry is composed of a 7.62-mm machine gun coupled to the [105 mm] gun with 4,000 cartridges and 4 smoke generator dischargers.

## Fire Control

The gunner has available two episcopes and a lens with magnification x 10 which comprises an electronic control for automatic display of fire correction and a laser rangefinder. The fire control also comprises various receivers which furnish the target's lateral and vertical speed, the cant and external temperature. The gunner has only to follow the objective, press the measure button, release it after 2 or 3 seconds and fire as soon as he has taken aim.

The tank commander has available a double magnifying telescope which makes possible observation in any direction he chooses, but his command of priority tracking makes it possible for him to point the gun in his observation direction, thus facilitating the transfer to the gunner of a detected objective.

For night driving, the driver has available a "light intensification" episcopes interchangeable with his main daylight episcopes.

## Mechanical Data

The excellent road and all terrain mobility of the AMX-10-RC is due to the versatility of its power unit and to the original overall six-wheel movement transmission conception.

Getting into gear is instantaneous due to preselection. Mistakes in handling the gears never cause the engine to stall, and it is possible to start in several gears, whence very easy handling on the road and on any terrain. It is possible to turn in place. A device makes it possible to vary the inflation pressure of tires while moving, so as to adapt it to the nature of the terrain. Aquatic propulsion is imparted by hydraulic drive hydrojets and steering is carried out by jet orientation.

In view of its technical data but especially of its weaponry and day and night fire control devices, the AMX-10-RC appears to outperform any other vehicle of its class today.

The order program provides for financing 403 units to be delivered ongoing through 1985 or 1986 to equip army corps reconnaissance regiments and the armored regiments of infantry divisions.

Commenting on the entry into service of this new armored vehicle, General Lagarde personally emphasized the necessity of designing now a light armored vehicle which would complement the mission and versatility of the AMX-10-RC. The task of this vehicle would be to search out, process and transmit information. This reconnaissance vehicle would in a manner of speaking furnish the "eyes" and the "ears" which the AMX-10-RC lacks to complement it over zones 25 kilometers wide and 60 kilometers deep.

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## USE OF NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN MEDITERRANEAN

Rome RIVISTA MARITTIMA in Italian Mar 80 pp 13-29

[Article by Vittorio Barbatì: "Control of the Mediterranean"]

[Text] In order to attempt to describe what the Mediterranean represents at present from the point of view of strategy, first of all it is necessary to focus on the setting in which the "function" of this sea is regarded.

There is a factor that acts -- we might say -- as a background for all present-day political and strategic action: the risk of a nuclear conflict. This factor is "present" in every zone in the world, but not to the same "degree." In some areas, the risk is maximum; in others, it is important but more limited; in others, it is small; in still others, it is minimum.

There is no accurate yardstick for measuring that factor. At any rate, it can be determined with some approximation, obviously not quantitatively. Generally speaking, it can be said that the risk involved is maximum in those areas in which the greatest concentration of potential nuclear opponents is recorded and then decreases as this concentration is reduced. It seems obvious -- and it is obvious, from certain points of view -- but some very important implications stem from that, two of which are of particular concern to us. The first one can be stated by saying that the probability of conventional conflicts is inversely proportional to the risk of nuclear conflicts; that is to say, the higher this probability, the lower this risk. The second one, which, in practice, is a consequence of the first one, consists in the need for adopting, on the conventional level also, a strategy of deterrence, of threat-counterthreat, rather than of out-and-out war action, in those areas in which the nuclear risk is highest.

Without any doubt, the Mediterranean area is characterized by a high nuclear risk (although to a degree undoubtedly lower than the risk in central Europe, where the highest concentration of potential nuclear opponents is found). It is, therefore, an area in which the strategy of deterrence, of pressure-counterpressure, of potential threat-counterthreat

finds, on the part of both blocs facing each other, an extensive application both from the nuclear point of view and from the conventional point of view.

From the nuclear point of view, that strategy is carried out by the "presence" of strategic systems, especially ballistic missiles on nuclear submarines, in the area. It is possible to threaten Western Europe, on the one hand, and Eastern Europe and the European regions of the Soviet Union, on the other, with these weapons from the Mediterranean.

From the conventional point of view -- it is actually difficult to put a precise border between the nuclear field and the conventional field, especially with regard to the possible employment of "tactical" nuclear weapons -- we are confronted, on both sides, by a more flexible strategy, primarily for the purpose of planning timely acquisition of control of the Mediterranean air-sea space, in case of conflict. It is appropriate to examine these two forms of strategy and their possible interrelations separately and more in detail.

As is known, within the sphere of the Eastern bloc, or, if preferred, the Warsaw Pact, only the USSR has nuclear weapons. Moreover, the USSR is also the only real naval power in that bloc and is the only one capable of operating nuclear and conventional forces in the Mediterranean area (actually, Bulgaria also might operate some small air contingents in the area of the eastern Mediterranean; it is, however, doubtful that the Bulgarian Air Force is capable of participating effectively in operations at sea).

At any rate, this is invalid reasoning. Actually -- differently from what is true of NATO where the national components are present, and evident, in the context of the strategy of the Alliance -- the strategy of the Warsaw Pact is nothing more than a component of the overall strategy of the USSR. Therefore -- avoiding subtle, useless distinctions -- we can speak calmly of Soviet strategy, when we are discussing the strategy of the Eastern bloc. Now we must point out the fundamental nuclear implications of this strategy, reserving the right to come back later to its conventional aspects.

Within the framework of a very long-range political-military strategy, the nuclear threat that the USSR is capable of making to Western Europe by using underwater and surface units, takes on, clearly, a dual function: direct, as a means of political-military pressure with regard to the countries located in that geographic area, and indirect, as a factor of break between the United States and its allies (almost every country in Western Europe is tied to the United States, either through NATO or through bilateral agreements), with a view to a division of forces and

<sup>1</sup> Under special circumstances, long-range tactical cruise missiles, carried on various Soviet naval surface units, can perform strategic or semi-strategic functions.

a possible "disorganization" of the reactions that the potential adversaries might bring into play in case of a crisis.

The introduction, already in progress, of new strategic systems in the Soviet arsenal -- especially of land-based mobile SS-20 IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) and SSN-17 SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile), which are replacing the older SSN-6 onboard "Yankee"-class submarines -- might, however, induce the USSR to "reduce" its nuclear-strategic commitment in Mediterranean waters, also in view of the fact that sizable NATO antisubmarine forces are operating in that area. It should be emphasized that this would not imply a renunciation by the Soviet Union of use of the nuclear threat against Western Europe. It would only mean a modification, permitted by technological progress, of the types and deployment of the weapons intended for carrying out the threat involved.

Use of the Mediterranean sea space as a "potential launching area" for strategic systems is also an integral part of NATO's nuclear strategy. Here, however, a few distinctions have to be made. In fact, the issues are looked at from three points of view: the point of view of NATO as a whole, of the United States and of the smaller nuclear powers -- France and Great Britain -- that belong to the Alliance.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to NATO, it must be said, although a well-known fact is involved, that there is no Alliance nuclear force. The force of Pershing II and Cruise missiles,<sup>3</sup> which may be installed on the European continent in a few years, cannot be regarded as such, either, in view of the fact that it will be a matter of a force usable only on the basis of an order from a national authority, specifically the president of the United States.

NATO, regarded as an assemblage of nuclear and nonnuclear countries, may, however, use, and in fact uses, as a "deterrent" factor with regard to the USSR, "doubt on the eventuality," the "possibility of not ruling out" the use of national nuclear forces, American primarily, located on European territory or in waters, starting with the Mediterranean, that bathes Europe, in reply to a nuclear attack against Western Europe.

On the other hand, with regard to the United States, the use of a nuclear threat against the Soviet Union by means of the strategic nuclear weapons deployed in the Mediterranean<sup>4</sup> -- the SLBM carried on the SSBN (Ballistic

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<sup>2</sup> It is known that France has withdrawn from the integrated military organization of NATO -- to which, however, it has been becoming "reconciled" in recent years -- but, concerning the rest, it is still a full-fledged member of the Alliance.

<sup>3</sup> These missiles are in an experimental phase at present.

<sup>4</sup> At present, no American strategic nuclear system is assigned to European territory. Eighteen French SSBS (Surface-to-Surface Strategic Ballistic Missile) are deployed in Alpes de Haute Provence.



Missile Submarine (Nuclear)) incorporated in Task Force 64 of the Sixth Fleet -- takes on a definite national function in the framework of the overall balance between the United States and the USSR, in addition to the NATO function mentioned above. Nevertheless, the importance of this function -- as is true of the function performed by the corresponding forces of the Soviet Union -- seems, with every probability, destined to decrease as a result, in addition to the probable deployment of the new missiles referred to above, of the going into service of new SLBM -- Trident I -- and new SSBN -- Ohio -- which may enable the United States to shift part of the underwater component of the deterrent force to American waters, withdrawing older class submarines from the more advanced areas.

The matter is different for the two smaller nuclear powers that are NATO members. Both France and Great Britain have missile-launching submarines armed with ballistic missiles. Both could find some advantage in deploying some of those units in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of being able to threaten Soviet territory more deeply. The fact that the Soviet antisubmarine organization must concern itself primarily with opposing American SSBN and attack submarines (SSN) offers French and British missile-launching submarines a maneuvering margin not to be underestimated.

Now, it is appropriate to take up, very briefly, another possible "use" of the Mediterranean as a "launching area" for strategic nuclear weapons.

It is known that, at present, the United States is developing several types of cruise missiles: the ALCM (Air Launched Cruise Missile), the GLCM (Ground Launched Cruise Missile) and SLCM (Sea or Submarine Launched Cruise Missile). The last-mentioned are of particular interest to us.

The SLCM (of which a version usable by carrier aircraft is also under experimentation) are being developed both in a tactical and a strategic version. Leaving aside the tactical version, we must dwell a moment on a consideration of the prospects that might be opened up as a result of an eventual wide-spread deployment of strategic SLCM.

Every surface and underwater combatant unit of the United States Navy, regardless of their deployment, should be capable -- if provision is made -- of employing them. It is clear that, if this prospect should materialize, several strategic balances would be changed, including the one in the Mediterranean. It is, however, likewise evident that the obstacles that must be overcome to achieve this kind of objective are several: it does not seem easy to put SLCM in operation; in some cases, the units will have to be "adapted" to their use, with additional costs not easily determined<sup>1</sup> and so on.

<sup>1</sup> It does not seem that it will necessary to install special launchers onboard. Rather, problems might arise concerning installation of the equipment needed for controlling the complex electronic equipment of these systems.



Moreover, generalization of these weapons might set in motion an uncontrollable spiral in the armament race, which has undergone a dangerous acceleration recently. It might also set in motion other mechanisms -- like the acquisition of territories suitable for performing the function of "protective belts" -- capable of introducing excessive elements of risk in a picture that contains more darkness than light already at present. These are all prospects to be evaluated carefully. But they also are prospects that cannot be excluded from consideration of a strategic picture, like the one in the Mediterranean.

As has already been stated, the existence of a high margin of nuclear risk makes it necessary for all the powers concerned in controlling the Mediterranean area, to proceed also in the conventional field more in terms of a strategy of deterrence than of the strategy of out-and-out war action.

One essential point should be clarified. The expression "conventional field" is being used here not so much to delimit the area of employment of so-called "conventional weapons" strictly, as to indicate the area in which action (or the threat of action) can be carried out by all weapons -- including tactical nuclear weapons -- that do not fall into the "strategic nuclear field" by definition (actually it is very difficult to set certain limits).

It should be pointed out, in this connection, that, in a situation like the Mediterranean situation, the "threat" (express, tacit, inherent in specific behaviors or made possible by specific circumstances) of the use of tactical nuclear weapons has, or may have, a considerable effect on the training, activity and deployment of conventional forces. It is hardly necessary to add that, up to now, no one has been capable of indicating precisely where the so-called "nuclear threshold," the point of transition from the use of conventional weapons to the use of nuclear weapons, should be placed in the field of tactics.

Control -- partial or total, temporary or permanent -- of the Mediterranean area may take on various meanings, both "offensive" and "defensive," for the Soviet Union, taking into account the fact that also the boundary between offense and defense is often evanescent.

From the point of view of offense, this control, tied essentially to the activity of conventional means -- regarding as such also nuclear-propelled attack submarines, which perform tactical functions capable of incorporation in the conventional field -- might have, first of all, the purpose of enabling the strategic nuclear means to carry out their threat, or, in extreme cases, their action freely. It should be pointed out, by way of parenthesis, that this is one of those typical cases in which the close tie between the instruments of strategic nuclear warfare and the instruments of conventional warfare is evident. What is very probably involved is a function "on the decline," for those reasons -- introduction of new strategic systems, and so on -- mentioned above, when the strategic-nuclear aspects of Soviet activity in the Mediterranean were discussed.

A second function of offense, this time purely conventional (or traditional, if preferred), may be assigned to the Soviet naval means operating in the Mediterranean: the function of threatening, and, in case of war, of striking the trade route to which the Mediterranean countries are tied for their very survival. This, too, is a function "on the decline," although, as we shall see below, for reasons completely different from the ones stated above.

From the point of view of defense, Soviet Mediterranean strategy seems to be oriented in terms of two objectives. First of all, it tends definitely to interdict the use of Mediterranean waters by the strategic nuclear forces of potential adversaries (and this is, undoubtedly, the primary defensive function of the Soviet Navy in every sea of the world). Here, in connection with all that we have seen above, we must point out that we are confronted by another situation in motion, because of the change that is shaping up in the nuclear deterrence of the United States.

The second defensive objective of the Soviet Mediterranean strategy (this objective also has secondary offensive aspects, not only because performance of the offensive functions discussed above may be tied to its attainment, but also because it may be pursued to cause the forces responsible for the air and land defense of the NATO countries to lack valuable support coming from the sea) consists definitely in preventing the NATO air and naval forces -- and, therefore, primarily, the aircraft carriers in the American Sixth Fleet forming the fulcrum -- from exercising effective control of the Mediterranean air and sea space and from projecting their power on the mainland from the sea.

In very general terms, these are the objectives that can be attributed to the Mediterranean strategy of the Soviet Union. Objectives are involved that fit in the context of that constantly tighter competition that is setting the Eastern bloc against the Western bloc, all over the world, for control of the most important strategic areas.

In order to implement this strategy, the Soviet Union uses a complex air and naval apparatus, whose fulcrum consists of the Mediterranean Squadron, administratively and operationally under the Black Sea Fleet (one of the four fleets -- the others are the Baltic Fleet, the North Fleet and the Far East-Pacific Fleet -- in which the USSR Navy is organized). This squadron has a variable force, which, sometimes, ranges around 40-50

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<sup>5</sup> Although it is possible to investigate adequately certain matters that lie strictly speaking beyond the aims of this article, it should be pointed out that this control is not, and can never be, an end to itself. Under today's conditions, it can be understood as a means for acquiring resources (raw materials, sources of energy, and so on), or as an instrument for obtaining important political and economic advantages by negotiating from positions of strength.

units.<sup>7</sup> It is supported by long-range naval aviation aircraft, land-based in the southwestern regions of the USSR.

Only prudent assumptions can be formulated on the actual operational possibilities of this complex, also because some of the technical solutions adopted by the Soviets with regard to naval armament do not appear at all clear. In particular, there are several doubts on the primary responsibility of the major units with aircraft capability and on the function of various missile systems.

There are, however, also some "certainties." Many units of the Soviet Navy have -- owing especially to the missile systems with which they are equipped -- considerable antiship capabilities. Several others have considerable antiaircraft and antisubmarine capabilities. On their part, the naval aviation aircraft are particularly equipped for launching anti-ship missiles or for guiding, beyond the radar horizon of launching units, missiles launched by surface or underwater units.

We can, however, take the liberty of expressing some doubts on the actual ability of that complex to "compete" for control of the Mediterranean (or part of the Mediterranean) with the air and naval forces of NATO opposing it, although its capability of inflicting especially serious losses on these forces cannot be questioned.

The weak point in the Soviet apparatus can be singled out in the lack of a component suitable for winning (and maintaining for the time required) control of the air space in the zone of operations. It is doubtful that the large multiengine aircraft of Soviet naval aviation can penetrate -- to launch their missiles or to guide the missiles of "friendly" ships -- the "protective screen" formed around the NATO task forces by the air interception superiority of the American nuclear aircraft carrier and/or the land-based fighters of the other "Western" countries. It is clear that, if the Soviet naval aviation aircraft do not succeed in carrying out these tasks, the capabilities of the Mediterranean Squadron are considerably reduced.

Moreover, the use in terms of "air superiority" of short or vertical takeoff aircraft carried on Kiev-type units (aside from the fact that, at least for now, no unit of this class is permanently assigned to the Black Sea Fleet), definitely not suitable for performing this kind of mission, is not even thinkable.

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<sup>7</sup> According to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London, ("The Military Balance 1979-1980"), the Soviet Black Sea Fleet (which also includes, in addition to the forces operating in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Squadron, the Caspian Sea Flotilla) is said to have about 75 surface units (excluding minor coastal units from the estimate) and 25 underwater units (including submarines and submersibles).

It should be noted, however, that the situation is changing. Introduction of backfire missile-launching bombers, equipped with much greater penetration capability than the older aircraft, in Soviet naval aviation units has certainly increased the capability of the complex involved. Moreover, the appearance -- observed already for several years -- of MIG-23 fighter aircraft (perhaps with Soviet pilots) on Bulgarian airports might be an indication of the attempt to overcome certain limitation. If the USSR should succeed in acquiring good air bases in other areas of the Balkans (especially in Yugoslavia and Albania) or on the coast of northern Africa, the whole present strategic situation would surely be changed. The Soviet Mediterranean apparatus would obtain -- by means of integrating the capabilities of all its components -- considerably higher operational possibilities than the present ones. At the same time, the situation of air and naval forces of NATO, and therefore of the countries defended by them, would become extremely critical.

Control of the Mediterranean area may also take on various meanings, both "offensive" and "defensive," for NATO. Here, however, some distinctions have to be made, because, as has been said, within the scope of NATO national strategic components appear that find nothing comparable within the scope of the Warsaw Pact.

Without wishing to go too deeply into a discussion, we can differentiate, in the activities intended for obtaining the control in question, three fundamental orders of objectives: one pertaining to the requirements of the Alliance as a whole; another concerning the Power, the United States, which plays a determining role within the Alliance, and still another regarding the Mediterranean members of the Alliance.

Actually, the differentiation between these three orders of aims and between the means and methods used to achieve them, is not as clear-cut as might seem at first glance. At any rate, it suits us to indicate them separately.

Control of the Mediterranean is essential for NATO as a whole, in order to guarantee the security of the southern flank of the Alliance. In this sphere, some more specific objectives acquire importance: interdiction of the waters of the Mediterranean to the units of a potential adversary that may threaten Western Europe with strategic nuclear systems; protection of the trade routes to which the very survival of the Mediterranean countries is tied; defense of the coasts of those countries from possible attacks coming from the sea (something that, in view of the increasing Soviet capability in the field of amphibious operations, is taking on an equally increasing importance) and, finally, support from the sea of the forces stationed in defense of the frontiers, of the territories and of the air spaces of the NATO countries in the region.

For the United States, the Mediterranean strategic problem presents both the same factors already considered for NATO and other, more specifically national, factors closely tied to the overall equilibrium between both



In short, these factors -- we might also speak of objectives -- can be summarized, on the one hand, in the utilization, in Mediterranean waters, of instruments suitable, at the same time, for conducting operations against the strategic nuclear means and the conventional means of a potential adversary and, on the other hand, in the possibility of projecting the air and naval power of the United States from those waters to all the surrounding areas, in terms both of NATO aims and of national aims.

Finally, with regard to the objectives pursued and pursuable, still in the context with which we are concerned, by the Mediterranean members of the Atlantic Alliance, we can say that they are identified, in general, with the aims of the Alliance itself, but they take on, or may take on, depending on the circumstances, more "intensive" national content.

In treating -- or, rather, in delineating very concisely -- the instruments used by NATO and its member countries to carry out their strategic objectives in the area with which we are concerned, it is necessary to follow a different order from the one adopted to present the objectives involved. It is necessary, that is to say, to present, first, how the NATO and national aims are being pursued by the American forces in the theater and, then, how the contributions of the Mediterranean members of NATO (and of non-Mediterranean members, in practice only Great Britain is involved, concerned with equilibrium in the theater) fit in.

It is known that the fulcrum of the Mediterranean system of NATO and of the United States consists of the American Sixth Fleet, a national complex that, in case of crisis, or at any rate of need, instantly assumes a precise role within the orbit of the NATO organization.

As also is known, the Sixth Fleet is organized in specialized task forces, by means of which it can perform a vast range of missions: Task Force 60, normally consisting of two aircraft carriers and their escort; Task Forces 61 and 62, forming a single complex for amphibious operations; Task Force 63, responsible for logistic support; Task Force 64, consisting of missile-launching nuclear submarines; Task Force 66, responsible for coordinating antisubmarine activities; Task Force 67, furnished with land-based patrol aircraft, and Task Force 69, consisting of nuclear attack submarine.

An important role is also played in the Mediterranean theater by the 16th Tactical Air Force, which has its headquarters in Spain and is under the USAFE (United States Air Forces, Europe). The tactical aircraft in this large unit, normally based in Spain, operate by moving primarily between the Iberian base at Torrejon, the Italian base at Aviano and the Turkish base at Incirlik. They are, therefore, in a position to conduct operations in various areas, from the Balkan area to the Near East, acting, if necessary, in close coordination with the aircraft of the Sixth Fleet and with air forces of other NATO countries. In case of need, other USAFE aircraft, coming from central Europe and Great Britain, and TAC (Tactical Air Command) aircraft, coming from the United States, can converge in the Mediterranean theater.

In short, it may be said that the American apparatus in the Mediterranean is a powerful, flexible apparatus, suitable, undoubtedly, for performing the tasks -- national and of NATO -- assigned to it.

There are four Mediterranean members of NATO -- from west to east, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey -- and they line up a complex of forces that is certainly not negligible. In addition, British air and naval forces are present in the Mediterranean. As is known, the French and Greek forces are not part of the integrated military organization of the Alliance, but they operate in close collaboration with it.

Without dwelling on a detailed analysis of the composition of these forces, we limit ourselves to discussing very briefly their essential characteristics, proceeding in the same order as adopted above.

France, a nuclear power, lines up very respectable air and naval forces. It should be added that, several years ago, the French Navy shifted the strongest part of its forces from Brest to Toulon, in the framework of a strategy tending to give more priority to the Mediterranean area than in the past. Among other units, the French Fleet lines up two "light" aircraft carriers -- the "Clemenceau" and the "Foch" -- the first of which recently received aboard Super Etendard fighter-bombers, suitable for performing tactical nuclear operations. In addition, units of the French Air Force operate in the Mediterranean area. Then, there is recent news of the establishment of a particularly mobile unit of the French Army for the purpose of performing rapid interventions in the same area.

The Italian air and naval forces also perform an important role in the Mediterranean context. Italy is basically in a strategic position for control of the area and has well-located bases. The Italian Navy, which has excellent ships, is in a position to play an important part both in protection of trade routes and in antiship and antisubmarine operations, owing also to its helicopter component and to the contribution of Air Force units suitable for warfare on the sea. When new units -- ranging from the "all-deck" cruiser "Giuseppe Garibaldi" to frigates of the Maestrale class and to Nardo-class hydrofoils -- go into service during this decade, on the basis of the Naval Act, its capabilities will be increased subsequently. They may be increased still more by the introduction of Tornado aircraft, suitable also for antiship employment, in AM (Air Force) units.

The contribution of Greece and Turkey is smaller, but not negligible. The navies of these two countries have rather old units, most of them of American origin, that can, at any rate, make an effective contribution particularly in the sectors of trade route protection and escort. Recent developments recorded in the field of fast craft equipped with missile armament appear to be important in both navies. On the other hand, capabilities of participation in operations at sea by the air forces of both countries seem to be limited. They are equipped, at least in part, with good-performance aircraft but not especially suitable for certain types of operations.



The British presence in the Mediterranean is still important, although it certainly cannot be compared with what it was formerly. In this sea, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force still have a role to perform. The Royal Navy by contributing, with its ships and its "familiarity" with the theater of operations, both to protection of routes and to counterforce operations. The Royal Air Force, by making not a negligible contribution, with its long-range patrol aircraft, to surveillance of the areas in which the surface and submarine threat may prove to be most intensive.

Is it possible to determine whether there is equilibrium or whether the scales tend to favor one of the two blocs competing for control of the Mediterranean?

It is possible to reply only with extreme caution. Geostrategic factors -- availability of air and naval bases, control of accesses (Gibraltar, Turkish straits and now also Suez) leading to the Mediterranean, and so on -- certainly work in favor of the Western bloc, which moreover, in case of crisis, might probably also count on the contribution of other countries -- Spain, Israel, Egypt -- concerned over maintaining certain balances. Technical factors -- structure of the forces, possession of a strong air component, and so on -- also work, at least for now, in favor of the Western bloc. It is, then, possible to believe that this bloc will be entirely interested in preventing the present situation from undergoing appreciable changes. It is also possible to believe that it is more advisable for the West to pursue the objective of direct control of the area in question, in view of the fact that the existing assumptions favor this solution.

On the other hand, two courses are presented to the Eastern bloc: either attempt, with political or military means, to acquire more favorable positions -- something better, in other words, than the present anchorages located outside the territorial waters of the coastal countries -- especially, as has already been mentioned, in the Balkans or in northern Africa, or aim definitely at attaining "indirect" control, by means of control of the areas (Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Indian Ocean, on the one hand, and the eastern Atlantic on the other) through which the direct routes to the Mediterranean pass. From a purely military point of view, also taking into account the fact, as has been pointed out above, that the introduction of new systems reduces the importance of the Mediterranean for purposes of strategic-nuclear equilibrium, it is possible to believe that the "indirect" control objective suits the Eastern bloc better. Also because this objective can be pursued in areas in which the positions of the West are less firm or out-and-out weak. From the political point of view, however, presence in the Mediterranean takes on the nature of an out-and-out necessity for the bloc, or rather for the USSR. This probably explains why the USSR has sought to follow both courses in the last few years.

Therefore, the game is very wide open. Also because control of the Mediterranean is not an end in itself. It is tied, in reciprocal cause and effect relations, to control of all the surrounding areas, starting with the area of the Near East. With all the implications, not only political and strategic, but also economic, that this kind of fact produces inevitably.

## LONDON PAPER ON ACTIVITIES OF PALESTINIAN BODY AT STRASBOURG

LD281127 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 23 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Suzan Stoeke: "Outcome of What Was Achieved in Strasbourg in Favor of Palestinian Problem in Europe"]

[Excerpts] Strasbourg--Khalid al-Hasan, chairman of the Palestine National Council [PNC] Foreign Relations Committee, has said that the joint conference between the PNC and the parliamentary body for European-Arab cooperation was "the most successful meeting of its kind" he had had the opportunity to attend. The 3-day conference, which was held in Strasbourg's Palais de l'Europe concluded its meetings on 20 April.

Al-Hasan said that the meetings between the PNC delegation and groups of th European Parliament members were very successful. The PNC delegation held official meetings with communist and socialist groups in the European Parliament.

Al-Hasan said that the socialists have said that their information about the Middle East was not balanced and that this situation must be rectified.

He said that he has invited the socialist group to visit Beirut in order to hold talks there. He strongly praised the Arab League's role in facilitating the PLO's work since Chadli Klibi took over the post of secretary general. He said that the Palestinians in the past suffered a great deal from the Arab League when Mahmud Riyad was its secretary general. The league then used to postpone time and time again the taking of decisions which the PLO would ask it to take until the whole thing led to absolutely nothing. As for Mr Klibi, he responded with an open mind to the Palestinians' demands and the Arab League is exerting great efforts in order to help the PLO in its public relations.

As for the next stage of the PNC delegation's visit to Western Europe, it has already begun with a number of delegates visiting West European capitals. In this regard, Hanna Nasir, the banished president of Bir Zayt University, together with al-Hasan, is now visiting the Netherlands and Britain. As for Mrs 'Isam 'Abd al-Hadi and Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz Haj Ahmad--the former doyen

of dentists who was expelled from the West Bank in 1976--they are visiting Dublin. Meanwhile, Mrs Salwa Abu Khadra, chairman of the Palestinian Women's Federation, and Muhammad Khalifah, member of al-Sa'iqah Organization and in charge of educational affairs at UNRWA in Syria, are visiting Brussels and Rome.

It is expected that the visit of Mrs 'Isam 'Abd al-Hadi and Dr Haj Ahmad to Dublin to be the most successful. The Irish delegates have repeatedly stressed that the attack by Israeli-backed rightist militias in southern Lebanon on the Irish unit in the UN peace-keeping forces will heighten anti-Israeli feelings among world opinion. It is likely that the burial of the three Irish soldiers who were killed by Major Hadad's militia will take place during the Palestinian delegation's presence in Dublin. This event is bound to strengthen the Palestinian cause in the mind of world opinion, according to the Irish parliamentarians.

The conference has issued a joint statement which said that it was decided to set up a joint bureau and a permanent secretariat in Strasbourg representing the parliamentary body for European-Arab cooperation and the PNC with the support and backing of the Arab League.

The conference also announced in the joint statement the setting up of a committee to strengthen European-Arab friendship ties consisting of members of the European Parliament. The committee will be set up in May and its work will be supervised by the joint secretariat to be set up in Strasbourg. The committee will participate in the conference scheduled to be held in the Hague in the fall and will be attended by representatives of the parliamentary body for European-Arab cooperation and the Arab Parliamentary Union which includes the PNC. The conference will discuss various political, economic and cultural issues.

The PNC will face a great challenge in trying to make its voice heard and to influence the prevalent views in the European Parliament through the secretariat which, it is proposed, will set up in Strasbourg as certain parliamentary blocs officially oppose the PLO. The Christian Democrats have refused to meet the PNC delegation officially and the liberal bloc sent two of its members with a statement explaining why the liberals refuse to meet with the PNC delegation officially. Most of the parliamentary blocs are divided in their views on the Palestinian problem because of the strength of Zionist pressure groups. It is known that Simone Veil, the European Parliament president, is strongly pro-Zionist.

However, the convening of the joint meeting between the PNC and the parliamentary body for European-Arab cooperation in the Palais de l'Europe was a significant symbolic gesture in view of the fact that Palais de l'Europe is the headquarters of both the European Council and the European Parliament, which means that the PNC has penetrated into the heart of European democracy. European parliamentarians have more than once expressed, in private, how greatly they have been impressed by the attitudes and work of Palestinian

parliamentarians during the conference. They were particularly impressed by the delegations' readiness to discuss with them frankly and flexibly most of the sensitive and controversial issues, including the role of armed struggle and violence as well as the generally disgraceful failure of the Arab Information campaign in the West and the PLO's relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The question now is: Will Nasir Muhammad be Aden's "Hafizollah Amin" after Isma'il has been its "Taraki" so that a man like Babrak Karmal will come and give the Soviets all that they want?

Relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: It is known that Nasir Muhammad is more flexible and more moderate than Isma'il. He supports rapprochement with the neighboring countries, especially Saudi Arabia. He has declared in his public statements his desire for the achievement of Arab solidarity and for adopting the policy of "the minimum," or the formula known as co-existence between different regimes. This also applies to Iraq whose relations with South Yemen worsened during the past year.

But the perplexing thing is that this change has come following the easing of tension in the relations between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen and the announcement that Isma'il would pay an official visit to Riyadh, and also following the success of Kuwait's mediation between Aden and Oman and the halting of war between the two countries.

Until such time as Nasir takes a new positive step toward the implementation of such policy it can be said that certain parties have probably seen in Isma'il's presence an obstacle in the face of rapprochement and, therefore, he was removed in order to facilitate this task.

The relations with North Yemen: 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il is, by origin, a North Yemeni. What is strange is that a number of South Yemeni ministers who support him and who are of North Yemeni origin, were ousted in the cabinet reshuffle that was carried out a few months ago, including Minister of Economy 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali and Minister of State for Security Affairs Muhsin ash-Sharqabi.

The relations between the two Yemens are the strangest there are between two countries. Despite the many ties that bring them together there are many factors that divide them.

Officials on both sides recently admitted the existence of many obstacles in the way of achieving unity but the final strong has not yet been broken. Nasir Muhammad may be able to tighten this link if he can take control of the internal situation in Aden and overcome all the contradictions.



## EP OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED BY JORDANIAN CORRESPONDENT

JN291747 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 29 Apr 80

[Report on interview with Jack Beaumel Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee]

[Text] In a statement to the Jordanian News Agency correspondent in Paris today, (Jack Beaumel), chairman of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Council's parliament, said that the resolution adopted by the European Council last Wednesday, in which the council called for the termination of the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and the recognition of the Palestinian people's rights, points to the development of the European mind's understanding of the Palestinian issue and the peace efforts.

(Beaumel), who made a factfinding tour of the Middle East states on behalf of the European Council, said: There can be no lasting solution for the Arab-Israeli dispute unless it is a comprehensive solution reached with the participation of all concerned parties. He added that the Camp David accords were not able to touch on the basic problem in the existing dispute in the Middle East region; that is, the Palestine issue.

Referring to the recent developments, particularly after the French president's visit of the Third World Arab states, he said: These developments have proved that the European states' views on the principles of settling the Middle East crisis are identical.

He said that Europe is called upon to issue a new international resolution through the United Nations which complements UN Security Council Resolution No 242 and takes into consideration the Palestinian people's national legitimate rights, including their right to establish their homeland on their soil: Palestine.

He added that the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories is a violation of all international laws and norms as well as an obstacle on the path of a just and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

## SWEDEN'S INDUSTRY MINISTER WOULD GIVE NORWAY JAS OIL CONTRACT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Mar 80 p 25

[Article by Sophie Petzell]

[Text] Large Norwegian gas deposits have been discovered in the North Sea. Norway's energy minister, Bjartmar Gerde, was interviewed in last Saturday's SVENSKA DAGBLADET. In the interview, he called for broader cooperation with Sweden, but he believed that the Swedish efforts so far had been weak. Why do you not let us hear from you, he asked.

Industry Minister Nils G. Asling has hopes for the future of trade with Norway. Among the projects he names is construction of the JA5--the fighter plane that may be manufactured in part in Norway--in exchange for oil and gas.

"We have had discussions with the Norwegian government on gas and oil," Industry Minister Nils G. Asling tells SVENSKA DAGBLADET. He is hoping for future Swedish industrial investments in Norway in exchange for petroleum products.

Nils G. Asling welcomes Pehr G. Gyllenhammar's initiative for a Swedish industrial syndicate to negotiate for delivery of Norwegian gas to Sweden.

Negotiations on establishing industry in Norway should be carried out by business and not by the government, Nils G. Asling says.

## Visit to Norway

He strongly denies accusations from both Norwegians and Swedes that the Swedish government has been inactive in connection with the possibilities offered by the Norwegian gas and oil deposits.

"In December I visited my Norwegian counterpart Lars Skytoen to discuss the possibilities," Nils G. Asling says. "We renewed discussions on the possibility of Norwegian oil and gas deliveries to Sweden. In particular, we discussed how the gas deposits that have now been discovered at the Ekofisk parallel could be used.



"This led to the possibility that a Swedish-Norwegian joint venture project for methanol production in northern Norway could become a reality in a later phase. Together with the Norwegians, we could construct facilities to handle the gas brought ashore in northern Norway and convert it to methanol for further transport on tankers."

#### Methanol Proposal

Nils G. Asling believes that Sweden should achieve a 15 percent methanol mixture in gasoline for all gasoline-powered vehicles during the eighties. It is possible that his proposal on this matter will be included in the energy proposal the government plans to present after the referendum.

In addition, during the cabinet meeting on Thursday, the government decided to begin negotiations for the construction of a new methanol facility in Sweden. The methanol plant would use gas from biomass. It is still unclear where the pilot plant will be located.

Various organizations and companies have expressed interest.

The project will cost around 100 million kronor over a 5-year period. This sum will be paid by the state.

#### Welcomes Negotiations

"As a result of the discussions with the Norwegians, I have passed the matter of gas and oil deliveries on to Svenska Petroleum AB, which is now negotiating with the Norwegian state for oil and gas deliveries.

"It is not the task of the government to run these negotiations, even if the Norwegian state is a party in the negotiations. I welcome the idea that the syndicate proposed by Pehr G. Gyllenhammar will also enter negotiations. It is conceivable that Volvo Petroleum may negotiate jointly with Svenska Petroleum AB."

Nils G. Asling supports the idea of Swedish industry establishing itself in Norway. He points to the planned Swedish fighter plane, the JAS, as a suitable joint project.

"I believe that as many components as possible should be manufactured in Sweden. But to keep costs down, international cooperation is necessary. Here, Norway would be a suitable partner--among other reasons, because Norway, too, will eventually need new fighter planes for its defense. Other possible areas of cooperation are off-shore and especially under-water technology."

Nils Asling will meet with his Norwegian counterpart on Monday in Reykjavik. It is possible that the discussions on oil and gas will receive new momentum at that time.

## CANDIDATES FOR UPCOMING LOCAL ELECTIONS

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 25 Mar 80 p 1

[Text] Work has begun to accelerate within the parties concerned in preparation for the elections for the municipal governments and village elders.

The identities of the candidates for mayor in Lefkosa, Girne, Magosa, Guzelyurt and Lefke, which have recently excited particular public interest, have begun gradually to come to light.

## Akinci and Ziya Rizki Are Candidates Once Again

Meanwhile it has been officially confirmed that the mayor of Lefkosa, Mustafa Akinci, and the mayor of Girne, Ziya Rizki, will once again stand as candidates from the Socialist Liberation Party [TKP].

Yesterday in the party's general headquarters the news was confirmed that besides Mustafa Akinci and Ziya Rizki, who were signing their candidacy forms, Vahit Nekidzade from Lefke would also be a mayoralty candidate.

## Denial

Meanwhile a news agency report that the DHP [Democratic People's Party], CTP [Republican Turkish Party] and HP [Populist Party] would join forces for the Girne mayoralty race was denied by the CTP and DHP in a press release published yesterday.

## The DHP Statement

In some of yesterday's newspapers it was stated that the DHP, CTP and HP had reached an agreement on the matter of presenting a common candidate in the Girne mayoralty race and that they had signed a protocol to this effect.

The party assembly held its first session following the party congress on 19 March 1980 and elected the secretary general and the members of the Central Executive Committee. The Central Executive Committee was granted

full authority at this meeting, bounded by certain guidelines, to determine candidates. According to the rules and resolutions of our party assembly, no party organ other than the Central Executive Committee has authority in this area.

The Central Executive Committee will hold its first meeting following its election on 24 March 1980 and will consider the matter of candidates. In view of this, the question of the conclusion of an agreement among the DHP, CTP and HP on the matter of a common candidate for Girne is contrary to fact. We would call this to the attention of the public and our membership with all due respect.

#### The CTP's Disclosure

According to an article appearing in the press on Monday 24 March 1980 attributed to the ASIA NEWS AGENCY the DHP, CTP and HP are presenting a common candidate for the office of mayor in Girne in the local elections to be held in June and have signed a protocol to this effect.

The CTP, which believes that it is necessary and useful for the opposition parties to collaborate in resistance to the UBP, which harbors fascist elements, informs the public that the report of a DHP-CTP-HP protocol is contrary to fact.

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CSO: 4907

## NUP PARTY ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 25 Mar 80 p 2

[Text] The results of the Party Assembly election held in the National Unity Party's Third Party Congress were officially disclosed by the party council under the leadership of Orhan Zihni Bilgehan following the count which lasted until yesterday morning and which was observed by a large party gathering.

In accordance with the new party regulations approved in the congress, 18 candidates from Lefkosa, 16 from Magosa and 6 from Girne gained membership in the party assembly.

Thus the UDP [NUP] Party Assembly consists of the following persons: Suha Turkoz, Mustafa Beton, Ulku Cabacaba, Guner Necat, Gulin Hasan Nihat, Ozkul Ozyigit, Cemal Kilic, Tokay Hasan, Ozer Asim, Hasan Ozav, Seval Bayramoglu, Zihni Gulpinar, Omer Bestas, Fuat Sonuc, Tulin Berova, Mehmetali Ulucengil, Izzet Komboe, Fevzi Beyar, Naci Elmas, Ali Babaliki, Naim Komutan, Mustafa Karpazli, Mustafa Ziba, Zihni Bilgehan, Altunay Fahri, Durdu Ozer, Asaf Senturk, Fasih Seyitoglu, Huseyin Duba, Necati Erozan, Salim Huseyin, Aytac Besesler, Ali Murat, Hasan Sait, Sait Guven, Macit Hakkı Yusuf, Altan Imamzade, Ibrahim Clinton, Ilker Ertemel, Ahmet Kanak.

## Meeting on Saturday

Furthermore, according to the announcement by the NUP, the NUP Party Assembly, consisting of the NUP members of parliament and ministers, three district chairmen, the NUP mayors, the NUP women's organization and youth organization chairmen and 40 members elected by the congress will meet at the invitation of the chairman general of the assembly on 29 March 1980 at the party's central headquarters in order to elect the secretary general of the party and members of the Central Executive Committee.

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CSO: 4907

## DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S PARTY HOLDS FIRST CONGRESS

Nicosia OLAY in Turkish 24 Mar 80 pp 5-7

[Text] The first congress of the Democratic People's Party was held in the Zafer movie theater in Lefkosa on 16 March, 2 weeks following the adjournment of the party district committee in Gazi Magusa, Lefkosa and Guzelyurt, and Nejat Konuk was once again elected chairman general.

Following the formal opening by Secretary General Ismet Kotak and the presentation of the agenda, the national anthem was played and a 2-minute period of silence was observed in honor of Ataturk and for all who fell in battle. The congress unanimously approved the proposed list of council members, electing Ahmet Yusuf Atamsoy and Feridun Adahan to the chairmanship and Celal Bayar, Talat Refiker, Adnan Isiman and Erol Bayram to the secretariat.

In a subsequent speech, Chairman General Nejat Konuk disclosed solutions to national problems and the party's position and conduct. Konuk said that "a total struggle" would be waged "to establish democracy" and that "partisan pressures would be resisted."

Ozan Orek dwelt generally on the subject of foreign affairs and explained the party's views with regard to Cyprus' relations with Turkey and with other nations in the world. Orek said that there was an understanding between Denktas and Kiprinou, that there was an agreement regarding the existence of the TFSC and stated that the UBP government was following an inconsistent policy whose limits were undefined. Orek expressed the hope that the Palestinian people would achieve their own state and said that the Soviet Union should withdraw immediately from Afghanistan and that pressure should not be exercised upon that country from abroad. Orek congratulated the people of Zimbabwe Rhodesia for having achieved peace in their country.

The secretary general read the activities report of the Central Executive Committee and Ozan Ali followed with a financial report. The congress unanimously approved both reports.



Following amendments to the rules, Lefkosa Deputy Najat Konuk, who had been presented as candidate with the joint signatures of the DHP parliamentary contingent and the district chairmen, was elected to the chairmanship general by a unanimous vote. Konuk came to the microphone, thanked the delegates and then proposed a resolution granting full authority to Osman Orek to represent the party in matters of external relations. This resolution was voted unanimously. According to disclosures which were made, Osman Orek would be participating in a meeting concerning the Cyprus issue due to be convened in Vienna during the month of April and would represent the Democratic People's Party at that meeting.

With respect to elections to the Party Assembly, 19 persons were elected from Lefkosa, 15 from Gazi Magusa and 6 from Girne. Ex-officio members of the Party Assembly will be Najat Konuk, chairman general and members of parliament Osman Orek, Ismet Kotak, Erol Andac and Feridun Adahan. Moreover, district party chairmen Salih Boyaci, Ali Yilmaz, Bulent Kelesoglu and Talat Refiker will also be assembly members. The chairman of the party youth organization, Feridun Adnan Isiman, will also participate directly in the assembly.

The elected members of the Party Assembly are as follows: From Lefkosa--Guner Cakin, Guzey Semsettin, Hasan Karsili, Ahmet Cemal Gazioglu, Hasan Erdil, Mustafa Yildirim, Esmen Ali, Ezel Akturel, Mehmet Senol, Ersel Taccaroglu, Ahmet Yusuf Atamsoy, Erol Bayram, Besim Adil Aroglu, Vedat Huseyin, Ahmet Sadik, Zuhtu Sayar, Ahmet Hasip, Merih Evrim, Mehmet Odabasi; from Gazi Magusa--Erdal Izzet Oncu, Dr Savas Ozyigit, Mehmet Dolek, Ahmet Yorgancioglu, Cemil Celebi, Kenan Inatci, Musa Cil, Mehmet Kizilkaya, Cemal Hudaverdi, Omet Demir, Ahmet Doguoz, Mahmut Cerkez, Ahmet Kusadali, Alpaz Montes, Mehmet Sukru Gunes, Huseyin Tanisik, and Aygun Salih.

Members of the Supreme Disciplinary Board are: Celal Bayar, chairman, and members Ahmet Akpinar, Ahmet Tansel, Raif Ahmet, Servet Alkurt, Omer Mehmet Cetinel, Ramazan Uzunkaya, Kemal Mut, Zeki Toprakci, Celal Mahmutoglu, Ahmet Zahteroglu, Dr Saydam Ahmet, Huseyin Kaya, and Ahmet Murat.

Members of the Supreme Control Board are: Fahrj Tunalier, Ergin A. Ulunay, Ahmet Unsal, Mehmet Tatar, Mehmet Salik Dogu, and Abdurrahman Demirtas.

#### Official Organs

The DHP Party Assembly met within the week and worked out the classification of duties.

The Party Assembly unanimously reelected the member of parliament from Gazi Magusa, Ismet Kotak, to the post of secretary general.

Members of the Central Executive Committee are: Erol Andac, Ahmet Yusuf Atamsoy, Feridun Adahan, Erdal Izzet Oncu, Dr Savas Ozturk, Aydemir Erdogan, Hasan Erdil, Ahmet Cemal Gazioglu, Aygun Salih Doratli, Mahmut Cerkez and Guner Cakin. Administrative Officer Erol Bayram was elected member of the Central Executive Committee, for life.

## EQUAL EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN URGED

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 18-24 Aug 80 p 27

[Text] A senior Government official has urged Cypriot women to become "more militant" in demanding equality with men in all walks of life, especially at work.

Mr Mikis Sparsis, Director-General of the Ministry of Labour, told a seminar in Nicosia that women in Cyprus formed only 30 percent of the workforce, and that most of them accept lower pay than men "without much protest or grumbling."

Mr Sparsis, who has held the key post at the Ministry of Labour for the past 20 years, told the seminar that he wanted to see women getting involved more in organisations such as Trade Unions which determine their position and role in society and at work.

"And also let me say this--I would like to see greater militancy and sacrifices on the part of women in order to acquire and make full use of their rightful position at the place of work and in society in general, of which they are an equal and inseparable part with men," he added.

## Low Wages

Mr Sparsis said according to a study just completed by the Ministry, women in Cyprus work mainly in agriculture and the clothing industry--fields where the wages are low. Women should seek jobs with higher remuneration, he said.

Releasing figures of the survey for the first time, Mr Sparsis said 51 percent of the workforce in agriculture were women.

"But in managerial or administration positions the ratio is: 94 percent men and only 6 percent women," he told his audience.

Mr Sparsis said that the public service, banks and hotels, the principle of equal pay for equal work was in force.

### 'Astonishing'

"But in almost all other fields of employment, women receive lower pay than men. And what is astonishing--or perhaps not--the majority of women accept this situation without any protest or complaint."

Mr Sparsis said one fifth of Cypriot women were without work, for one reason or another.

The survey suggested that there should be more employment opportunities for women and that the gap between men's and women's pay should be reduced.

But Mr Sparsis stressed that it was up to the women themselves to seek better employment by getting the necessary training for the jobs that are in greater demand by the island's economy at present.

He mentioned some examples to illustrate the problems at hand. He said there are now about 4,000 pupils attending Technical Schools--but of these only 213 are girls, representing 5.3 percent of the total.

### Tradition

And there are only 82 girls taking part in apprenticeship schemes which are being attended by 1,350 people.

"These figures show that Cypriot women shun professions which are in demand in the labour market and follow traditional branches of training, thus condemning themselves to unemployment," Mr Sparsis said.

So apart from any social prejudices against women regarding their work, the women themselves carried some of the blame, he believed.

Mr Sparsis said that in fact, the level of women's participation in the workforce (30 percent) compared well with other countries. It was almost as high as in some of the most advanced European countries, whereas in Greece women's participation was 28 percent, in Italy 28.6 percent and in Ireland 26 percent.

"There is no doubt therefore that Cypriot working women have been able, gradually but steadily, to break the barrier of prejudice and traditional thinking about the role of woman at work, and to assume an important role in many fields of economic activity.

### Nurseries

"But there are great margins for further improvement, and also serious obstacles that have got to be overcome," he added.

Mr Sparris outlined the Ministry's efforts to encourage women to join the workforce--through the operation of state nurseries and the expansion of private and community nurseries. He said some 46 percent of unemployed women had expressed a willingness to work under certain conditions, one of which was the existence of a nursery near their homes or place of work.

The seminar was organised by the Pancyprian Federation of Women's Organisations (Pogo) to discuss the role of the Cypriot woman in the fifth year of the "UN Decade for Women."

The Minister of Justice Mr Petros Michaelides (the seminar was held under his auspices) said the position of women in Cyprus was legally protected through the ratification of a number of international conventions and by the Constitution itself.

#### Conclusions

The seminar was also addressed by the Minister of Education Dr Chrysostomos Sofianos and the former Minister of Justice Mrs Stella Soulioti, the only woman in Cyprus to have held such a public office.

Mrs Soulioti, a lawyer by profession, welcomed the "mobilisation of public opinion" about the role of women and the "need for change" which, she said, was now recognised by both men and women.

She said this world campaign had offered an opportunity to women to undergo "self-criticism" and draw certain important conclusions.

She remarked: "There are difficulties which emanate from ourselves and from ages of tradition which have become for us a second nature.

"For example, the working mother is split between her loyalty to the children and her career, something which creates in her a guilt complex.

"This dilemma is a factor which makes women reluctant to take part in politics; it is only natural for the mother in politics to think that her work is stealing time from her family." Mrs Soulioti said education and mental readjustment were needed to overcome these difficulties--and such targets could not be achieved overnight but required time and patience.

CSO: 4920

## MOTORCYCLE, MOPED SALES INCREASE DUE TO GAS PRICES

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 18-24 Apr 80 p 1

[Text] The recent petrol price increases have given a dramatic boost to the sales of motorcycles and mopeds in Cyprus.

As people search for economical ways of travelling to work, the sales of these machines have increased tenfold. More motorcycles and mopeds are being sold now in one month than for the whole of 1978.

"We get about 200 applications a day for registration of motorcycles and mopeds, something we cannot really cope with," said an official at the Motor Car Registry Office in Nicosia.

## Registrations

He told THE CYPRUS WEEKLY: "At the present rate, we register about 2,500 a month. The figure will easily reach 3,000 with the coming of summer weather."

As he spoke, one dealer came up to his office with a list of 66 applications for registration.

The total number of new motorcycles and mopeds registered during the whole of 1978 stood at only 2,100.

The sales began to rise about a year ago when the first petrol price increase was announced. Many dealers then ran out of stock. Soon, new makes began to flood the Cyprus market. Then petrol prices went up twice last month.

## Petrol

Most of the motorcycles now come from Japan, Italy, France, and other European countries. People use them mainly for driving around in the towns.



And whereas petrol consumption for an average car ranges from 20-30 miles a gallon, a 90 cc moped can do up to 130 mpg.

The importer of a well-known Japanese model said some of their motorcycles could do up to 150 miles per gallon.

They cost around 350 pounds sterling while the smaller mopeds sell for between 200-250 pounds sterling.

Cyprus had about 14,000 motorcycles and mopeds in circulation at the end of 1978. Another 5,600 new machines were registered last year.

At the end of 1979, there were a total of 133,500 motor vehicles in circulation on the island.

They included just over 83,000 private cars, 12,480 motorcycles, 7,000 mopeds, 20,000 goods vehicles, 4,800 tractors, 1,300 taxis, 1,700 self-drive cars and 1,500 buses.

The sales of big saloon cars has dropped considerably in recent weeks, not only because of the increase in the price of petrol, but also as a result of the high rise in taxes.

CSO: 4920

## JORGENSEN FACES PARTY REVOLT OVER HANDLING OF ECONOMY

## Circle of Advisers Formed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Mar 80 p 5

[Article: "Anker J. Has Hard Core of Advisers"]

[Text] Anker Jorgensen has now revived the old Social Democratic tradition of a circle of close advisers around the premier. Unrest in the government and in the Social Democrats in the Folketing since the October election has brought upon the premier such serious internal crises in the party that on the advice of Folketing group chairman Knud Heinesen he has decided to surround himself with special advisers.

The new circle of advisers will consist of Svend Jakobsen, minister of finance, Group Chairman Heinesen, Political Chairman Ole Jespersen, and Economy Minister Ivar Norgaard. It is for this council that the most important decisions will be made during coming weeks before they are passed on to the government and the Folketing group. Group Chairman Knud Heinesen has thereby become a new power among the Social Democrats.

## Economic Measures for Spring With Two Savings Packages

The government's eight-man Savings Committee, chaired by Knud Heinesen, decided yesterday that the government's spring measures are to be presented in two packages. The first package, to be implemented at once, will be savings for fiscal year 1980, an employment plan, and some taxation proposals. The second package will consist of long-range savings amounting to increasing billions for the next 3 years. There have been hectic discussions in recent days in the government on how political problems of a [tax] deductions reform and negotiations on defense were to be resolved, and it is possible that both problems will be put off until fall. This means that changes in the people's pensions and the introduction of a social income concept must also be put off. It can also be expected that the premier will attempt to contact a number of parties before the government's short-range plans for 1980 are presented, especially as concerns the employment plan and economic policy, and that a new round of hearings with the [trade union] organizations will be called for.

## Inadequate Socialist Policy

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Mar 80 p 9

[Article: "A Party in the Abyss"]

[Text] There are unmistakable signs that the Social Democrats are not now nor will be able to formulate a policy that will help Denmark out of its serious economic situation:

1. According to the government's own calculations, the steps taken in December alone reduced [sic] the balance of payments deficit from about 60 to about 49 billion for the 1980-1983 period. (Source: the budget departments brochure No 10, and note of 20 December 1979.)

After the recent energy price increases and in view of the prospects of the international economy a continuing deficit in the balance of payments of over 75 billion kroner must be calculated with during the 1980-1983 period.

2. In December 1979 that party, on the basis of distribution considerations, changed the proposed income policy, which, according to the government's own calculations, will result in 15,000 more unemployed persons in 1983. (Source: the budget department's note of 20 December 1979.) In addition, high wage increases are being granted in the private sector--supported by Social Democratic Trade Union chairmen, while the government looks on passively--which will further worsen unemployment.

3. In the debate on economies only Knud Heinesen and Svend Jakobsen have advocated putting a stop to the growth in the public sector. Henning Rasmussen has announced a goal for savings of 7 billion kroner in 1981, and others have mentioned savings goals of 5, 10, and 15 billion for the years 1981-1983. In the face of a deficit of 17 to 18 billion in the balance of payments in 1980, rising to over 23 billion in 1983, this is quite inadequate, even if at the same time an increase in the value added tax of, for example, 25 percent, is undertaken or energy charges increased correspondingly.

4. While the government wishes to save on public financing, plans for increasing employment and other things will be carried forward. Thus, side by side with the savings efforts, public activity is to be expanded. Calculations on the financial effect--undertaken by government economists--show constantly increasing employment in the public sector consequent upon the overall financial policy. This policy creates a shortage of labor, reduces the opportunities of business and industry, and aggravates the structural tendencies toward balance of payments deficits. (Source: the budget department's brochure No 3.)

5. The government has destroyed the chances of a reasonable dialogue with business and industry. It has worsened taxation and depreciation opportunities, proposed reduction of the right of business to make dispositions,

and gradual reduction of the property rights of capital owners (OeD) [expansion unknown].

6. Proposals dealing primarily with distribution [of wealth], first and foremost the change in taxation of wealth, and the idea of prompt legislation concerning de-escalation of interest deduction, have created much uncertainty in the matter of a number of business and industry dispositions, including the housing industry. The Social Democrats have had the main responsibility for ruling Denmark during the postwar years. The party has not had a majority in Parliament, but its policy has been carried out in area after area. It has been spoken of as the party of the great expensive reforms. That time is past. Denmark is on its way toward the so-called economic abyss. It can be asserted, in fact, that today we find ourselves in the abyss. For it is not at all relevant that we can borrow much more and for a longer period. For we have borrowed so much that we are about to die a slow death from interest. The large interest payments make it difficult to do away with the balance of payments deficit. But this being unsuccessful, interest payments and the balance of payments deficit becomes even larger. In addition, the domestic interest level of 20 percent produces strangling effects in the economy. Points 1 to 6, reasonably documented, show that the Social Democrats neither can nor will carry on more income policy, etc., than they have done. On the contrary, it is plain that the goal of full employment has been abandoned. Neither against this background are they able to comprehend the extent of the task of financial policy.

Even though history never quite repeats itself the situation today is reminiscent of conditions of about 650 years ago. At that time the costly wars of Erik Menved and Christoffer II brought the country to the edge of bankruptcy, and it was pawned to the lords of Holstein and Germany. Today it is exaggerated, expensive reforms, Social Democratic wastefulness, too great wage increases over a long period of time, and the fiasco of Social Democratic governments vis-a-vis business and industry that have lead to rather unlikely borrowing for so small a country, without raw materials and any domestic energy production of importance.

The situation is still not irreparable. But much indicates that the Social Democrats cannot repair it. Large sectors of this party--the so-called left wing--have either not realized the seriousness of the situation, or for ideological reasons they wish to use remedies that would only make everything even worse.

The ideologists have taken over the Social Democrats. In the voters' clubs and at Christiansborg, the social democracy of Stauning, Buhl, H. C. Hansen, Hedtoft, and Viggo Kampmann no longer exists. In any case, the party would have had difficulties because there is no longer anything to take from the few to give to the many. The old Social Democrats also had a certain ability to adjust according to the nature of the problems. The pragmatic party has been replaced by an ideological SF-like core that sends out signals to the right and to the left and uses most of its energy for internal strife.

A crisis of leadership is also spoken of. From the point of view of social economy it must be asserted that the present Social Democratic leaders--Anker Jorgensen, Knud Heinesen, Ivar Norgaard, Erling Jensen, Svend Jakobsen, Kjeld Olesen, and others--bear the main responsibility for the economic detour now visible. It is true in any case that former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen--budget minister from September to December, 1973, finance minister from February 1975 to November 1979, and next chairman of the Social Democratic Folketing group--bear considerable joint responsibility for all decisions--or lack of them--that could have stopped developments in time. If Heinesen has greater insight into economic conditions than Jorgensen has, is his moral responsibility not then greater?

Now the Social Democrats have chosen to exclude the possibility of Denmark to a greater degree being able to produce itself out of the difficulties. We are to choose the most painful way and tax and save ourselves out of them, while at the same time high wage increases make the whole thing more bleak. But the chosen way neither can nor will one really take. For, as mentioned, it will not suffice to put a brake on growth in the public sector and increase some taxes. Nevertheless this is what the Social Democrats can at most decide upon.

Many people live off the Social Democrats or hope to do so. In government, in municipalities, and in the provincial governments, as well as in the trade unions, the party's strong role has provided employment for many of its adherents. Naturally, many of these people act rationally, trying to protect their own immediate interests. Some of them perhaps think the most important question is perhaps whether the party can stick together--let what may happen to the country.

As mentioned, perhaps Denmark has for some time been in the so-called abyss, but our problems are not insoluble if the country only had a proper leadership. It would have been easier only a few years ago to find a solution, and it is now becoming more difficult almost every month that passes. In reality it is a question whether it was the Social Democrats who some time ago fell into the abyss and now attempt to draw Denmark and all of us into it to save their own skins.

Jorgensen: Would Step Down

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Mar 80 p 12

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen: "Political Mobbing and Crisis of Discipline"]

[Text] The government and the Social Democratic Folketing group keep up with the times. Both have modern problems in a special edition: mobbing and a crisis of discipline.

It is not petty internal quarrels about the political line or the usual trouble between fellow party members that at this time make chaos in the government party spread to general political chaos, for which the premier



assumes part of the guilt. Intrigues, power struggles, and undermining efforts plague the party, bringing with them rumors of change in the leadership. Ministerial cabals are working in the "court" of the premier and sharp public settlements of accounts occur among the members of the Folketing group.

Only after 4 months does Anker Jorgensen now seem to react to the dissolution tendencies by banning the public quarrels among the ministers and attempting to re-introduce the "stocks" method. If the premier is unsuccessful in combating the mobbing and the crisis of discipline he has himself predicted that the result may be an election in the spring.

#### General Jorgensen

To a great extent the "privates" took the "general" at his word when the premier in October called for an election campaign against the bourgeoisie and demanded a strong social democratic party in close cooperation with the people. However, "the general" did not subsequently devote time to tell the survivors the difference between fighting and peace in the Folketing and of the danger of lacking loyalty to the leadership. Instead, after the successful election campaign, he changed his profile from the people-loving Anker to the isolated and apparently arrogant Jorgensen, who let himself be affected by chance moods among his fellow group members or made decisions over the heads of all.

During the few months that have passed since the election, dissatisfaction has increased over decisions having been made entirely by the premier alone. And the premier has now made it clear to his Folketing group and his government that the party must resign as the governing party and try to recover in opposition if the crisis of discipline continues. For himself the turning point was a long conversation with his closest adviser, Group Chairman Knud Heinesen, last Sunday. Since that time the public squabbles among the ministers have stopped, a close staff of counselors around the premier has been set up, and legislative work has been systematized in hours-long meetings of the ministers. Within a short time the savings plan will reach the Folketing group, and then the stocks method will be tested there.

#### The Special Class

Ever since October the government has had a "special class" of bitter ministers who either could not keep up with the premier's political oscillations or had to accept reprimands and disavowals. The SV government made very long political attempts, but existence of the special class has made them almost as long for the Social Democratic minority government. In the class sit now Tax Minister Karl Hjortnaes, with a tainting Tax case and a reprimand from the premier for criticism of the National Bank director; Housing Minister Erling Olsen, with a reprimand for public criticism of the tax minister's one-day agreement on the interest deduction; Energy Minister Poul Nielson, who in a few seconds was instructed about a political about-face in his field of work; Agriculture Minister Poul Dalsager, who

had a special tax in his field put over on him; Industry Minister Erling Jensen, who, with his political profile, is hunting for new fields of work; Labor Minister Svend Auken, who got busy abandoning a security reform rejected by the LO; Defense Minister Poul Sogaard, who had a NATO missile ploy rejected and later changed the plans for the defense negotiations; and finally Social Minister Ritt Bjerregaard, who had a pregnancy law proposal rejected.

#### The Coffee Clubs

Most internal problems of the Social Democratic Folketing group can be traced back to the government. How the individual ministers look for "basic groups" for their viewpoints can be mapped.

Social Minister Ritt Bjerregaard's coffee club, for example, supplemented by some new members, asserts itself strongly in the field referred to as mobbing of government colleagues and fellow group members. The Frederiksborg troika, consisting of Inge Fischer Moller, Jytte Hilden, and Majken Hessner, have been leaders in settlement of quarrels about shaping of savings in social affairs and defense policy. The three are supplemented by other "intermediaries," such as Jimmy Stahr, Erik B. Smith, Magnus Demnitz, Jytte Andersen, Lissa Mathiasen, and Soren Norgaard Sorensen. The success of the new left wing in the Folketing group with both great and small initiatives has made the members more faithful to authority ponder whether they could survive in the struggle for personal votes by remaining loyal and let others have the honor of changed decisions. Now they have decided on a counterattack.

#### The Problem Crusher

Partition of classes or removal of some disturbing elements is used in school against mobbing and disciplinary cirses. The former the premier can attain only in an election, the latter through reshaping of his government. But the quarreling has now gone on for so long a time that only the threat of an election, as in December, can weld the party together effectively again.

During the more than 4 months since the election the mobbing in the Social Democratic Party has eroded the picture of the premier as the effective "problem smasher," who with his party at his back was able to win contests with both the LO chairman and the opposition in the Folketing. The premier who, as the opposition put it, tried to walk on water in the flush of victory, is about to have to learn to swim instead. An opposition politician expressed it more plainly: "Now it is a matter of shutting up and seeing if the government does not overturn itself!"

## Jorgensen Should Confer More

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Mar 80 p 9

[Editorial: "He Does it Again"]

[Text] The premier will do what he usually does. This does seem not promising. On the contrary, it will make everything worse. He obviously thinks, as does Chief Physician Sven Heinild, that it is a blotch on Danish democracy that everybody does not show solidarity with the government. It is a question, however, whether it is not Anker Jorgensen who blotches democracy, not out of ill will, but simply because he does not understand the political situation.

The premier whipped his government together. He did it without looking either to the right or to the left. He did it without negotiating with anybody about the conditions his minority was to survive on. This was a hot-headed act in view of the invitation to negotiations directed to him by others.

Thereupon the premier had his government prepare the crisis legislation that was presented to the Folketing in December. He negotiated with nobody about what it should contain, and he obviously gave no consideration at all to who would or could join in effecting the necessary legislation. He preferred so-called free negotiation, with the result that he stumbled on the way and only with great turmoil had legislation adopted that was not the right one.

And now the premier wishes to do it again. Anker Jorgensen urges his followers to keep silent, and he will not speak with others. Cautious hints that somebody might wish to talk are rejected, accompanied by a remark to the effect that this is a dying idea. Anker Jorgensen will again let his government prepare a number of proposals to be presented to the Folketing. Then we shall see who will go along with what, thinks the premier. He will not negotiate with anybody in advance, nor will he this time offer a moment in consideration of who will go along with giving him the majority he needs.

Such a premier cannot simply count on a majority supporting him, for they do not know what he wants, and on the day they know it may be too late. It will be too late because the government has committed itself to much that a majority perhaps would not go along with. And it is a democratic right to have an opinion different from that of a government.

About the policy of savings required it is known that it will not have the support of the socialist parties. The majority to be created must come from the non-socialist parties. It would therefore be wise if the premier spoke with them in advance. Talking together is a good democratic custom. But this Anker Jorgensen does not wish to do.

## NEW BIOGRAPHY OF PRIME MINISTER JORGENSEN PUBLISHED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Mar 80 p 12

[Article by Tage Taaning: "Anker Jorgensen; Hans Lyngby Jepsen's Conversations with the Prime Minister during Critical Periods for Society and the Social Democratic Party]

[Text] Hans Lyngby Jepsen: "Anker Jorgensen. Menneske og politiker, (Man and Politics)". 100 pages. 36 kroner. Berlingske Forlag. Court poets are a historical reality--writers who praise the rulers. In present times, both dictators and the top people in the democracies have had their biographers and singers-of-praises during their lifetimes. Up until now, there has not been much in the way of that sort of literature in this country, but now Lyngby Jepsen seems to be taking aim at the position of "poet laureate" for the governing Social Democratic Party. He has already written a well-received biography of Stauning, who also had his career described, during his lifetime, by Johannes Lehmann, in "Fra bydreng til statsminister (From Messenger Boy to Prime Minister)." Anker Jorgensen has had a similar career, but Lyngby Jepsen has preferred another kind of emphasis, pointing first at the man and then at the politician. The attractive book with its many illustrations can also be divided into four parts, as follows: eulogy, narrative, life work and description of circumstances.

The main part of the book is written in the form of interviews, and approximately half of it was previously published in the BILLED-BLADET in interview form, but the parts which were added later carry a sharper political and current-interest emphasis. Only in the introductory chapter does the author himself undertake to present Anker Jorgensen from the subjective point of view. Stress is placed on his steady, reliable, confidence-inspiring and honest nature and character. The writer comes close to making him an honest man among rogues--an idealization which has turned out to be dangerous for Danish politicians in the past. Thereafter, Anker Jorgensen himself brings things into better balance with his matter-of-fact answers to questions.

The principal lines his views follow are well known from other documentary material, but there also are several details which one either reads with pleasure, but with shifting sympathy, or simply as political history. The anecdotal now and then has to serve as an indication of deeper insight.



Naturally, critical times are especially interesting, as are climactic political events and internal disputes within the party and his personal relationship with OL [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] chairman Thomas Nielsen, with respect to whom he denies the existence of any sort of personal enmity. One even realizes that they have a two-man coffee-drinking club. However, Lyngby Jepsen suggests that one cannot overlook class differentiation on the job as the background for certain attitudes. Perhaps he is alluding there to the traditional relationship between the skilled and the unskilled--in other words, let every man ride in his own type of conveyance. But Anker went past Thomas to get to the top of the political left.

It is remarkable that the gifted young man from Christians-havn who was able to acquire good skills early in life still retains the political catechism of youthful years and the propagandist's terminology in his memory today. But in reality he has abandoned the idea of the millennium, "for we will never reach it, but we must never lose our sense of direction and our feeling for what we will fight for--and against--" he says. The welfare state is not relinquished, but he says that he has the courage to accept defeat, too (OD? [economic democracy]). In that connection, his belief in socialization is worth noting: "I believe that, in the central areas of economic life, a socialization of central portions of the economy--not just with socialized government but also with socialized ownership--will be a good thing," Jorgensen says.

Like everybody else at the top, Anker Jorgensen has felt loneliness. The ultimate responsibility is certainly his, and his associates certainly let him take the responsibility in difficult times. On the other hand, he will review the ranks now and make sure that the troops have the correct, reserved party attitude.

Lyngby Jepsen gives him a good character, but he asks whether Anker Jorgensen "will be remembered as the politician who stood at the helm of the government during the seriously critical times in the middle of the second half of the twentieth century, almost on the threshold of the year 2,000, and who lived to see thoughts which formerly had constituted the accepted views be swept aside as worthless and the welfare state capsize in an atmosphere of universal selfishness?" It is the answer to questions of that kind which we will be looking for during the 1980's.

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## DEFENSE MINISTRY REPORT SHOWS DROP IN DRAFTEE PHYSICAL SHAPE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Mar 80 p 7

[Text] Seventy percent of all recruits for the defense forces cannot pass the initial physical test: running 2,400 meters in 12 minutes. Their physical standards are not satisfactory until they have had 3 or 4 months of training. That was the discouraging report Defense Minister Poul Sogaard had to give to the Defense Committee of the Folketing during a consultation yesterday. And, moreover, he also had to admit that the initial test was made less demanding in 1979 than it had been in previous years.

"That means that older commanding officers who are on the point of retiring can outrun the young people," the Conservative member of the committee, Keld Andersen, commented. He had asked whether the Defense Ministry was satisfied with the draftees' physical condition.

"For the Defense Ministry, it is entirely indefensible that, on the one hand, we have to work with a very short period of compulsory military service, and that, on the other hand, we have to allow for the fact that months will pass before the soldiers can function as they are supposed to, and that a lot of time will have to be spent in training them up to the point where they can so function," Andersen said.

"We can see here the penalty we are making the Defense Ministry pay for the primary-school compromise, which allotted a number of hours to gymnastics and sport that was much too small. Just at the present time, when everybody is living more comfortably and the young people use mopeds instead of their muscles very early in life, the standing of gymnastics and sport should have been strengthened, instead," he said. The consultation was connected with the reading of the compulsory military service bill in the Folketing, and Keld Andersen announced the beginning of an effort to alter the rules regarding the right of previously convicted individuals to volunteer for military service. During the last 10 years, people who had been sentenced to less than 5 months in prison could apply. With the great softening down of the regulations concerning those convicted of assault, Keld Andersen is afraid that the defense forces will get an influx of undesirable elements. Therefore he wants a limit of 2 to 3 months of imprisonment set.

## HOME GUARD RESEARCHER PREDICTS EFFECTS OF ZERO GROWTH BUDGET

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Mar 80 p 10

[Article by Ole Koefoed, a graduate in political science and second in command of the Home Guard's Student Company: "Results of a Zero-Growth Solution for the Home Guard in eastern Denmark"]

[Text] I would like to thank Jorgen Rojel for the nice words about the Home Guard in his 15 March article, "Never Again a 9 April", but I have to give Jorgen Rojel the sad news that there unfortunately is nothing to support his optimistic views.

The people in the Home Guard are, indeed, leisure-time soldiers, and for that reason there quite naturally are narrow limits to the training they can undertake and the complexity of the weapons they can learn to operate and maintain. Clearly, such training cannot be comprehensive. Therefore, the weapons of the Home Guard are chiefly small arms and a certain number of simple but effective antitank weapons. On the other hand, the Home Guard's personnel strength is relatively large.

This is in contrast with a field army which is small in numbers but has extensive training and fairly modern weapons and equipment, although it still should be noted that where both the field army and the Home Guard are concerned a good deal of material would have to be procured before the standard could be declared satisfactory.

The differences between the Home Guard and the field army which are mentioned here would naturally lead to a division of labor in case of war, with the Home Guard performing a number of missions which require numbers of men, such as performing guard duty and general surveillance duties while the field army concentrated on actually fighting the attacking enemy. The field army's fight can be supported by the Home Guard in small and uncomplicated combat actions which can delay and hamper the enemy's advance, but the Home Guard can never hold up an enemy attack. A well-trained and well-equipped field army is needed for that. It can also be said that the Home Guard and the field army supplement each other, but one can never replace the other, and it is an illusion to maintain a home guard if one does not have a reasonably strong field army at one's disposal which can take care of the actual fighting.

The government's draft proposal regarding the future defense program--the so-called zero-growth solution--in spite of its name, implies a significant amount of cutting back of the air force, the navy and the field army. Where the army is concerned, the cutting back hits Sjaelland exclusively, for the strength will be cut in two there, and with the best will in the world the remaining half can only be characterized as a symbolic force, especially when one considers that the air and naval defense of the island are being weakened at the same time.

Thus, they have actually abandoned the idea of defending Sjaelland, and it would therefore have been a logical result if the government, simultaneously with its draft proposal for the new defense program, had proposed that the Home Guard should be abolished on Sjaelland, Lolland-Falster and Mon. The reason that did not happen, naturally, is that they want to make the population believe that they always have a defense force, and so they expect that the Home Guard people, who have swallowed so much that was indigestible during the course of the years, will also proceed to munch on this, too. Time will tell whether they are calculating correctly.

I am sorry to have to say this, Jorgen Rojel, but you would do well to get ready for another 9 April where eastern Denmark is concerned, at any rate.

9266

CSO: 3106

## GREENLAND WEIGHS NATIVE HIRING PREFERENCE LAWS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Mar 80 p 7

[Article: "Landsting To Decide Greenlanders' Preference for New Jobs"]

[Text] Greenland's Landsting [Parliament] will at its recently opened spring session decide whether Greenlanders are to be given preference to jobs in a number of categories of work. In a new proposal to the Landsting it is stated that employers in Greenland are obliged to hire new personnel primarily among Greenlanders. If the employer is unable to find qualified Greenlanders he must apply to the local labor office for permission to hire others than Greenlanders. The authorities can then either issue the permit or assign Greenland workers, if they are to be found. At first, the proposal affects unskilled workers, the HK [expansion unknown], craftsmen, and pedagogues.

Last fall the Landsting debated a similar proposal, which was put off. The previous proposal also contained a regulation to the effect that non-native workers had to apply for special work permits, but this was omitted because it was considered unnecessary. The proposal was submitted by Lars Emil Johansen, the Landstyre member for business and industry. Viggo Svendsen, chief of office in the Greenland Ministry, says the Landsting has the necessary competence to adopt the proposal, and that it does not violate paragraph 74 of the Constitution concerning free and equal admission to callings. According to the chief of office the reason why the proposal was advanced was that during the next 15 years the number of job seekers in Greenland is expected to rise by 15 percent, to 26,000 persons. At the same time, no significant expansion of the public sector can be expected, so that the extra jobs will have to be found in a modest private sector.

Poul Schluter, chairman of the Conservative group, characterizes the proposal as a "great provocation," with plain political overtones. He warns the Landsting against passing it because it would serve to isolate Greenland, which would not be in the interest of either Greenland or Denmark.

"The proposal would be a step in the direction of dissolution of the union between Denmark and Greenland," says Poul Schlure, "for it cannot be the intention of the union that some citizens should have to seek permission from the authorities to work within its borders. This would be as if people of Jutland had to seek permission to work on Bornholm."

If passed, the proposal would enter into force at the beginning of 1981. It will not affect Danes now working in Greenland.

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CSO: 3106



## GREENLAND PARLIAMENT ADOPTS ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Mar 80 p 6

[Article: Greenland Wishes to Save on Dramatic Oil Bill]

[Text] Greenland's Landestyre has decided during it's spring session to implement an energy conservation campaign. Experience of additional insulation added to public buildings in Greenland has shown that energy consumption can be cut by one-fourth. Because of the climate, energy consumption is very high in Greenland, and since it rests almost exclusively on oil, expenses have risen dramatically, from 29 billion kroner in 1970 to over 300 million kroner in 1979.

Almost 60 percent of the consumption goes toward space and water heating. The adopted energy conservation campaign will therefore be directed particularly to this field. Experience of the Greenland Technical Organization's additional insulation of public buildings has shown that energy savings of about 25 percent can be attained.

Savings of this size will be of great importance to families, because the typical heating bill for a family residence is between 9,000 and 12,000 kroner.

Planning the details of the campaign, which will include subsidies for insulation, will be done in the Landsting's Economic Planning Committee, but will also be based on thorough preparatory work in the Greenland Ministry. As the Landsting understands it, expenses are to be distributed among the state, the municipalities, and the Home Rule treasury.

11,256

CSO: 3106

## GREENLAND COOPERATION PARTY ISSUES URANIUM MINING STAND

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 10 Mar 80 p 10

[Article by Philip Lauritzen: "Siumut Says Stop to Uranium Mining"]

[Text] Nuuk, 9 March, After a debate of several months in the locale and some challenges to the party leadership, the board of directors of Siumut has now officially clarified its position on uranium mining in Greenland.

At a recent meeting the board decided unanimously that all uranium mining and uranium exploration should be stopped next summer, when the test extraction project at Kvanefjeld near Narsaaq is completed.

Since four of the five members of the Greenland Landestyre [government] are members of the party board of directors, among them Lars Emil Johansen, Landestyre member for business, industry, and resources, as well as Jonathan Møtzfeldt, chairman of the special Danish-Greenland Raw Materials Committee, the board's decision will also be that of Greenland's home rule.

One of the main points of view in Siumut's position is that the people of Greenland have been too poorly informed of the consequences of continued uranium mining.

More Information

The board of Siumut says in a declaration issued after the meeting that after next summer, time shall be used in "informing the public about the various sides of uranium mining in a more thorough and precise way than has theretofore been the case." Siumut proposes that an impartial group of Greenland and Danish authorities for the purpose of giving the public "truthful information on uranium extraction in other parts of the world, with particular reference to its effects on the environment, culture, and economy of the surrounding society." Whether uranium mining is to be carried on at all shall be decided in a referendum in Greenland, according to Siumut. Referring to the uncertainty surrounding

security and environmental problems at the present time, Siunut cannot now recommend uranium extraction.

#### Preparedness

Aside from uranium, Siunut has also decided that more information must be provided concerning resources research in general. Thus it proposes that Danish and Greenland authorities work out "a report, easily understood by the citizen, on existing preparedness technology in connection with test and extraction drilling for oil and gas in Arctic regions."

In addition, Siunut demands a report on the consequences of resources activities, biologically and as concerns the environment, whether oil, gas, or minerals are concerned. Siunut points in particular to the consequences of increasing shipping traffic in Arctic waters, referring to the plans of Canadian authorities for a supertanker route along the west coast of Greenland for the purpose of transporting liquid gas from Arctic Canada at first, and later probably oil.

With the decisions of the board of Siunut, several months of internal debate is at an end for the time being. Several locals have demanded an immediate stop, but the board has chosen to let the already decided upon test project under Riso's leadership be completed during the next few months.

No Danish reaction to Siunut's decision is as yet available.

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CSO: 3106

## PROFESSOR EGGERT PETERSEN, ENERGY EXPERT, PROFILED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Feb 80 p 17

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Text] "He suffers from the firm conviction that all of Denmark's problems can be solved if we just set up 6,000 twin-sized windmills, but he forgets to tell us where they should be placed."

"He has an opinion on everything and espouses some strange points of view."

Professor, Naval Commander, Doctor of Philosophy Eggert Petersen, (that is his title according to the Blue Book), is not being treated kindly by a number of Social Democrats following his brief, 2-week guest appearance in the Social Democratic group in Parliament, an appearance that did not go unnoticed, thanks to him.

Thursday last week he submitted an eight-page Social Democratic energy policy proposal, based among other things on thousands of large and small windmills, solar collectors on all homes, energy conservation measures, the greatest possible utilization of North Sea oil and natural gas, increased coal importation and the use of permanent sources of energy.

Many Social Democratic representatives in Parliament characterized the proposal as "pure nonsense." Whether the right wing of the Social Democratic Party considers the proposal important or not: the government, in any case, once more postponed the decision on nuclear energy in Denmark. This postponement immediately led Liberals and Conservatives to inquire about the energy supply situation.

Eggert Petersen, 52, made his appearance in the Social Democratic group in Parliament as the deputy for Minister Lise Ostergaard, who was traveling. He has earlier run in opposition to other Social Democrats. He ran as a Social Democratic candidate for the EEC Parliamentary Committee last June. He was not elected, but managed to define his critical view of the EEC during the entire election campaign. He calls himself an EEC skeptic.

Since 1977 he has been a Social Democratic candidate for Parliament from Hellerup district.

Eggert Petersen, the son of a Bovrup merchant, has been involved in public debate for a number of years, first through his military life in the navy, then as director of the National Association for Mental Hygiene, as director of the Mental Hygiene Research Institute, as sociology instructor, as advisor in the selection of issues for the International Association, as leader in the choice of Foreign Volunteers, as professor of labor psychology at Aarhus University, as self-appointed social critic and as left-wing Social Democratic politician.

As a 100-percent NATO supporter in the 1950's, lieutenant commander and graduate of psychology, Eggert Petersen at that time asserted that Danish defense should be considered as part of the NATO solidarity, that Danish defense could help maintain atomic balance, that Danish defense was a necessity to guard against local war, that Danish defense should be permitted to participate in the protection of other NATO countries and perform FRO military duties.

In 1959 Eggert Petersen received the Navy Lieutenant Society's bronze medal for his treatise entitled "The Retracted Defense," where he advocated that the last bastion in Denmark's defense was in the area surrounding Frederikshavn. Copenhagen should be declared an open city.

But Eggert Petersen's activities--which at that time did not create undivided joy among top naval officers--were many. Under his leadership, a number of psychologists developed a treatise on the discipline crisis in the navy.

In 1961 Eggert Petersen became naval commander and temporarily stepped out of active service. That is, he became director of the National Association for Mental Hygiene, and the lives of Danes were charted with the aid of analyses and good advice. In 1966 he made investigations for the Mental Hygiene Research Institute.

He suggested that Denmark withdraw from NATO and that the defense money be used to support an EEC force and foreign projects. NATO did not provide a high degree of security, but presented dangers, particularly in alliance with the United States, according to Eggert Petersen.

He also found time to become doctor of philosophy in 1968 with the dissertation "Sanctions and Well-Being in an Authoritarian-Led Social System." The purpose of the dissertation was to illuminate the criminality of the navy, and it was in that connection that he said he did not feel at ease in the military.

When Eggert Petersen defended his dissertation, he was finished politically in the Social Democratic Party, but, prior to that, he had been enamored with the left-wing parties. In 1974, however, he acknowledged: "It was



fashionable to run with the far left. I ran, too, and we realized only too late that the trousers did not fit."

That same year he had become the first professor of labor psychology in Danish history at Arhus University. A couple of years later, as central board member of the National Association for Mental Hygiene, he agreed to dissolve that association. "The association has lost favor; it has lost its reputation," he said at that time.

In 1976 the professor--who was characterized by some as the Social Democratic Party's chief ideologist, but that was then--told the government how to manage the economic situation in Denmark.

He called his advice "Crisis Plan 77," which was a 136-page book. And here he surrounded himself with windmills, a low degree of industrial technology, recycling measures and new wage arrangements.

This is what one review said about the crisis plan: "The basic model is the February-revolution's recipe for doing away with unemployment--let the unemployed dig a large hole in the ground outside Paris and then fill it in again."

#### Small Communities

The professor, in prosperity, stated a few months ago that the better the Danes have it, the less content they are.

"If we took energy seriously and demanded that each little community have its own biogas plant, its own windmill and if every citizen were motivated and made responsible for recycling by demanding that the refuse be sorted, that could give meaning to life and that is what we need," he said.

Privately, professor Eggert Petersen lives in an old, half-timbered farmhouse with a straw roof in Galten near Arhus. He has been married 25 years to Marianne Woldbye Petersen, and they have three daughters, the youngest of which, Camilla, 14 years of age, is the only one still living at home.

"But he surely does not intend to set up a giant windmill in Galten; that would cause trouble with the neighbors," was the way one Social Democrat said it yesterday.

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CSO: 8113/0887

## PROFESSOR LISE OSTERGAARD NAMED CULTURAL AFFAIRS MINISTER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Feb 80 p 1 (Part II)

[Article by Mogens Auning: "We Have a New Culture Minister"]

[Text] Professor Lise Ostergaard, Ph.D., Social Democratic Folketing candidate elected in Copenhagen and until yesterday minister without portfolio with foreign policy as her field, now takes up the position of minister of cultural affairs, a position that became vacant on the death of Niels Matthiasen. Ever since she was appointed to the cabinet in 1977 Lise Ostergaard's name has been prominent in public debate. She was not a member of the Social Democratic Party, and it was a great surprise to her when Anker Joergensen telephoned her to ask whether she wished to join the government. She was to deal in particular with Danish aid to developing countries, a question always close to her heart.

Unavoidably, she has in her career as minister often been exposed to criticism. It was thought that she handed out too much money to the developing countries, and recently there was something of a sensation when last fall she opposed Denmark's support of the NATO decision on modernization of the missile defense of Western Europe.

In her work in the Foreign Ministry and on her many journeys Lise Ostergaard has been a warm spokesman for peace and detente in the world. In a recent conversation with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE she expressed sympathy with the Women for Peace movement because, like many others, she found that the increasing tension in the world causes concern to many.

Lise Ostergaard's background is academic. She received a degree in psychiatry in 1947 and Ph.D. from Copenhagen University in 1962. Later, she became a professor of clinical medicine. In addition, she has been a leader of the counseling clinic in Copenhagen, of the National Society for Mental Hygiene and of the Student Counseling clinic in Copenhagen.

Lise Ostergaard has written a number of articles and books, primarily on psychological themes, among others a psychological analysis of formal schizophrenic thought disturbances.

In 1971 she received an Ingrid Jespersen grant, and in 1973 Tagea Brandt's travel grant.

**ERIK HOLST, ENGINEER, NAMED NEW ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY CHIEF**

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Feb 80 p 1 (Part II)

[Article by Mogens Auning: "We Have a New Environment Minister"]

[Text] In the shift in his government undertaken by Premier Anker Joergensen yesterday, Engineer Erik Holst of Denmark was appointed environment minister. He replaces Ivar Norgaard, who remains in his second ministry, the Economy Ministry.

Erik Holst is one of the Social Democratic politicians who several times in the past have been mentioned as possible ministers when it has been a matter of formation of Social Democratic governments or changes in sitting governments. Thus far, however, Holst has not desired to enter a government.

The new environment minister is a mechanical engineer by profession. He was born in Nakskov. As a youth he worked as a mechanic, later as master mechanic, before, in 1948, he obtained a degree as engineer.

For 5 years, up until 1952, Holst was a teacher in labor psychology at the Work Leader Institute and at the School of Work Technology in Copenhagen. From 1949 to 1962 he was employed by the P.L. Smidth concern, and next became section engineer at the Holmegaard Glass Works in Kastrup.

In 1966 Holst was elected to the Folketing by the Social Democrats of Storstrom County. Until he was appointed minister he was chairman of the Folketing Energy Committee and vice-chairman of the Market Committee. He was formerly a member of the Environment Committee, which he will now again meet with as minister, and of the Committee on Scientific Research.

In 1965 Erik Holst was a Social Democratic Folketing candidate in the Naestved precinct. The party was seeking a new man to replace former cabinet member Carl Petersen, who wished to retire at the end of the term. There were good names among the candidates: Economy Minister Henry Grunbaum, Karen Dahlerup, now a Folketing member, and editor, now Folketing member Knud Damgaard. There was one local man, a certain Engineer Erik Holst.

To the surprise of all, Erik Holst obtained as many votes as did Economy Minister Grunbaum.

11256

CSO: 81170902

## JORGENSEN REPRIMANDS HOUSING MINISTER ERLING OLSEN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Feb 80 p 1 (Part II)

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "And the Housing Minister Was Reprimanded"]

[Text] It was Olsen's day in the Folketing. But he was not there much himself. But that made no difference. In the noon radio news one could hear all the way to Aarhus how the premier gave him a reprimand of dimensions not seen since Karl Hjortnas received his reprimand. Olsen was not affected, however, not even when later he had a conversation with the premier.

The entire unfortunate affair arose because Erling Olsen, despite everything, let himself be taken off guard. "The technocrat Erling Olsen was taken off guard, and says that kind of ill-considered thing," said a fellow party member. And the housing minister was really taken aback when at a meeting of Nordic housing ministers in Aarhus he was telephoned by a journalist and was told that his government had entered into an agreement on the changes in interest deduction.

"If the change had been made to a simple gross amount principle one would have informed the housing minister. If changes are made in the housing field one informs the housing minister," said Erling Olsen. But this is just not what was done. His statements were characterized as "impermissible" by the premier.

Erling Olsen has never been afraid of taking a few slaps in the face. "If one takes standpoints one has enemies. I have many and I am not afraid of them," he has said. And without batting an eye he accepted the premier's reprimand.

## Well Liked

But the 52-year-old housing minister, professor, doctor of political science, is well liked in the government and in the majority of the Social Democratic Folketing group. He has never made a secret of the fact that he is to be found on the right wing of the Social Democrats. Several years ago witty souls even put him "to the left of Glistrup."

On the other hand he is so marked a technocrat that he has difficulty in engaging in dialogue with the grass roots. "He is unable to explain himself in a popular way, and when he tries he makes those statements that makes it seem that he has not given thought to the matter," as one of his right-wing colleagues expressed it.

Erling Olsen became housing minister when the SV [coalition] government was formed in 1978. He was an invention of Anker Jorgensen, and he is still on good terms with the premier.

Nevertheless, it was a Liberal politician who, the day before Anker Jorgensen made the offer, told Erling Olsen that he was on the list of ministers.

In the LO [National Federation of Trade Unions]

At that time Erling Olsen had been the political chairman of the Social Democrats for a scant year, and his goodbye to that post was less than elegant. He had, however, prevented the "Risgaard Knudsen-Thomas Nielsen coup" against the group. This meant that the SV government was approved of, regardless of the opposition of the LO.

Erling Olsen's effort was not particularly well-considered. He opposed the "footstep theory," i.e. the thesis to the effect that the trade union movement and the party should stand shoulder to shoulder. As political chairman he was a member of the LO's Executive Committee, and it was there he learned emphatically that the LO opposed the SV government.

Within the group Erling Olsen presented the matter in reverse. According to his own statements "people became so excited in hearing the sentence concerning the end of the footstep theory that they forgot to listen to the rest, when I said that the LO was opposed." Later Erling Olsen therefore was abused because he had not in adequate terms told the group that the LO denounced the government.

It is not without amusement that it is now being noted that Erling Olsen seeks support in the LO in opposition to the government's agreement.

#### Administrator

In August 1978, however, Bus-Olsen--his name as chairman of the Traffic Company of the capital area--took his seat as housing minister and was re-christened Housing-Olsen. After yesterday's events, everything indicates that Erling Olsen would like to remain in that seat.

In the Housing Ministry he is seen as a good administrator. As it is being said, "He is the first housing minister in many years who has gotten control of matters."



Not without smiles it is noted among Folketing members that one of the first things the technocrat Erling Olsen did was to ask the officials to prepare "self-explanatory notes" for the Folketing elections. In Erling Olsen's view these are notes in which premises and conclusions should hang together.

#### Marxism

Erling Olsen is hard to understand, even for his colleagues in the government. But he is an "able and good comrade and very knowledgeable," in their opinion.

His political position as right-wing Social Democrat is perhaps understandable. His father, Professor Albert Olsen, was a convinced Marxist, called Moscow-Olsen, so that in his youth his son joined the conservatives. But he soon ended up among the Social Democrats and was for the first time a Folketing member in 1964-1968. He was elected to the Folketing from the Rysvang precinct in 1975, obtaining good contact with the voters by holding "consultations," during which he filled out income tax returns for pensioners. As minister, he had no time for this last year, and in the October election he suffered a severe loss of votes.

In 1971 he became rector at the Roskilde University center, but soon ran into problems with the, in his view, militant, ideologically stamped students, so that the right-wing Social Democrat was defeated at the first rector election. He continued as a teacher, however, but his view of the RUC was and remains critical.

#### Books

In his books, as well, Erling Olsen's viewpoints come through. Among other things he has published, together with Folketing member Robert Pedersen, a highly critical book about the Progress Party, and last year, after lengthy preparation, "The Shaven Marx."

In the latter book Erling Olsen said, "If Marx had been alive today he would not have been a Marxist. He is probably turning in his grave today because of the Marxists. Nevertheless, there is no reason to revile Marx because his theories no longer are valid."

11256

CSO: 8113/0902

## BRIEFS

**STRIKE OVER FAEROES BUDGET**--The trade unions in the Faeroes decided yesterday to engage in a general strike for 24 hours, beginning at midnight last night. The strike is in protest of a law proposal the government has advanced concerning setting the price index at zero as of 1 January. The Faeroese Labor Coalition, the Thorshavn Workman's Union, the Thorshavn Women's Labor Union, and the Women's Fishery Workers Trade Union are behind the strike warning. The government presented the proposal on zero setting of the price index and other economic measures to the Lagting [second house of Parliament] which today, at 1100 hours Danish time, meets for second consideration of crisis measures. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Mar 80 p 8] 11,256

**WIND ENERGY MILLS**--The Vestas enterprise in Lem will start large-scale production of windmills next summer and the advance interest is so great that more than 1,000 people have stood in line to buy the mills. Two types of mill will be made: one which can provide an average single-family house with energy continuously, and one which is big enough to take care of the energy consumption of a farm. The enterprise is said to have finally begun carrying out the project which was declared the winner of Riso's windmill competition, which was won by Henriks Stiesdal, from Vildbjerg. He got 200,000 kroner for producing and testing his proposal for a mill. The prototype built in accordance with the winning project is expected to be finished and tested within a year and a half, and Vestas will have the rights to the mill thereafter. Vestas has just built Denmark's fourth largest windmill in Lem. [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Mar 80 p 10]

**PROGRESSIVE PARTY VOTE**--A majority of only one vote ensured Folketing member Ove Jensen's re-election to the position of chairman of his Folketing group yesterday. In a vote taken during a meeting of the group yesterday for the purpose of electing the group's leaders, the outcome was a count of 10 votes to 9 for Ove Jensen and his rival candidate for the position, Borge Halvgaard, respectively. Ove Jensen is ordinarily regarded as belonging to the so-called "loose wing" of the group, while Borge Halvgaard belongs to Glistrup's harder line in the "tight wing". After the vote was taken, Mogens Glistrup indicated that, in principle, it did not matter very much who the group chairman was because no special political power was connected with the position, but only the duty of acting as chairman during meetings. Mogens Glistrup also pointed out that he himself had voted for Ove Jensen's re-election. Uffe Thorndahl, John Arentoft and Anker Tang Sorensen were also re-elected to their positions in the group's leadership. [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Mar 80 p 8]

## STALINISTS ATTACK CP CHAIRMAN IN OPEN LETTER

## Criticize CP Foreign Policy

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 13 Mar 80 p 11

[Text] Aarne Saarinen can have been expected to come up with just about anything. He has made public all sorts of peculiar bits of theories, along with some strange interpretations of history.

But the sort of slander he made public through KANSAN UUTISET on 26 February 1980, was more than even he could have been expected to come up with.

Leaving aside his other accusations, we will here touch mainly upon his use of the term "fifth column." So the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] is an enemy of the Finnish people, a "fifth column"? Such a statement is profoundly untrue.

The statement has been used earlier by the blackest strata of our people, the ultrafascists. All facts controvert it. The claim, though it now came out of the mouth of Aarne Saarinen, cannot kill the traditional idealism of the SKP, as it was intended to do. But it is the sort of claim that can harm the SKP. The party's enemies will grab this claim as a dog grabs a bone; they will repeat it over and over again, gnaw it no end. They will take advantage of it in order to make the SKP a goal of suspicion and discrimination in people's eyes. It is a malicious stab in the back for the SKP.

As old members of the SKP and long-standing workers in the Central Committee we have lived through the different stages of our party and the difficulties that it has been subjected to ever since the 1920's, we have lived through the hatred and persecution by the party's enemies during the period of underground activity.

We have seen the party members stand upright in the face of the hatred and persecution they have been subjected to. We have seen the wavering and the fear of responsibility in some, albeit few, party members. But never before--with the exception of Arvo (son) Tuominen's tirades--have we seen or heard anything from inside the party comparable to the slander by Aarne Saarinen against our party. It is not objective criticism, but rather an outrageous accusation against the SKP.

## Traditions of Former Labor Party

Aarne Saarinen did not substantiate his claims in any way. This failure is proof of their poverty. Such claims can be made at any time. Saarinen seeks to make his claims credible by using obscure references and round-about turns of phrases from the 60-year-old past of the former labor party, now defunct. The slogan "dissociate from the bourgeoisie" came up as early as the time when the Finnish Labor Party was being founded and its character being defined. The slogan is also valid now and always will be, since there is always association with groups of people who are outsiders. Otto Wille Kuusinen interpreted the controversy inside the former Labor Party in his book "Suomen Työväenliikkeen Opetuksia" ["Teachings From the Former Finnish Labor Party"]. On page 10 he states:

"The Siltasaarians were often blamed for being intolerant supporters of Marxism. The direction controversy was blamed on them and they were ordered to stop their critical attacks against the Right. It is possible to realize now, in the light of the historical experience, that the Siltasaarians' fault was not that they were fighting this battle of direction but that they were fighting it half-heartedly... If the Siltasaarians had pursued this clear course systematically, it would have fortified the national consciousness of the party and its fitness for battle, as well as helped the large groups of laborers to realize in time what the leaders of the rightist wing of the party really were: associates of the bourgeoisie.

The matter became palpable during the class war of 1918. The rightist group, then led by Vaino Tanner, openly directed itself against the workers. It cooperated with the staff of the German invaders. There was no other division within our country's labor party, not even within the labor movement, during the class war.

Although there were differing opinions in the party representatives' meeting in November 1917 during the discussion on tactics, the workers and tenant farmers arose unified throughout the country to defend their life and their rights in January 1918, when the workers were subjected to an attack from the bourgeoisie. There and then, in that battle, the legacy of the old Labor Party was divided.

## Principle of Internationalism

We are now asking Aarne Saarinen: should the SKP in your opinion have directed itself along the path of class betrayal of labor in order to dispose of the accusation by its enemies that it was a "fifth column"? No honest person could take such claim seriously.

In the founding meeting of the SKP, there were no ideas of adopting the Tannerian course. The founding meeting unanimously approved the class struggle principle declared by Marx and Engels:

"The Communist Party rests on the Marxist socialist principle declared by Marx and Engels but wrongly interpreted by later revisionist politicians..."



An indispensable part of that principle is also the principle of the internationalism of labor. The SKP has always and in all phases fought honorably against the bourgeoisie leaders' Great Finland expansionist ventures and against their politics of war.

In the area of foreign policy, the leading light of SKP activity has always been the principle of the internationalism of labor. Why is this policy based on the internationalism of labor not good enough for you now, Aarne Saarinen? What is wrong with it? The only alternative is the principle of nationalistic xenophobia, typical of the bourgeoisie. There is no other alternative in this matter.

Socialist Soviet Russia was subjected to an attack from the outside at its very birth. In addition to its own counterrevolutionary forces, the military forces of over 10 countries--Finland included--attacked the Soviet country. The SKP was on the side of Soviet Russia. Was this wrong? When the Finnish bourgeoisie began to create Great Finland at the expense of Soviet Russia, the SKP was against this. When the people of Spain had to defend themselves with weapons against hordes of fascists attacking it, the SKP was on the side of the Spanish people.

When the Finnish war politicians increased their war preparations before World War II in order to attack the Soviet Union as soon as an opportunity presented itself, the SKP representatives' 1935 meeting warned:

"The spreading of anti-Soviet poison must not be tolerated without opposition. People have to be enlightened, patiently and untiringly, to understand that the great Soviet nation is not an enemy of Finland but a friend, and that the mighty Soviet Union is Finland's--and other small nations'--support against world imperialism if only Finland will live in peace with it."

The violent, exploitative rule of oppression against one's own people in the realm of internal politics and the anti-Soviet spirit of attack in the realm of international politics are two sides of one and the same policy. They grow from the same root.

Chairman Aarne Saarinen, you now owe Finnish labor an open and straight answer.

Which of these two alternatives are you really choosing now: the internationalist course of labor or the nationalistic fervor typical of the bourgeoisie?

In an attack against the SKP, at least, you have been closing ranks with the bourgeoisie.

Helsinki, 10 March 1930  
Aaro Uusitalo  
Aimo Aaltonen  
Kaisa Junttila



**Veikko Hauhia  
Aili Sippola  
Kauko Heikkila  
Helmi Karvonen  
Mirjam Suvanto  
Veikko Sippola  
Lauri Kantola**

#### **Former Chairmen Signed**

**Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Mar 80 p 17**

[Text] Two former chairmen of the Communist Party and eight other old communists are demanding calling Chairman Aarne Saarinen to account for slandering the SKP. Saarinen is claimed to be adopting a bourgeois course in his political judgments.

An attack against SKP Chairman Aarne Saarinen by 10 communists who have acquired battle experience during the underground era was published in **TIEDONANTAJA**, the organ of the Stalinist minority of the Communist Party.

"Aarne Saarinen can have been expected to come up with just about anything. He has made public all sorts of peculiar bits of theories, along with some strange interpretations of history. But the sort of slander he made public through **KANSAN UUTiset** on 26 February 1980, was more than even he could have been expected to come up with."

These are the opening remarks of the criticism against Saarinen by Aaro Uusitalo, Aimo Aaltonen, Kaisa Junttila, Veikko Hauhia, Aili Sippola, Kauko Heikkila, Helmi Karvonen, Mirjam Suvanto, Veikko Sippola [as published], and Lauri Kantola.

Aaltonen is a long-time chairman of the SKP whom Aarne Saarinen unseated in 1966 when the party was starting to dump off its Stalinist ballast. Uusitalo was SKP chairman in the 1940's while Aaltonen was the chief of the State Police.

The other signers are also old members and workers of the Communist Party. Heikkila in his time was a feared cadre chief who watched over the ideological purity of the communists. This supervision even covered the private lives and lifestyles of members. Before going on pension, Hauhia was responsible for the labor policy of the party.

#### **Fifth Column Caused Anger**

The title of the accusation by the veteran communists against Saarinen bore the title "A Word to the Chairman." The writers claim that Saarinen branded his own party as a fifth column.

"The statement has been used earlier by the blackest strata of our people, the ultraconservative fascists."

In the writers' opinion, Saarinen has stabbed the SKP in the back by talking about a fifth column.

Saarinen mentioned a fifth column when he was evaluating the outsiders' view of the SKP in *JÄMSÄN UUTISET* a couple of weeks ago. Saarinen ventured that, in outsiders' eyes, the SKP continues to be a strongly unpatriotic party, a representative of a foreign power, a fifth column, etc.

"Whether there is any justification for this picture is another matter. I feel that there are reasons for this view, even if it is also distorted," Saarinen wrote.

The writers in *TIEDONANTAJA* say they cannot recall ever having heard or seen anything comparable to the slanderous fifth column metaphor used by Saarinen--with the exception of Arvo (son) Tuominen's tirades.

("Fifth column" refers to persons who are ready to join the enemy when given an opportunity, i.e. to commit treason. The name originates from the Spanish Civil War.)

The veteran communists demand that Saarinen answer whether the party should have adopted the course of "class treason led by Vaino Tanner" in order to prevent the enemies from blaming the party for being a fifth column.

They also suggest that Saarinen has given up the principle of the internationalism of labor. "Was it wrong," the *TIEDONANTAJA* address to Saarinen asks, "that the SKP defended Soviet Russia against the Great Finland fantasies of the Finnish bourgeoisie? Saarinen is requested to declare openly to the Finnish workers whether he is going to choose the internationalistic course of the SKP workers or the nationalistic fervor typical of the bourgeoisie."

#### Majority Counterattacks

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Mar 80 p 7

[Text] The majority of the Communist Party Central Committee condemned on Wednesday [19 March] the Stalinist organ *TIEDONANTAJA* for violating decisions made at the representatives' meeting. According to the critics, the paper should not have published the attacks by the veteran Stalinists against Chairman Aarne Saarinen.

Ten well-known old Stalinists, among them two former chairmen of the SKP, last week attacked Chairman Aarne Saarinen in *TIEDONANTAJA*. They demanded that Saarinen clarify whether he represents the internationalistic line of labor or the nationalistic fervor of the bourgeoisie.

The Saarinenist majority of the Communist Party felt the attack was so vicious that a decision was made to submit it to the judgment of the Central Committee.

The Stalinist minority of the Central Committee tried to escape the judgment on Wednesday by opposing the drawing up of the statement of position, but the TIEDONANTAJA group suffered a loss with a 24-21 vote. The majority of the Central Committee branded the accusations brought forth in TIEDONANTAJA as personal slander and provocative misrepresentation of facts, all unsubstantiated.

"TIEDONANTAJA cannot be unaware of the specific decision by the representatives' meetings, according to which writings and speeches will not be published that have the character of personal accusations or that on the basis of their content lead to maintaining or increasing differences of opinion. For this reason, the Central Committee considers that the paper acted consciously against decisions by the representatives' meetings."

Saarinen already had answered the veteran Stalinists in TIEDONANTAJA before the Central Committee reinforced his lack of fault as a communist. According to Saarinen, there is no reason to get angry if also the past of the SKP is examined from a somewhat critical point of view.

TIEDONANTAJA defended the Stalinist veterans' views by reminding the committee members that these veterans had been lying in Finnish prisons and concentration camps for over 70 years altogether, accused of being Russian spies and fifth column men.

A major reason for the accusations and counteraccusations is the forthcoming representatives' meeting of the SKP. Saarinen has publicly announced that there is no reason to pursue unanimity in the SKP at any price. Chief Editor Urho Jokinen who spoke for the minority in the Central Committee meeting was of a different opinion. He said he expected the decisions to be unanimous even in the upcoming representatives' meeting.

The Central Committee on Wednesday also gave a statement on international politics. It emphasized that in asking for military and economic assistance, Afghanistan used a right that it has to determine its own internal development and its relationship with other states.

While the USSR is supporting the Afghan people's right of self-determination, the U.S. leadership is using the Afghanistan incident to aggravate the international situation, build up armament, obstruct international cooperation and effect various boycotts, the statement declares.

The Central Committee also expressed concern over the increase in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) activity in northern Norway.

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## NATION'S SURFACE ARTILLERY OF 1980'S DESCRIBED

Paris DEFENSE INTERACTIONS in French Apr 80 pp 12-18

[Article: "Surface to Surface Conventional French Artillery of the 1980's"]

[Text] Introduction

Jean d'Estrees, Valiero, Gribemval, the "75." The artillery has decorated the history of the French Army with prestigious names.

Whether at Valmy, at Wagram, on the Marne, or in many other places, the artillery often played a role of the first importance.

If, at the end of the first World War, France had the largest air force and the greatest armored force, she also had the most powerful artillery, with about 12,000 pieces (a quarter of them motor-drawn), of which 7,100 were heavy artillery. In four years of war the proportion of the personnel of the artillery in the French forces as a whole had gone from 16 to 29 percent (the infantry had gone from 67 percent down to 41 percent). It was the period of the adage, "Artillery conquers, infantry occupies."

On 10 May 1940, the date of the beginning of active operations on the Western front, the French artillery still had 11,500 pieces available (5,600 of 75 mm, 5,900 of greater than 75 mm), the equipment of almost 300 regiments of artillery. Quantitatively, it thus clearly surpassed German artillery, which hardly placed in line more than 7,700 pieces of various calibers. Qualitatively, the balance was less positive, because, contrary to the German Army, which had had to reconstitute its military potential, the overwhelming majority of French materiel dated from the previous war. Moreover, a great number of units organic to an Army Corps (one regiment with three or four groups of 12 long rifles of 105 mm and of 155 mm per Army Corps) or to an Infantry Division (in principle one regiment of three groups of 12 pieces of 75 mm and one regiment of two groups of 12 pieces of 155 mm per Division) were still horse-drawn.

After the war France, like most western countries, turned towards materiel mounted on vehicles or self-propelled, which were judged better adapted to modern combat. However, to equip its heavy artillery regiments organic to divisions, France developed, at the beginning of the 1950's, the 155 HF 50 howitzer, the one self-propelled piece of heavy artillery mass-produced in western Europe since the end of the war.

In terms of personnel the artillery today has a less substantial place in the military system of France, as it represents only a little more than 10 percent of the total number of troops in the Army, but its destructive capacity has increased considerably with the entry into service of the surface to surface tactical nuclear missile PLUTON.

As far as conventional materiel is concerned, the present situation seems to us, in more than one way, rather a matter for worry, as the table below shows.

Type and Caliber	Quantity in Service	Entry Into Service	Protection	Level of Use	Remarks
<b>TRACTOR DRAWN:</b>					
105 HM 2 Howitzer	About 200	Second World War	None	9th Div Marines; 27th Army Div, units overseas, reserve units	Materiel is wearing out. Replaced in active Army by 120 mm mortars and tractordrawn 155 mm pieces
155 HF 50 Howitzer	About 100	Beginning of 1950's	None	Infantry Division	In the future will equip almost all regiments of general reserve (units of 3 batteries of 6 pieces)
<b>SELF-PROPELLED:</b>					
105 AU 50 Howitzer	About 160	After 1952	Against small caliber projectiles; no CBR protection	Army Corps artillery	Self-propelled piece in non-revolving turret on AMX-13 chassis; doomed to disappear



Type and Caliber	Quantity in Service	Entry Into Service	Protection	Level of Use	Remarks
155 AM F3 Rifle	190	Since 1968	None	Armored Division artillery; (units with 4 batteries of 5 pieces per Division)	Self-propelled piece on AMX-13 chassis. Personnel and munitions transported by truck.

However, this is a temporary situation because the French artillery at the moment is going through a period of major change. The efforts being made bear at the same time on:

— The reorganization of the structure. One of the most important decisions consists of extending the square [quadrinaire] structure to the artillery regiments of the combat force [corps de bataille]. This measure, adopted for all of the combat regiments of the Army, permits a clear improvement in the relationship of combat elements to support elements.

— Modernization of materiel. In fact this involves replacing practically all of the present equipment by the introduction of more effective, modern systems. In effect, about three-fifths of the artillery pieces in service in the units of the active Army date, at best, from the 1950's (105 AU 50, 155 HF 50, HM 2).

Now at the beginning of the 1980's we can conclude that the artillery has reached a transitional stage: the new structures are now in place, while the development of the materiel of the future is entering an active phase.

#### Organization

With the organization of units of the 1967 type of maneuver forces, only the level of Brigade calls for a conventional surface to surface artillery regiment in the active Army. The formation is composed of a command battery and attached services (with a section of our RATA and a supply platoon for gasoline and munitions with 18 to 23 trucks) and three line batteries of five pieces of 155 AM F3 (for the 11 mechanized brigades) or of five howitzers of 105 AU 50 (for the remaining four motorized brigades), with a total strength of 550 to 600 men.

To respond simultaneously to requirements for direct support and long-range fire, the new structure adopted in 1975 and applied from the beginning of 1976 organized the conventional artillery at two levels--at Army

Corps and Division—and increased the firepower of the regiments by bringing up to four the number of basic firing units.

**a) At the Level of Army Corps:**

The organic elements include two regiments of self-propelled artillery with a structure identical to those of the regiment in an armored division but with two observer teams per battery instead of four.

The 105 AU 50 type self-propelled howitzer with which the units are equipped will soon be replaced by self-propelled rifles of the 155 AU F1 type.

The artillery available to the Army Corps can furthermore be reinforced by two or three artillery regiments from the general reserve forces. In the future, that is, when the new 155 self-propelled rifle enters service in the infantry division, the major part of the general reserve corps will receive the self-propelled howitzer of the 155 HF 50 type.

**b) At the Level of the Division:**

Each of the 15 divisions which make up the active French Army includes, organic to it, an artillery regiment with structure and material adapted to its function:

— For the armored divisions (eight in all): one artillery regiment of tracked 155's with four batteries; the self-propelled 155 AM F3 rifles of the transitional period will be replaced by 155 AU F1 self-propelled rifles.

— For the infantry divisions (four in all): one artillery regiment of tracked 155's equipped with the 155 HF 50 howitzer, which will be replaced by the new 155 rifles.

— For the specialized major units (9th Division of Marines, 11th Parachute Division, and 27th Alpine Division): heavy, 120 mm mortars and self-propelled 155 rifles will ultimately replace the self-propelled 105 mm pieces still in the inventory.

**c) Composition of the Units:**

With only a few exceptions (the mixed surface to surface and surface to air artillery regiment of the 9th Division of Marines or the artillery regiment equipped with 120 mm mortars and vehicle-drawn 20 mm pieces of the 11th Parachute Division) the artillery regiments of the new style active Army will be uniformly composed of:

— one Command Battery and attached services composed of

- 1 General Staff
- 1 regimental Command Post (with an ATILA automatic system center)
- 1 SIROCCO station (radar system for meteorological observation)
- 1 RATAc section with three groups of two radars
- 1 directing officer and his team
- 1 command section and supporting services
- administrative services
- technical services (repair and evacuation equipment)
- 1 platoon for supply of gasoline and munitions
- medical services

— four line Batteries composed of

- 1 battery Command Post (with a MIRADOP apparatus for measuring initial velocities and an ATILA system for fire calculations)
- 1 liaison and observation detachment (DLO) with one liaison team and four observer teams equipped with the TM 12 telemetric binoculars and with a message unit from the ATILA system (the artillery regiments of an Army Corps have only two teams of observers per battery)
- 1 topographical reconnaissance team
- 6 tracked or vehicle-mounted 155 rifles, "back up" trucks carrying ammunition resupply (in principle, one for each 155 rifle)
- battery services

Let us recall that in the transitional structure the availability of 155 AM F3 rifles and 105 AU 50 howitzers permits assignment of only five pieces to the line batteries.

If, moreover, one refers to the agreement recently signed by France and the other countries participating in the MRS international program (United States, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany), multiple rocket-launching units should complete the artillery formations in the future.

The new organization thus responds to the double aspect of the mission of an artillery regiment: fires with 20 and then 24 artillery pieces (plus long range missiles) and acquisition of targets with the six RATAc sets, the four liaison teams, and the 16 observation teams equipped with laser telemeters (eight in the Army Corps units).

As far as the artillery regiments of the general reserve are concerned, re-equipped with the 155 BF 50 howitzer, they will also include, in addition to supporting services, three line batteries of six tracked pieces each.

## Present and Future Materiel

At the beginning of this decade five types of artillery pieces, representing three different calibers, are the equipment of the conventional surface to surface artillery units:

- the self-propelled 105 AU 50 howitzer, in service in the Army Corps artillery regiments;
- the self-propelled 155 AM F3 rifle, in service in the artillery regiments of the armored divisions;
- the 155 HF 50 tracked howitzer, principally in service in the artillery regiments of the infantry divisions;
- the 105 HM 2 tracked howitzer, in service in the artillery regiments of the 9th Marine Division, the 27th Alpine Division, units stationed overseas, and general reserves;
- the 120 mm rifled mortar, which has replaced the 105 mm OTO MELARA in the 11th Parachute Division.<sup>1</sup>

After 1985 there will be no more than four types of artillery pieces (of which two will use the same firing tube), and the 105 mm calibre will have disappeared. We will then find:

- the self-propelled 155 AU F1, in service in the artillery regiments of Army Corps and of the armored divisions;
- the new, tracked 155 mm gun, in service in the artillery regiments of the infantry divisions and of specialized units;
- the tracked, 155 HF 50 howitzer, which will be the equipment of most of the units of the general reserve;
- the 120 mm rifled mortar, in service in specialized units.<sup>1</sup>

As we may note, the effort undertaken is important, because it looks to the complete re-equipment of the units of the active Army. Upon completion of the program, out of about 20 regiments which make up the conventional, surface to surface French artillery, about 12 of them will be equipped with

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<sup>1</sup>It should be noted that the infantry corps (mechanized regiment, motorized infantry regiments attached to Army Corps, and infantry divisions) will all have a section of four or six 120 mm rifled mortars.

155 mm. self-propelled pieces and, in the case of about six others, they will have tracked pieces provided with the same 155 mm firing tube.

a) Characteristics of the Present and Future Self-Propelled Pieces

	Present Material		New Material
	105 AU 50 Howitzer	155 AM F3 Rifle	155 AU F1 Rifle
1) General Information:			
Chassis	AMX-13	AMX-13	AMX-30
Crew of Piece	5-6 men	9 men (7 transported in accompanying vehicle)	4 men
Overall length with tube	5.2 m	6.22 m	10.4 m
Overall width	2.51 m	2.75 m with spades raised; 3.0 m with spades lowered	3.15 m
Overall height	2.3 m	2.2 m	3.3 m
Combat weight	16.3 tons	17.36 tons	41 tons
Maximum speed enroute	60 km/h	60 km/h	60 km/h
Range without refueling	350 km	300 km	450 km
Clearances:			
--Beneath	0.60 m	0.60 m	2.20 m
--Slope	60 percent	40 percent	60 percent
--Vertical obstacle	0.63 m	0.60 m	0.93 m
Pressure on ground	0.740 kg/cm <sup>2</sup>	0.784 kg/cm <sup>2</sup>	0.870 kg/cm <sup>2</sup>
Type of material	self-propelled, armor-protected	self-propelled	self-propelled with turret
Motor	gasoline, 250 HP	gasoline, 250 HP	variable fuel, 720 HP
Specific Power	15.3 HP/ton	14.4 HP/ton	17.5 HP/ton
Protection	Sufficient against small caliber rounds. Very limited against CBR agents	None	Good against small caliber rounds and CBR agents



	Present Materiel		New Materiel
	105 AU 50 Howitzer	155 AM F3 Rifle	155 AU F1 Rifle
2) Armament:			
Type	1 105 mm M50 Howitzer	1 155 mm rifle	1 155 mm rifle
Length of tube	23 calibers	30 calibers	40 calibers
Field of fire	18° 30' to left and right; -4° 30' to + 66° in height	30° right, 20° left; 0° to +67° in height	360°; -5° to +66° in height
Missile velocity	568 m per second	725 m per se- cond	810 m per second
Maximum range	14 km	20 km	23.5 km (shell with hollow base); 30 km (shell with improved range)
Manner of loading	manual	manual	automatic
Maximum rate of fire	6 rounds/minute	3 rounds per minute	6 rounds in 45 seconds
Ammunition provision	54 complete rounds	None (41 rounds in accompany- ing vehicle)	42 complete rounds
Fire control	1 panoramic goni- ometer; 1 telescope for direct aim	1 panoramic goniometer; 1 telescope for direct aim	1 optical-electric goniometer with suspension from universal joint; 1 directional ta- ble; 1 telescope for direct aim
Secondary armament	1 7.5 mm machinegun	None	1 12.7 mm machine- gun or 7.62 mm machinegun

b) Characteristics of present and Future Tracked Pieces:

	Old Materiel		New Materiel	
	155 BF 50 Howitzer	105 HM 2 Howitzer	Tracked 155 Rifle	120 mm Mortar
Crew of Piece	11 men	8 men	8 men	6 men
	(These totals include the gun commander and the driver of the towing vehicle)			
Overall length				
— in road position	7.8 m	6 m	8.5 m	3.015 m
— in firing posi- tion	7.15 m		10 m	(same)

	Old Materiel		New Materiel	
	155 BF 50 Howitzer	105 HM 2 Howitzer	Tracked 155 Rifle	120 mm Mortar
Overall width	2.61 m	2.16 m	2.93 m	1.93 m
Overall height in road position	2.5 m	1.97 m	2.6 m	1.25 m
Total weight	8.5 tons	2.2 tons	9.5 tons	0.58 tons
Weapon	155 mm Howitzer	105 mm Howitzer	155 mm Rifle	120 mm. Mortar
Length of tube	23 calibers	14 calibers	40 calibers	2.08 m (tube + breech)
Field of fire: -- Horizontal -- Vertical	80° -4° to +69°	45° -5° to + 65°	65° -5° to +66°	14° +28° to +85°
Range	17.7 km	11 km	24 km with hollow base shell	8.135 km with PR 14 projectiles; 13 km with additional propulsion
Manner of loading	manual	manual	hydraulic system	manual
Rate of fire: -- Rapid -- Sustained	3 rounds per minute 1 round per minute	8 rounds per minute 100 rounds per hour	3 rounds in 15 seconds 120 rounds per hour	18 rounds per minute 6 rounds per minute
Time required: -- To unlimber -- To prepare to move out	10 to 15 minutes 10 to 45 minutes	3 minutes 3 minutes	5 minutes maximum 2 minutes	1.5 to 3 minutes 2 minutes
Pulling vehicle	6 x 6 GBU 15 truck (with 42 complete rounds	truck or tracked ve- hicle for snowy ground	6 x 6 GBD truck (with 50 complete rounds	VAB, FL500 small tac- tical truck
Speed enroute: -- Maximum	45 km/h	variable, de- pending on pulling ve- hicle	80 km/h	variable, depending on pulling vehicle

	Old Materiel		New Materiel	
	155 BF 50 Howitzer	105 HM 2 Howitzer	Tracked 155 Rifle	120 mm Mortar
— Average speed	30 km/h	variable, de- pending on pulling ve- hicle	50 km/h	variable, depending on pulling vehicle
— Range of pull- ing vehicle	600 km	variable, de- pending on pulling ve- hicle	600 km	variable, depending on pulling vehicle
Autonomous capacity to move	None	None	a few dozen meters at a speed of 4 km/h, with 32 HP motor	None

#### Missions and Possibilities of Artillery Units

a) The general mission of the conventional surface to surface artillery consists in applying on a continuous basis the direct and indirect support fires necessary to the movement of friendly forces.

Although it is during an attack that the artillery would provide a full application of its possibilities, the artillery would have a role of the first importance in practically all combat situations: defensive, offensive, counter-offensive, delaying action, combat in urban areas, making breakthroughs. That occurs by reason of its firepower, its flexibility of employment, its ease of disposition, its capacity to go into action under any kind of weather condition, day or night.

The various kinds of munitions available for us permit the artillery to provide varied fires adapted to the needs of the situation:

— With conventional or improved explosive projectiles it participates in the destruction of the enemy, principally in the battle against armor and in neutralisation of opposing artillery.

— With smoke shells it can hide the movement of friendly forces from observation by opposing forces or blind opposing forces' positions for firing anti-tank missiles and their system of observation (blinding fire). It is appropriate to underline the growing importance of the need for smoke fires.

As opposed to the foregoing, the artillery, a great consumer of heavy munitions (a 155 mm shell weighs 45 kg), requires substantial logistical support. Now, the trucks which transport its ammunition supply (an artillery regiment of an armored division equipped with 155 AM F3 guns has no fewer than 70 trucks dedicated to this task.) are extremely vulnerable to conventional or CBR fires.

b) Neutralization of an anti-personnel type over an area of about one hectare requires 30 rounds of 155 mm shells. If it is a matter of an anti-tank mission, twice the number of shells would be needed.

At present this effect is obtained by a battery of five 155 AU F3 rifles firing for two minutes at the maximum rate (three rounds per piece per minute). When the 155 AU F1 is provided to the units, a battery in action will fire the same number of rounds in one-third the time. It is quite evident that the artillery will find its effectiveness clearly improved also, because an enemy on the move, subjected to such fire, would have greater difficulty in withdrawing from a zone of danger in 40 seconds than in two minutes (in two minutes a tank covers 500 to 1000 m in all terrain conditions).

With the ammunition supply which it has, an artillery regiment with 155 mm guns can carry out 40 fire missions. That represents, in all, almost 300 tons of munitions.

c) The new, two-level artillery organization will permit it to accomplish rapidly the stunning and massive concentrations of fire required by manoeuvre, which was not previously the case. For example, an armored division (7000 men, 118 tanks) could, in a definitive sense, benefit in case of need from the support of 110 to 130 155 mm guns, most of them vehicle-mounted (one organic artillery regiment plus two artillery regiments from Army Corps plus two or three artillery regiments from the general reserve), to which would be added the 12 120 mm mortars from the mechanized regiments.

d) In addition to its general mission of fire support the conventional surface to surface artillery regiment would play an important role in the collection of intelligence in the depths of the area of operational responsibility of the division, considering the means of reconnaissance which pertain to it (radar, liaison teams, and observation teams).

In the case of an armored division this point takes on an importance all the greater, since all of these elements move on armored vehicles and since the division itself has only weak means of reconnaissance, which have no protection at all (a squadron of scouts on VTT vehicles).

In practice, the liaison and observation detachments which are found in equal number in the combat regiments of divisions are deployed in front of the units to which they are attached. The liaison team commanded in principle by the commander of a battery in action of the artillery regiment



reports to the Command Post of the colonel commanding the regiment undertaking the movement, while each observation team reports to the Squadron to which it is attached.

### Conclusion

It is undeniable that the artillery, in time, will present a rejuvenated and strengthened appearance, but let us not be overcome by exaggerated optimism without taking carefully into account all the real factors which exist.

First of all, if a conflict should occur in Europe today or in the coming years, the French artillery would enter combat with old materiel (40 percent of the pieces date from the first half of the 1950's; 30 percent are from the period before 1950; only 30 percent have an average age which is less than about 10 years.). It would have no effective protection or would have protection of a kind now obsolescent (including the most recent systems). It will be necessary to wait until the second half of this decade for the first positive results to make themselves felt.

On the other hand, in spite of a certain improvement in the situation, artillery has a less important place in the French divisions than in the divisions of the other principal armies of the theater of operations. We find, in effect, a 155 AM F1 rifle for 292 men in the armored divisions (one 155 AM F3 rifle for 350 men now, but only one piece for 380 men in the old mechanized division), as against:

- one self-propelled gun for about 240 men in the German armored and mechanized divisions (54 M-109 155 mm; 12 M-107 175 mm; and 6 M-110 203 mm per unit)

- one self-propelled gun for 218 men in the British armored divisions (24 FB-433 of 105 mm; 12 M-109 of 155 mm; 3 M-110 of 203 mm per unit)

- at present one self-propelled gun for 245-250 men in the American armored and mechanized divisions (54 M-109 of 155 mm and 12 M-110 of 203 mm per unit); in the new organization there will be one gun for only 160 men (16 M-109 and 16 M-110 per unit)

- one piece for 200 men in the Soviet armored divisions stationed in the German Democratic Republic (18 self-propelled howitzers of 152 mm; 24 122 mm rifles, of which six are self-propelled and 36 are pulled); one piece for 175 mm in the Soviet mechanized divisions stationed in the German Democratic Republic (18 self-propelled howitzers of 152 mm; 78 122 mm rifles, of which six are self-propelled and 72 are pulled).



Finally, since VADAR was abandoned, there is no other modern specialized system capable of insuring antiaircraft protection of the artillery units.

Even so, it is appropriate to underline, in conclusion, that the artillery is not in a worse position than the other branches of service. In reality, as in the other branches, it is suffering from the lags accumulated in the course of the last few decades.

1472

CSO: 1100

'L'AURE' SCORES 'BLACKMAIL' OF WEST BY LIBYA, ALGERIA

LD280929 Paris L'AURE in French 15 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Jacques Guilleme-Brulon: "Defending Europe"]

[Text] The Arab Steadfastness [and Confrontation] Front member states who recently met in Tripoli have chosen the right moment for announcing their strategy.

It comes on the eve of the Carter-Begin talks on the future of the West Bank and Gaza.

It comes on the morrow of a warning by the White House to Europe which has been accused of practicing one-way solidarity and paying only lip-service to the positions defended by the United States in its dispute with Iran over the hostage affair.

And it comes on the morrow of the American decision to boycott the Moscow Olympic games.

The policy pursued by the heads of state of Libya, Syria and Algeria and the PLO chairman obviously falls within the framework of the action taken by the USSR in the Near East and Africa.

In fact, it is not by chance that the "charter" which they have adopted emphasizes the importance of the strengthening of their nations' ties with socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union.

Thus the selective oil and natural gas embargo with which the United States and its West European allies are threatened by Libya and Algeria stands forth in all its significance.

Seen in this light, the main aim of the warning issued by the front is to make the "Nine" withdraw their support for action taken by Washington against Tehran.

It is clear, in fact, that the four participants in the Tripoli summit were determined not only to show their support for Palestinian interests but also emphasize their solidarity with the Iranian Islamic Republic.

If the Europeans show "wisdom" and refrain from supporting the measures taken by the United States against Iran, they will be allowed to benefit from "mitigating circumstances" and will not be penalized with respect to their oil and natural gas imports from Tripoli and Algiers.

No blackmail could be more flagrant.

Furthermore, the denunciation of the American-Egyptian-Israeli collusion is no mere verbal exercise.

Colonel al-Qadhafi has now appeared again as the Kremlin's loyal intermediary bent on spreading disorder throughout a large area of the African continent which includes Egypt, a Morocco gnawed at by the Saharan guerrillas, and Chad where the anti-Hissain Habre coalition receives massive aid from Tripoli.

There can be no doubt that a partitioned Europe, in trouble with Washington, has laid itself open to attacks by Steadfastness Front extremists.

There can be no doubt that, contrary to hints by the Bonn and Paris governments, the Soviets have now switched over to the offensive on all fronts.

In any case, everything has encouraged them to do so--lack of cohesion in the Western world, the Europeans' abstract intellectualism, incoherence in the policy hitherto pursued by the United States and the handicap from which the United States suffers in the military sphere.

Under the circumstances, any attempts to oppose Moscow's hegemonism while sparing Moscow's feelings or merely to respond to its concerted moves as the occasion arises fall within the province of utopia and come close to freely admitted abdication.

We have probably reached a turning point of decisive importance for our civilization.

At a time when everything forecasts a hot summer in Africa, the Near East and the Middle East, at a time when the worse could well happen in the Gulf region any day, there is no longer any room for equivocation.

The only solution is to meet offensive with offensive.

In all spheres.

In harmony with our great allies beyond the Atlantic.

In order to really defend Europe.

CSO: 3100

## PCF PAPER DEFENDS 'REALITY' OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES

LD011055 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 8 Apr 80 pp 1, 6

[Article by Claude Quin: "Socialist Countries and Full Employment"]

[Text] Mr Jean Boissonnat recently made his contribution to the task of denigrating the socialist countries, first in the Servan-Schreiber family journal "L'Expansion," then on Europe 1 Radio.

With the tone of an expert who knows everything and who speaks dogmatically, he now finds only crisis and difficulties in the socialist countries. Growth is apparently stunted there, prices are spiraling madly and--height of misery--the working people there are paid for doing nothing. They are the "salaried unemployed." In brief, they seem to be sinking into mediocrity.

As the popular saying runs: "So be it!"

If there is one human right which is effectively guaranteed in the socialist countries but not here, it is the right of all to work. J. Boissonnat can take all the liberties he wants with the facts; the reality of the socialist economies still remains that unemployment is unknown. The truth is this: Whatever the problems of labor organization, there are not too many working people in the socialist countries, rather, there are too few! Let us add that nobody is drafted into a job by the authorities. Anyone can change his job, business or region for his own reasons. Moreover, few working people in the socialist countries are in need!

Far from experiencing a social crisis, working people and families in the socialist countries are increasing their social achievements: Not just full employment and job security, but also good employment; training and personal development for all; the population's health is really protected. At the end of their studies their children are guaranteed a job for which they have been trained. There is social welfare against everyday accidents. That is the reality!

J. Boissonnat argues against the socialist countries that their 1979 growth rates are in decline. Well, let us look at this: In the last 4 years

(1976-1979), industrial production in the Soviet Union has increased by 20 percent, in Hungary by 21 percent, in the GDR by 22 percent, in Poland by 26 percent, in Bulgaria by 28 percent and so forth. And France? The growth rate for the same period was 7.6 percent. The difference is already large.

But there is another, even greater difference. The socialist countries have maintained a high industrial growth rate by creating millions of new jobs: 22 million in the Soviet Union alone during the last 10 years. Meanwhile France's slight growth has been won with 2 million unemployed thrown in! Clearly, J. Boissonnat does not speak of that.

He is equally silent on the responsibility for the crisis in the capitalist system. The negative repercussions of this crisis on the socialist countries are not negligible, however, especially for countries like Hungary, Poland or the GDR. But through East-West trade the socialist economies are being attacked indirectly by the capitalist countries' galloping inflation, the disordered state of the international monetary system and the speculative, soaring prices of certain products. The reactionary governments now want to add economic boycott to all this and the restrictions already existing in trade!

The drop in production in a small number of socialist countries in 1979 does not compare with our crisis in any way. On the one hand it is temporary; these countries will resume growth immediately. On the other, it does not threaten any of their social attainments, starting with full employment.

The April edition of "Economie et Politique" demonstrates this: Despite everything, the socialist countries' economic development is continuing without any blockage or profound structural crisis. Not without problems or difficulties, clearly. No one in the socialist countries questions this. On the contrary, broad discussions are in progress there and reforms are being instituted. Not all the answers have been found yet, but advances are under way.

These advances are encouraging because they are supported by the achievements of socialism: Social progress, full employment, planning experience, the participation of the working people's representative organizations and of the working people themselves, and national independence.

Studies by official French organs do not foresee any crisis in the socialist countries. On the contrary, they envisage that these countries will manage to overcome any temporary difficulty, including the effects of the capitalist world crisis, and continue their growth.

Finally, the reality now in the socialist countries is far more interesting, profound and encouraging than J. Boissonnat's remarks would have you believe. In reality, the socialist countries are preparing to engage in a new stage in their development in which the great questions of a new type of growth are posed directly. Their progress is of concern for our future, here, in France.

It is no doubt this which seems to be embarrassing J. Boissonnat and many others.



## MERCURY-TAINTED WHEAT FOR USSR CONFISCATED IN ROUEN

Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Apr 80 p 45

[Article by J.G. (possibly Jacqueline Grapin): "For Shipment to the USSR: Tainted Wheat Confiscated in Port of Rouen"]

[Text] A shipment of grain for the USSR has been confiscated in the port of Rouen last week. The two 6,000 ton holds of an 18,000 ship contained wheat intended for bread-making and which had been contaminated with seed wheat treated with mercury compounds. These organo-mercury compounds are toxic. For instance, the FO [Force Ouvriere] Consumer Organization--who made the matter public--recalls, they were the cause of the Pont-Saint-Esprit poisoning case, when packaging which had contained organo-mercury compounds had been reused. In the present case, although the proportion of contaminated wheat is low, 800 to 900 grams per kilo [as published], this amount renders the whole shipment unfit for consumption.

Early in March, a 3,500 ton shipment of grains had already been refused on identical grounds by its Polish consignee. This refusal, together with a work-to-rule strike of the fraud-control personnel, affecting trade with East European countries, have led to the discovery of this matter, the extent of which is hard to evaluate at present. Eight barges loaded with wheat are said to have been placed under seal at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre (Seine-et-Marne), as well as a truck in Beauvais. The matter has been referred to the court, and the investigation will tell whether this is only an isolated error during handling at a storage facility. It should also determine whether wheat intended for domestic consumption has been affected by this contamination. The FO Consumer Organization has asked for "determination and immediate neutralization of all existing stocks which might present an obvious potential hazard for the consumers." It also remarks that this affair cannot fail to constitute a serious obstacle to our grain exportations at a time when the international situation of the wheat market is a cause for concern.

The General Association of Wheat Producers does not deny the accident; however, according to its manager, Mr David, the amount of grain contami-

nated with toxic products is extremely low and does not constitute a hazard to human health. Poland's refusal of a barley shipment, for sanitary reasons, can also be considered as common trading practice. "All seed wheat treated against soil diseases is colored bright red so as to make it easily recognizable. The awareness created by the Polish case will of course result in a multiplication of controls and serve as a reminder to all producers to be careful," Mr David also stated.

9294

CSO:J100

## BRITTANY SEEKS NEW ENERGY SOURCES

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Mar 80 p XIV

[Article by Bruno Dethomas]

[Text] Two thousand windmills, energy plantations, tidal power stations... A team of research workers is showing that in Brittany one may live with new energy sources.

Whereas many Bretons are rebelling against the Plogoff Nuclear Power Station by incessantly pestering the forces of law and order and disturbing a public utility inquiry, which will not make much sense, some ecologists are stating that it is possible "to live better in Brittany without oil and nuclear power."

Research workers, belonging to the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), to the French Electric Power Company (EDF), to the College de France and to the National Agronomic Research Institute, had published, in 1978, a project, "ALTER," subtitled "Study of an energy future for France centered on the renewable potential; draft of a long-term all-solar program." (LE MONDE of 23 May 1978.) Supported by the Unified Socialist Party (PSU) of Brittany, some research workers of the same bodies as well as of the National Center for the Exploitation of the Oceans (CNEXO) and the Institute of Marine Studies have done their utmost to apply to Brittany the principles defined by ALTER.

One must admit, it is not possible to apply to such studies the criteria of usual judgments. The principal accusation generally brought against the so-called new energy sources is their weak profit-making capacity. However, the initiators of an energy solution for Brittany refuse to fall into this trap.<sup>1</sup> "We have not kept any record of production costs for our energy

1. The authors of Project ALTER had announced statistics that were never published.

proposals," they say. "Only the technological feasibility has been retained. The question of cost makes no sense, leaving aside the economic system in which we are reasoning." "Who can say," they add, "what the price of petroleum will be in 1995?"

The Brittany project arouses doubts about the present economic system and the type of society it produces to call for "satisfying the basic needs of men and women (...) by rejecting all waste." But for all that it is not a matter of going back to the candle. The population--including that of the Loire-Atlantic--is expected to increase from 3.5 million to 4 million from now till the end of the century. And the project calls for an increase in the needs of industry (+50 percent), of the residential and tertiary sector (+22 percent) and especially of agriculture and fishing (+67 percent). Individual energy consumption would then increase from 1.82 tons of petroleum equivalent (tpe) to 2.16 tpe in the year 2000.

But waste would be reduced: overall consumption would increase by only 30 percent as opposed to more than 100 percent in the official studies, and, in the name of "small is beautiful," the big cities would again be involved, industry totally reshaped (by the growth in the number of small production units), and the Bretons would be asked to eat less meat.

To obtain the 9.2 million tpe (69.78 million barrels) of primary energy necessary by the year 2000, the authors of the project put their trust mainly in four sources of renewable energy; marine, biomass, direct solar and windmills.

The exploitation of algae fields after methanization, the installation of wave-action power stations (50 units of 10 MW and 250 barges of 0.5 MW) and of tidal power stations would furnish 1.28 million tpe [9.33 million barrels].

The energy plantations--almost as many farms will be devoted to it as to the feeding of humans--sawdust, the methanization of agricultural waste and the transformation of garbage into energy would represent 4.8 million tpe [30.64 million barrels].

Two thousand 2 MW windmills would produce 2.01 million tpe [14.73 million barrels], and the direct solar method--the 370,000 housing units of medium-sized cities, for example, would be heated exclusively by solar heat--would contribute 2.04 million tpe [14.95 million barrels] to the Breton energy balance-sheet.

There is, to be sure, some science fiction and a bit of a dream in such studies which radically turn away from the present. But the energy solution sketched thus has the advantage of making one more aware of the shortcomings of a policy founded on hypercentralization and gigantism of the means of production. And then, as the authors of the project note, he who can do more can do less. Is France sufficiently interested in wave action or in windmills? Science fiction is sometimes a way of giving us a peek at the future.

## BRIEFS

INFLUENCE IN NEW CALEDONIA--Canberra, April 28 (AFP)--France will remain in New Caledonia for some years to come, according to the high commissioner for the French republic in the Pacific, Mr Claude Charbonniaud. Speaking at a press conference here today, Mr Charbonniaud, who is visiting Australia at the invitation of the foreign minister, Mr Andrew Peacock, noted that few people understood the unique and difficult situation of New Caledonia, a country comprised of numerous minority groups. He said: "Maybe my history is wrong, but I can think of no example to compare with the New Caledonia problem." He said it was impossible to predict when that country would be ready for independence as it was difficult to imagine one minority group ever succeeding to overcome the others. The solution, he said, had to be a compromise and for this reason France's presence in New Caledonia was both "useful and necessary". He said France felt very strongly that it had a role to play as an umpire in the country's evolution towards democratic independence. Asked what the relationship between France and an independent New Caledonia would be, Mr Charbonniaud said he could not imagine such a situation and that it was "enough to cope with the present." However, he added that, in his opinion, the desire for independence did not mean a desire to break all ties with France. He stressed that France's interest in New Caledonia was neither colonial nor strategic and that France would stay for as long as the New Caledonians wanted it. [Text] [OW281315 Hong Kong AFP in English 0802 GMT 28 Apr 80]

CSO: 3120



## GOVERNMENT LIFTS SPECIAL IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 17 Apr 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] On the 15th of this month, Mr. C. Mitsotakis, Minister of Coordination, made the significant statement that, as importers and the business world in general had honoured their undertaking for voluntary cuts in the volume of their 1980 imports, the Government was in the happy position to lift both the 25 percent levy on imported goods (another word for the re-imposition of import duty after supposed tariff disarmament) and the 75 percent blocked account deposits. As regards the former, the Minister of Finance has already signed a circular for all Customs authorities implementing the decision with effect from the 25th of this month. As regards the latter, corresponding instructions are expected soon. (Editor's comment: It has to be remembered that, 48 hours earlier, the EEC-Greece Committee of Association meeting in Brussels had tackled this very subject with the Greek delegation voicing the Community's objections to the measures in question.)

Earlier, the Minister of Coordination had said that nothing had changed in the Government's outlook on the country's economy, since the meeting of the Economic Council of Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister of the 1st of April.

Mr. Mitsotakis added that optimism expressed during that meeting as regards the prospects for the cost-of-living index were based not so much on the slight improvement seen in the first quarter of the current year in comparison with that of 1979, as on the fact that the rise in oil prices this year occurred during the first quarter in question whereas, in 1979, higher oil prices did not come into effect until May. In consequence, Mr. Mitsotakis felt that the 15 percent 1980 inflation was realistic, if one allowed some modest margin of deviation, as a forecast at this stage. With reference to reported EEC reactions to the measures adopted in November 1979 by the Greek Government to meet growing deficits in the balance of payments, Mr. Mitsotakis pointed out that, such measures as the imposition of a higher levy on newly-registered private passenger cars was a purely domestic matter which did not discriminate at the expense of the EEC. As regards the "gentlemen's

agreement" with the business world for voluntary cuts in 1980 imports of a wide range of articles, Mr. Mitsotakis pointed out that it was a procedure for helping the balance of payments far less drastic than those adopted at various times for the same purpose by other EEC member-states. He, therefore, felt Greece could count on understanding on the part of the EEC on this point. (Editor's comment: Going back to the Minister's inflation forecast, the fact that he has now admitted the possibility of some deviation from his original 15 percent by "a modest margin" narrows the gap between the estimate made under item 2 on page 3 of HELLENEWS 118/2nd April, 1980 and shows him approaching the more hopeful of the two extremes made in the bulletin's forecast. Whether either estimate proves to be a few points out in one direction or the other, the Minister is quite right in saying there is no cause for alarm over the Greek economy because of whatever difficulties it is facing at the present moment. It will have to grapple with these and no doubt with more to come but they cannot be described as insurmountable, given systematic and skillful handling.)

CSO: 4920

## REVISION OF TAXATION ASPECTS PLANNED

Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 17 Apr 80 pp 2, 3

[Text] In the last two years, the Ministry of Finance proclaimed its intention to revise taxation "on a more just basis" and the usual committees were then set up to study the matter. Unlike some of these committees, they went into the question thoroughly and within a reasonable space of time, had rendered their reports and recommendations. Whatever these were, the Ministry stopped short of adopting any of the new procedures which may have been suggested and, instead, has now appointed a fresh committee to study the findings of its predecessors, to up-date such material as they had compiled and to render a report. The points at issue are mainly two. The scaling of income tax and the tax on property. Tax-free maximum earned income has remained the same since 1975. Inflation and nominal wage rates since then have increased by a little short of 100 percent since then (if the current year's projected 23.8 percent inflation rate is taken into account). This means that small and medium wage and salary earners while moving up the scale of income tax, find themselves in a worse position regarding purchase power. The question is, therefore, to see how much the tax-free earned income ceiling can be raised.

As regards property, tax introduced in 1975, foresaw that property worth up to Drs 10,000,000 would remain tax-free and would be taxed on a sliding scale for amounts in excess of the tax-free limit. The value of property since 1975 has multiplied even faster than overall inflation and wage and salary rates so that, nowadays, the tax no longer hits the segment of the population which may choose to live in expensive homes but even average families of four adults inhabiting a non-luxury average flat of slightly over 200 M<sup>2</sup>. By many quarters the tax is considered not only a failure but also immoral. It is argued that a home in which to live is acquired with savings and they are the residue of income which has already been taxed. The new Committee is therefore considering whether to abolish the property tax entirely, whether to raise the tax-free value limit or whether to recommend the imposition of some other tax to make good such revenue as may be lost if either of the first two alternatives are adopted. (Editor's comment: The fact that a general election may be not too far out of sight, may well influence decisions and give various candidates for the next Parliament a vote-catching opportunity out of this issue.)

## MORE FLEXIBLE EXPORT POLICY PROMISED

Athens HELLENICS EXPRESS in English 17 Apr 80 p 4

[Text] The Ministry of Trade has announced that it intends to pursue a more flexible export policy.

1. It is appointing regional export councils whose task will be to pinpoint, study and propose solutions to export problems.
2. It is planning a system of permanent briefing on export matters, in conjunction with intensification of foreign market research, through the commercial counsellors and attaches at Greek embassies abroad.
3. It has asked for a clause to be added to the Bill on Trading Companies, now awaiting debate by Parliament, whereby no new fiscal burdens would be permissible on exports, without prior consultation with the Ministry of Trade.
4. It has asked the Economic Council of Ministers to exempt export firms from the 2.5 percent levy on exports of Greek fresh fruit and vegetables which, by law, was imposed recently in favour of the Farmers Pension Fund (O.G.A.).

Meanwhile the monthly meeting between the various organizations of exporters and the Ministry of Trade took place on the 11th of this month, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Trade, Mr. J. Dimopoulos. The Association of Mining Companies asked that interest subsidies granted on exports of minerals, under the provisions of Currency Committee Decision No 1574, should not be reduced. Exporters in general asked for the Currency Committee's decision to consider ten classes of export goods as self-sustaining on world markets, to be revoked so that the goods in question could once again benefit of the competitive edge provided by interest refunds.

Representatives of preserved fruit, jam factories, etc., asked that means be devised to ensure continuation of the supply to them of sugar at reduced rates from the State sugar refineries.

(Editor's comment: With particular reference to the 2.5 percent retention in favour of OGA, the matter is extremely delicate because the farming community still accounts for about a third of Greece's population and a general election is quite possible, in the near future. The 2.5 percent levy may hit exports and the country's economy generally in the long-run but, as a short-term vote-catcher it has its advantages.)

CSO: 4920



## BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, STATISTICS REPORTED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 12 Apr 80 pp 2, 4

[Text] The 1979 balance of payments figures appeared finally in the press. The reluctance to release them officially is not justified by information so far available. As expected, the December 1979 figures show a slowdown in the increase in imports largely as a result of the restrictive Government measures applied since that month (see B & F no 75).

## High Increase in Imports

From January to December 1979 imports rose by 37.7 per cent to a record \$10,102 million. December imports at \$813 [as published] were the lower monthly figure since April 1979. The spectacular increase in imports in 1979 is mainly due to the following factors: First to higher oil prices. One-third of the \$2,764 increase in imports over 1978 is attributed to higher imports of oil. The oil bill exceeded \$2 billion, compared with \$1.1 billion in 1978. Second, to stockpiling in anticipation of higher prices and restrictions and third, to higher world prices for nearly all categories of imported goods, not only oil. It is estimated that prices of imported goods (excluding oil) rose by 12-14 per cent in 1979. The balance reflects higher volume imports largely due to stockpiling.

State imports--which include oil--while private imports rose by 35.8 per cent to \$7,905 million. [sentence as published] State imports account for a slightly over one-fifth of the total imports.

## Exports and Invisibles Also Rose Substantially

Exports also rose by 30.9 per cent to reach \$3,926 million. According to the information available, nearly all categories of imported goods have registered healthy increases, particularly foodstuffs and refined petroleum products, followed by exports of manufactured goods. As export receipts cover less than 40 per cent of the imports, the trade deficit increased by an even higher rate--42.3 per cent--to a new record level of \$6,176 million. Some 64 per cent of the trade deficit was covered by

healthy and growing net invisibles. Invisible receipts in fact grew by 27.4 per cent to reach \$5,256 million with all categories registering record levels. More analytically, receipts from tourism increased by 25.5 per cent and reached \$1,664 million, with tourist arrivals exceeding 5.5 million, a record level. Shipping remittances recovered strongly from the past two years low growth levels, increasing by 26.7 per cent to \$1,515 million. Emigrant and worker remittances also show an increase of 18.2 per cent to \$1,163 million. Of the invisible payments, which also rose by 28.9 per cent to a record \$1,338 million, the most important items are the interest payments and payments for tourism and education.

#### Current Account Deficit Widens

Despite the strong performance of the invisibles, the current account deficit increased finally to \$2,258 million, 80.6 per cent over the \$1,250 million registered in 1979. Despite this large increase the situation is not as bad as the figure suggests. Higher private capital inflows and a \$339 million positive errors and omissions figure, reduced the need for borrowing to slightly above the 1978 levels. Of the \$1,751 million private capital inflows some \$200 million are loans to commercial banks and other financial institutions. Boosted by tax and other incentives, inflows for the purchase of real property reached \$566 million. Supplier credits and the entrepreneurial capital outside the DL 2687/53 also recorded healthy increases.

#### Borrowing Increased at Lower Rate

Official borrowing (State, Bank of Greece, and public enterprises) finally reached \$600 million, as the Bank of Greece drew in December a large part of the \$500 million Euroloan contracted in the second half of 1979. Of the \$600 million official borrowing \$326 million were used to pay back old loans. Other bank loans of about \$200 million exceeded the amortization of the private sector by \$100 million. Despite the considerable higher current account deficit, borrowing increased at a much lower rate thanks to the private capital inflows. The 1979 balance of payments developments are rather good considering that Greece paid about \$900 million more for oil in 1979 and that GNP grew by about four per cent.

#### 1980 the Crucial Year

1980 is going to be crucial for the balance of payments and there is an air of pessimism. Is this pessimism justified? It is too early to say, as not even the January figures have been made available. The Government and the importers have reached an agreement to restrain imports of the "non-basic" goods. If this works satisfactorily, and if deflationary policies are applied successfully, the 1980 trade deficit might be kept near the 1979 levels. Assuming a restrain in import growth, the balance of payments will present no problem for 1980. In the meantime

export thrust should continue and the productive investment needed badly, should come forward to help Greece increase its productivity in the secondary sector. The same applies to the services sector, which has so far bailed Greece out from a balance of payments crisis.

Greece: Balance of Payments (millions of dollars)

January-December (preliminary)

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1978/1979</u>
1. Imports	7,338	10,102	37.7
a. Private	5,821	7,905	35.8
b. State	1,517	2,197	44.8
2. Exports	2,999	3,926	30.9
3. Trade deficit	-4,339	-6,176	42.3
4. Net invisibles	3,089	3,918	26.8
a. Receipts	4,127	5,256	27.4
Tourism	1,326	1,664	25.5
Shipping remittances	1,177	1,515	28.7
Emigrant and worker remittances	984	1,163	18.2
Other	640	914	42.8
b. Payments	-1,038	-1,338	28.9
5. Current account deficit	-1,250	-2,258	80.6
6. Capital inflow (net)	1,663	1,925	15.8
a. Private capital inflow (net)	1,489	1,751	
b. Official borrowing (State, Bank of Greece and public enterprises)	531	500	
c. Amortization	-357	426	
(public)	(-294)	(-326)	
(private)	(-63)	(-100)	
7. Errors and omissions	-270	339	

CSO: 4920

## RETAIL MARKET PROBLEMS REPORTED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 12 Apr 80 p 6

[Text] The Greek retail market faces today serious problems regarding the bad credit conditions, the lack of incentive for modernization, the large number of small shops evading tax control, the outdated time schedule causing cost increases, reduced productivity and giving the consumers a hard time and the outdated commercial law.

The above were underlined by the president of the Association of Greek Retailers, Mr. G. Meimarides, during the regular annual general assembly of the Association.

In particular, Mr. Meimarides referred to the following basic points:

Trade is not responsible for the boosting inflation in Greece. It contributed approximately 5.8 percent to the total 24.8 percent of inflation, with oil prices and imported raw materials, agricultural financing, labour costs and the public sector being the remaining factors influencing inflation 9.5 percent, 5.5 percent, 2.0 percent and 2.0 percent correspondingly.

Recent measures (e.g. the A3) hitting production, reinforcing inflation and reducing competitiveness should not be applied again.

The time schedule of the shops should become independent of the working hours of the civil servants and the other employees. If small shops could freely choose their working hours, productivity and investments would become better off, consumers would have better service and more people would be employed. Imports should also be rationalized.

The Greek commercial sector has to be in touch with the traders abroad and be continuously informed on the new methods of trading as well as methods of sales promotion, advertising organization, etc. The consumer has to be offered good quality at reasonable prices.

A basic prospect is the creation of commercial centres based on the USA model. This will contribute to the effort for decentralisation which has lately been very slow. These centres are necessary for the service of the consumers who have moved outside Athens and they will allow the large and small shops to develop, thus, creating modern commercial units, able to stand under the competitive pressures from the EC, organized so that the credit system will offer better conditions for healthy business financing. The financial support given to the commercial sector by the industrial one is expected to be abolished and this is a positive step in the right direction.

It is wrong to believe that the conjuncture of international problems is responsible for the problems of our country. For the 1974-1978 period Greece has maintained low growth rates and high inflation accompanied by lack of action and there lies the cause of the problem. During this period the structural problems were not faced and only labour was favoured by the redistribution of income while the returns on capital fell under one fourth of the value added.

The structural changes should, in particular, be realized in the following sectors. Firstly, the competitiveness of the Greek products should be increased, production should become more differentiated and technological equipment should be properly chosen to promote the above developments. Secondly, public administration should be reorganized, public expenditures should be restricted and any further employment in the public services should be inhibited. Thirdly, the healthy and organized commerce should be restructured from the viewpoints of cultivations, financing production, and movement and trade of the products.

However, changes in production require investment to be based on. These investments did not take place. Fixed capital increases at a decreasing rate and the entrepreneurs try to find alternatives to substitute for fixed capital.

The government had, apparently, the wrong impression that excess profits were being experienced from 1974 onwards. A series of new tax measures caused an immediate reduction of profits and, therefore, of the cash-flow, leading to investment restraints.

The narrowing of the absolute profit margins caused a decreasing rate of returns on capital. Even though these returns are still on a theoretically satisfactory level, they cannot be considered to be a strong incentive for new investments. Inflation by itself demands an increase of the working capital and, generally, of the cash flow. The above developments led to stagnant private investments and low rates of growth.

The public sector should be reorganized and limited in volume. In reality, however, it continues to expand. The increase of taxation on incomes which finances pressures for increases in the nominal incomes,



and, therefore, either in the rise of cost of production and the reduction of profits, or in the rise of final prices. The reduction of profits leads again to the known investment and growth effects.

Private and public borrowing is another problematic case. During the 1963-1978 period, the public sector has increased significantly its borrowing from the monetary sources. The banks finance the public deficit using the surplus of private deposits. If the private sector borrows smaller amounts than the total private deposits the public sector can absorb the remaining amounts. Credits, however, are not easily given to the private sector. A more efficient and anti-inflationary Governmental policy would be to stop employing more public servants, to limit consumption expenditures and allow private initiative to be involved in an environment favouring the undertaking of business risks.

CSO: 4920

## SECOND CHAMBER CLEARS F-16 AIRCRAFT NEGOTIATIONS

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 17 Ap. 80 p 2

[Text] The Hague, April 17--The Second Chamber yesterday said it had no objections to negotiations with the U.S. Government on the purchase of a further 101 F-16 planes to replace the Air Force's Northrop NF-5 fighter bombers and to cover peacetime losses among the 102 F-16s already ordered.

Defence Minister Willem Scholten said this at a news conference last night after a meeting with the Chamber's standing Defence Committee on a report which he sent to the Chamber in March.

In this report the cost of the new order was put at between 1,700 and 2,100 million guilders, depending on whether the aircraft are produced in the United States or by the Fokker aircraft works in Amsterdam. (See morning 27/3/1980 p. 8.)

Eighty-one of the potential order of 101 new F-16s are meant to replace the Air Force's Northrop NF-5s and 30 F-16s are to replace those which could be damaged on future peacetime missions.

Mr Scholten told the news conference that the talks with the U.S. Government were to produce information on the exact price of the aircraft and the possibilities of production by European aircraft companies.

## Further Report

He promised to submit a further report to the Chamber after the negotiations, but before the Government would place a final order.

In addition to negotiations with the U.S. Government, Holland would have talks with its partners in the European F-16 consortium (Norway, Belgium and Denmark) to find out whether and on what conditions co-production within the consortium could be resumed, Mr Scholten said.

He added this would depend on whether the other countries were prepared to order more F-16's to replace obsolete fighters.

Mr Scholten said replacement of the NF-5 would have priority over the purchase of planes to ~~make~~ good, peacetime losses, because the NF-5 did not have a nuclear task and neither had its successor.

This fitted within the Cabinet's intention to cut back the role of nuclear armament, he noted.

CSO: 3120

## POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN MOSCOW OLYMPICS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Mar 80 p 3

[Text] A majority of Norwegians who have taken a position believe that Norwegian athletes should participate in the Olympic games in Moscow this summer, according to this week's Gallup poll. But one-fourth of the people are in doubt. The majority for Norwegian participation are among the adherents of the Labor Party and the Socialist Party of the Left, while the Conservative Party, Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party are mostly opposed to Norwegian participation.

Those who favor Norwegian participation in the Olympic games give as their reason that sport and politics should not be mixed, according to Norwegian Market Data's opinion poll. Many of the opponents believe that by means of a boycott Norway can show its disapproval of Soviet policies.

Half of those who oppose Norwegian participation would prefer to see the summer games moved. One-tenth of those who favor Norwegian participation share that view.

The poll was taken by personal interviews conducted nationwide, selecting 1000 women and men over 15 years old. The questions and the more detailed results are given below.

Question 1. "A couple of questions now about this year's summer Olympics after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the exile of Sakharov. It has been discussed whether Norway should participate in the summer games in Moscow. What is your opinion about that--do you or do you not believe that Norway should participate in the Olympic games in Moscow this summer?"

	All	Men	Women	Under 30	30-59	60 and over
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Should Participate	47	48	46	55	45	43
Should Not Participate	34	35	33	30	35	36
Do Not Know	19	17	21	15	20	21
Total Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100

Obviously there is little difference in the response according to sex, but those under 30 are to a greater extent in favor of Norwegian participation than their elders.

Norwegian Market Data has also classified the answers according to political inclination, and it seems that there is a clear majority of those who favor the Labor Party and the Socialist Party of the Left, who also favor Norway's participation in Moscow. Among those who vote conservative, Christian People's Party and Center Party the opponents are in the majority.

#### Question 2. "Why do you believe that?"

Should not mix sports with politics.....	88%
Must not break all relations/that does not help peace.....	8%
Afraid of the consequences of a boycott.....	2%

Those who were opposed to Norwegian participation explained as follows:

To show our opposition to Soviet policies.....	49%
Should stand firm concerning Afghanistan.....	21%
Should react against Soviet aggression.....	14%
So the Soviet man in the street would realize our viewpoint.....	9%
To show our solidarity with smaller nations.....	5%
There is only one nation at war.....	4%

At the end of the interview the final question was asked:

"Would you prefer that the summer games be canceled, or that they be moved if possible to another or several other countries, or do you believe that it is best that they be carried out in Moscow as previously planned with the countries which wish to participate?"

The responses from all those questioned, those favoring and opposing Norwegian participation, were as follows:

	All %	Question 1: Norwegian Participation	
		For %	Against %
The games should be canceled	12	1	31
The games should be moved	24	10	48
The games should go ahead in Moscow	47	84	14
Don't know	17	5	7
Total percent	100	100	100

9287

CSO: 3108



## LARGE NUMBER OF STORTING REPRESENTATIVES TO STEP DOWN IN 1981

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Mar 80 p 3

[Text] Although it is still a long time before the Storting elections next fall, it is known that there will be numerous changes in the composition of the Storting, clearly more than what is usually considered normal. This is especially true in the Labor Party where a "new generation" is expected to move in next fall. The conservatives had so many new members in the last election that no major change is expected next time. When it comes to the top level, there are large questions about the Storting leaders for the Labor Party and the Christian People's Party, Trygve Bratteli and Lars Korvold, who wish to continue for 4 more years.

None of them wish now, one and a half years in advance, to bind themselves to a position concerning their candidacy before the next election, and that is also typical of many in the Storting. They wish to consider the matter first when the process is seriously underway. Most representatives must, in the course of the coming autumn, give a reply to their respective parties if they can consider serving for another term, or if they wish to end their service in the Storting. Then it is up to the nominating committee to evaluate the candidates and in the final analysis to the voters on election day.

In the Labor Party it is expected that between 25 and 30 representatives will withdraw, of a group today of 76. If true, this is a very large number. Arvid Johanson and Asbjorn Jordahl have finally said no to being renominated in 1981. They are just waiting to take up their positions as editors with HALDEN ARBEIDERBLAD and TIDENS KRAV respectively. There is also a question whether Kjell Magne Fredheim will assent to taking an editorial position with HAMAR ARBEIDERBLAD. Harry Hansen has clearly stated that he will withdraw. Gunnar Berge is busy with the same thoughts, as he and other candidates are seeking the post of chief county labor leader in Rogaland. Oslo representative Haldin Havroy has recently moved to Bergen. Thor Lund and Thor Gystad can not be reelected because they have been elected to the Water Course Board and the Municipal Bank respectively, and are thereby excluded from further service in the Storting.

The same applies to the deputy chairman of the Storting group of the Conservative Party, Hakon Kyllingmark, who has been elected chairman of the board of the Municipal Bank. That official duty excludes him from seeking reelection to the Storting. Odd Vattekar was named county prefect of Vestfold, and will terminate in the Storting in 1981. Paul Thyness will go to the UN where he will be director of UNDP with an office in the vicinity of the UN building in New York. According to plans he will take over that position this summer. These are the conservative representatives who will not seek reelection. In addition there are seven or eight others who are seriously considering not running, but who do not wish to disclose today what their plans are for next year.

In the Christian People's Party Sverre L. Mo and Toralf Westermoen have refused reelection. But they are almost the only ones to withdraw. Certain others are also thinking over what they will do, but do not wish to bind themselves to a definite decision now. In this party as in all the others, circumstances change from month to month. That which seems obvious today is perhaps not so obvious at this time next year.

In the Center Party only one of the 12 representatives has said that he will withdraw from the Storting. That is Sverre Holland from Hordeland.

9287

CSO: 3108

## STORTING DEFENSE COMMITTEE CHIEF URGES MORE FUNDS

Dale AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Mar 80 p 2

(Commentary by Per Hysing-Dahl, chairman of the Storting Defense Committee: "and economy can never determine the need for defense")

[Text] For the first time in many years the Storting Defense Committee is divided over an important long-range question. That is the matter of the debate over the proposal by the Defense Commission for the development of defense forces over the next 15 years. It is dangerous that we can not retain the broad political unity which until now has given our defense policies a special stability and credibility, which in itself has been a positive and significant contribution to our defense capability. The split between the non-socialist parties on the one side and the Labor Party on the other in the debate over the Defense Commission's proposal is therefore a serious matter.

First some of the background. The Defense Commission of 1974 had a broad professional and cross-political makeup. It had the foremost Labor Party politicians as chairman and members. The commission gave its report in 1978. Eleven of the commission's 13 members approved the commission's recommendations.

The recommendations were based on a careful analysis of Norway's large and special defense tasks and requirements. From their findings the commission recommended certain budgets for defense in the coming years. This budget profile will make it possible to undertake the necessary investments in material and equipment and maintain and strengthen the necessary capability and readiness.

The concrete recommendations of the Defense Commission must be seen as a package. If we are not willing to appropriate the necessary economic resources, it will not be possible to supply the defense forces with the material, equipment and personnel which our defense tasks require, or to maintain the readiness and mobilization forces which are necessary. If we reduce the budgets, we also reduce our fighting capabilities.

The analysis by the Defense Commission of our defense needs concludes with a statement of the means we require to establish reasonable security.

What has happened while the commission of 1974 was working and after it submitted its report and recommendations? In the first place the international political and security situation in the world has generally become more unstable, and the balance of military strength has changed in our disfavor. At the moment we have the crisis in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan,

in the second place, during the same period we have actually given the defense forces much less resources than assumed because price increases have eaten up so much of the appropriations that the defense forces have consistently had to limit their readiness and combat capability in order to remain within tight budget limitations. That has happened in direct opposition to the requirements of the entire Defense Committee and the Storting.

Therefore we have every reason to fulfill the Defense Commission's requirements for our defense, and preferably do more.

During the debates in the Storting Defense Committee a majority--from the non-socialist parties--decided that the Defense Commission's plan and recommendations would be the basis for the development of the defense forces in the years to come. A majority voted to approve the Defense Commission's analysis of our defense tasks and requirements, as well as its recommendations for the resources which are necessary to fulfill the requirements and cover the missions.

The Labor Party has not wanted to follow the Defense Commission's recommendations. They are committed to a lower level of appropriations than that recommended by the commission. The reason is that the party believes that the economic situation in Norway will not allow such large contributions to defense.

Against that background it is necessary to make something very clear. In the first place it is the Labor Party which is breaking up the cross-political unity over important defense questions by going against the recommendations from the Defense Commission which was set up by the Labor Party, and in which distinguished Labor Party members of the commission still stand by the recommendations they have made.

In the second place, we can not direct our defense planning in accordance with economic conditions. Economic developments in our country or in the rest of the world do not determine what hazards we are exposed to, and which defensive needs we must provide for. And even if the economic policies which have been followed have brought us difficulties in prices and costs, we have significant resources in our country. We must realize that some things are more important than others, and that defense appropriations may make certain sacrifices and resignation necessary in other areas.

In the above situation, manipulation of numbers does not help. When Geirmund Ihle of the Labor Party tries to defend his party's viewpoint, he is playing such a numbers game. He claims in an article in AFTENPOSTEN on 25 March that we should be satisfied with ourselves in Norway since our defense expenditures per capita are in line with the defense expenditures of other countries. That underscores the actual verity that we can never defend ourselves with statistics, but only with resources which relate to our tasks. Norway would have had the same defensive requirements if the country had for example 1 million fewer inhabitants. Certainly no one claims that our security requirements depend upon how many people we have in the country. Norway must live with its defense needs, and therefore finds itself required to pay more for security than other countries which are less exposed.

Ihle also tries to combine two opposing viewpoints in an impossible balancing act. The non-socialist parties are not paying attention to the country's difficult economic situation, that is to say they appropriate too much for defense. On the other hand they break the cross-political unity for, in his opinion, an economic triviality, namely whether the defense budget should be 4 or 3 percent.

If that really were a triviality, obviously the Labor Party would not have worried so much about the economy.

Today it is not a triviality. For the first 5-year period the difference between the Labor Party's recommendation and the non-socialist parties' recommendation amounted to nearly 1.5 billion kroner.

Probably Ihle's contribution does not represent the Labor Party's viewpoint. Also there is reason for concern, with all the signals which indicate that defense activity is being reduced, readiness is eroding, and maintenance and replacement of material and installations is not taking place.

Work on the 1981 budget is now going on. The foundation is being laid for our defenses in the 1980's and 1990's. The non-socialist parties have given a clear message as to how this budget should develop. In view of Geirmund Ihle's reasoning, and the positions that can be deduced from it, one can conclude that the weak proposal which the Labor Party is setting forth to counter the Defense Commission's long-range plan will not be carried out in the budget.

If that is the case, it will be more important for the opposition to work systematically for the strengthening of the defense forces than to protect the cross-political unity of insufficient economic resources in this decisive sector.

9287

CSO: 3108



## NAVY LEAGUE ATTACKS PLANS TO REDUCE NAVAL DEFENSE

Oslø AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Apr 80 p 7

[Text] The government seems to want to reduce the navy to the extent that our future credibility—and ability to oppose an enemy—can be doubtful. The Navy League drew that conclusion in a statement about the Storting's announcement which is based on the report of the Defense Commission. It is maintained that changes in the military situation on the northern flank and in Western Europe have not affected the distribution of resources in the proper direction.

According to the government's plan we will greatly weaken our ability to receive allied assistance, said the Navy League. The capability to escort vital supplies and reinforcements will be cut off. The current announcement from the Storting cuts off even the capability to attack foreign submarines which are operating in our areas in peacetime. The announced reduction of the navy's combat capability will reduce the ability to protect our sovereignty in our waters to a significant degree, says the statement from the Navy League.

The Navy League points out that the Storting's announcement plans a reduction of 30 percent in the number of ships from 1970 to 1990. But the report which forms the basis for this plan, and also for the Defense Commission's and the government's recommendations, rests on very uncertain ground, according to the statement. The announcement will be debated in the Storting in mid-April. In its recommendations the Storting Defense Committee did not take a position on the objections which have arisen, but refers to further discussions on the structure of the navy.

The Navy League rejects all arguments which point out the annual percentage increases in the defense budget. As far as they are concerned, these increases do not result in a corresponding increase in defense potential. Three examples are given of lacking proportionality: expensive and unnecessarily complicated navigation systems on coast guard ships, the coast guard base at Sortland, and pay increases for conscript personnel.

In the statement it is also pointed out that looking at the budget from a strictly monetary view gives a misleading picture of reality. In that connection the pay raises and increased operating expenses are cited. These have created no demonstrable improvements in defense.

The government's assertion that defense activities have been sustained in spite of the reduction of the operating budget below planned levels for the years 1974 to 1978 was rejected. Sustained compared to what? The number of ships in commission is not a measurable criterion when the ships are undermanned and do not have the opportunity to conduct necessary exercises, said the Navy League in its statement.

Finally the statement makes it clear that the Navy League does not share the optimism of the Storting report as it applies to East-West relations in Europe. The fact is that the Soviet Union only becomes stronger in all sectors--and is conspicuous as an offensive global superpower. While Norway, on the other hand, has an expanded sea area to look after, distinguished by its oil production activity, the Navy League pointed out.

9287

CSQ: 3108

## HEAVY INDUSTRY CONCERNED OVER ELECTRIC POWER PLANS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Mar 80 p 3

[Text] The Ministry of Industry is now working on a new and up-to-date survey of the power requirements of heavy industry in future years. AFTENPOSTEN understands that contact will be established with the industries concerned this spring, probably in May. The conclusions of the energy report will not be taken up with the employees or the owners of heavy industry.

In a discussion in Bjelvfossen's annual report it is stated that the long-range view of the future for that business gives cause for great concern, especially with respect to the expected deliveries of power and its price. The energy report predicts price fixing for energy at a level which far exceeds industry's ability to pay, it said. The contents of the report deviate so far from the policies on energy, industry, and trade that have previously been adhered to that there is reason to fear that much work and planning already accomplished will be lost if the substance of the report is carried out. Bjelvfossen points out that heavy industries have in recent years invested billions in mandatory environmental controls, technology for energy saving, and investment designed to achieve a position of international importance, with future-oriented planning, high technology, and vigorous export activity.

"Increasing the prices of all power to record heights will be an artifice which will have as its immediate consequence a permanent deficit in this industry," said a letter to Prime Minister Odvar Nordli from the workers committee at Bremanger Smelteverk [Smeltery].

"We are opposed to the idea that water power should be treated as common property which all have equal rights to, no matter where one lives in the country. The truth is that water power is often the only natural resource which when converted can create jobs in many parts of the country. Why should these resources be commonly owned as compared with, for example, the timber land in Hedmark or the fishing in Lofoten," asks the workers committee.

"It is believed that democracy at the work place is based on participation in determining what the profits should be used for and what they should be invested in. Also, local discussions mean local power. But if profits in heavy industry are to be fixed by exorbitant prices for power beyond that which people in the ministries say is needed, one can expect little use for these democratic rights. We do not approve of changes like this," they said.

The company association at Eiken-Spigelverket [Nail Factory] believes that a price increase on electric power can have very serious consequences for a number of jobs throughout Norway.

They have therefore decided to appeal to the authorities not to carry out a policy which will weaken the basis for this power-consuming industry. The price and costing policy which is recommended in the report has created so much uncertainty about future conditions in the ferro-alloy industry that Eiken-Spigelverket has found it necessary to postpone the decision on expansion of Salte Verk until later. That is considered unfortunate, because the authorities have in this manner weakened the prospects for a project which could be very important to North Norway.

The survey of the requirements of heavy industry for new power which the Ministry of Industry is now revising shows a gross increase in power requirements of about 5.6 billion watt-hours until 1990.

9287

CSO: 3108

## INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION URGES END TO STRICT PRICE CONTROLS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Mar 80 p 12

[Text] In an application to the Ministry of Consumer and Administrative Affairs, the Federation of Norwegian Industries requested the abandonment of existing price controls at the time of the imminent revisions. An investigation conducted by the federation shows that until October 1979 industry had an average increase in expenses of 10 percent since the time that the strict price controls were enacted in May 1977.

The federation writes that industry therefore in reality has subsidized the Norwegian consumer with billions of kroner during that period. The investigation furthermore shows that based on competition in the market businesses were not able to regain more than an average of about 7.5 percent of the increased expenses through price increases, even if they had obtained permission to do this.

As it is now, there is a growing tendency for many businesses to eliminate non-profitable Norwegian production, and instead fill the market with imported goods, it says in Thursday's application.

The government has said that the ability of industry to make a profit must be improved. At the same time businesses are prohibited from covering their increases in expenses through prices. Therefore the share of capital in industry continues to fall. Now it is near 15 percent, which is much too low. The problem especially affects domestic industry. In this group there are many thousands of small businesses which mean a lot in their districts, but often have little power of resistance, says the federation.

The application, which is written in an unusually sharp tone, states that the Norwegian Employers' Association has claimed that wage bonuses must be passed on in prices. It also states that the government should establish price regulation in relation to the springtime wage increases.

9287

CSO: 3108



## HISTORIAN OF IDEAS SEES LEFT CONTINUING ANTINUCLEAR STAND

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Sven-Eric Liedman, professor of the history of ideas at Gothenburg University: "Slogans Reveal Totally Different Ideas"]

[Text] Many political commentators maintain that the environmental and energy issues are in the process of changing the traditional right-left scale. Historian of ideas Sven-Eric Liedman questions this reasoning. He analyzes the various comprehensive views which are behind the three alternatives in the national referendum, and he believes that the left is most likely to continue the popular campaign and prevent the political test of strength from degenerating into a game of tactics.

The popular referendum is now over and all of the statemen's words have been spoken. Now the commentaries abound. The anatomy of the game of fox and geese is revealed, and alternative 2 appears to be a winner on tactics and a loser on morality.

The political analysis, as it is practiced on radio, television and in the newspapers, to an increasing extent has used sports journalism as a model. It is as if an election or a referendum were nothing but a competition or a match, that is to say a competition which is not for anything but which has as its purpose only the struggle and the victory.

There is also risk that the politics will be guided by what is expected from them. Can the promises of the two yes alternatives for "abolition" have any form of objective content? Isn't it only a way to disturb and destroy the game? Is there really any foundation for the existence of two yes alternatives? Wasn't it only a shabby calculation, a calculation which on top of everything acquired decisive importance for the election result?

## Three Ideologies

These and many similar questions have already been put many times and have been answered almost as many times. But now I will try to show the other

side of the issue. Could it instead be assumed that the three alternatives correspond with three different -- or, more precisely, at least three different -- ideologies, that is to say social systems and worlds of ideas in general? Is there anything to discover if the sports journalism is left behind and instead an attempt at logical analysis is made?

In the campaign before the referendum the three alternatives behaved extremely different from one another. We do not need to speak of the separate status of alternative three; that alternative was borne up by a billowing popular movement and not by any ombudsmen or directors. But even numbers two and one were of different character.

Number two presented itself as the intermediate alternative. It is a coincidence, which was probably a rash little idea, that even its campaign button looked like a malicious parody of the no-button. The sun itself, in accordance with the demands of reformism, had been given the shape of a cogwheel. All of its propaganda contained key words which seemed to be right in the middle between those of alternatives one and three. While it was obvious that in fact -- on the immediate political issue -- there was agreement with number one, there was agreement "in principle," as Olof Palme never tired of emphasizing, with number three.

This differentiation between fact and principle does not need to be, or needs not only or primarily to be, a tactical game of fox and geese. No, I believe on the contrary that it belongs to the very deep layers of a dominating ideology.

#### Key Word

Let us momentarily nail down the key words in the various campaigns. The message of number one was simple, clear and coherent. It was concentrated to words such as "facts," "common sense," "expert" and "economy." Number two also centered around "the economy," but the real key word gradually turned into "the jobs," reinforced in Palme's linguistic fantasy by auxiliary words such as "gray" and "everyday" (Ola Ullsten didn't even have to mention grayness, for he is grayness personified). If alternative three is to be summed up in a few simple formulas, the choice would in all simplicity be "risks" and "alternatives."

What, then, do these words mean, what do they indicate?

The central vocabulary of alternative one provides us with an excellent, unusually clear and distinct picture of the ideological profile of the modern Swedish Conservatives. What there was already a relatively clear picture of, namely that the Conservatives have few and superficial points of contact with the old Conservatism with its concepts of value, tradition and organization, here stands out in a glaring light.

"These are facts," it says in the advertisements, "this is truth;" "why is alternative three lying?" they ask perplexed. Gosta Bohman preaches "common

sense" with his typical clever cockiness; and above him hover the "experts" like a row of smiling cupids.

In the end "the economy" is the compulsory law in this world. What is economically advantageous is in so many words unrealizable.

#### Positivism

It is strange and extremely interesting that the opinion which constitutes the actual starting point for the Conservative campaign is in many respects identical to the one which in scientific-theoretical connections is usually called positivism (alternatively neopositivism or factual positivism). The appropriateness of the designation is regularly discussed; the actual role of the phenomenon in modern scientific development is indisputable.

But not only in science! It belongs in a society where hard little facts are doled out by confident experts in accordance with sound and profitable economic principles. Alternative one is a fervent supporter of that society.

The campaign before the referendum otherwise seemed to point more clearly than most anything else to the fundamental impossibility of the concept itself. The experts were not unanimous, and almost every fact which was brought out turned out to be dependent on its content. One fact had its interpretation dependent on which way of thinking it was a part of -- that is to say the opposite of what alternative one proclaimed.

But alternative one did not let that faze it, for then its entire world view would collapse. Consequently, the opponents must be ignorant, foolish, lying and the like.

Alternative two as well focused on the economy, but it wasn't the same economy. Here it was primarily the economy which provides job opportunities. It was an axiom for alternative two that each major encroachment on the energy policy had to cause the jobs to suffer. It would be possible to proceed only with extreme slowness, otherwise an already grave crisis would grow worse, it said.

Nuclear power is dangerous, yes, but if things are going to hell, at least they should go to hell with full employment.

In "The Alternative" Rudolf Bahro pointed out that in "actually existing socialism," for example in Eastern Europe, a policy is being conducted as if for a constant struggle for survival, that is to say the most pitiful subsistence, and that it is therefore considered possible to postpone radical reforms, prescribed by the proclaimed ideology, until a distant future.

It is perhaps not equally strange that this kind of politics dominates in capitalist societies, where life and death competition evidently takes place all the time. But it is strange that Social Democracy, supported by social liberalism, without resistance yields to the same pattern.

Therefore, we can do almost nothing in this respect today, for then we will sink under water and drown. On the other hand, we can hope to float better in a few decades, and while waiting for that cork pillow we can put together a program of 27 or umpteen points about how to behave at that time.

Thus, we are in fact expanding nuclear power, but "in principle" we are abolishing it.

### Separation of Property

But is this double attitude, or, more correctly, the distinct difference between the "in fact" of the gray everyday and the "in principle" of the good intentions, so new for Social Democracy (about social liberalism we don't need to say very much)? Isn't it the same division of property between realpolitik and ideology which has caused the party to wait patiently and long for the demise of capitalism, not to mention that of the monarchy and the state church?

Nuclear power may be postponed for 25 years; by that time today's Social Democrats will be retired anyway. At that time they will at most make guest appearances, such as Erlander and Strang are doing now, and remember what was said in bygone days.

And alternative three? Alternative three was not represented by ombudsmen or experts. Alternative three was the people themselves. One should perhaps be cautious not to overemphasize the ideological uniformity of the alternative. Among its Center Party members it also counted the rural conservatives, conservatives of a kind for which the Conservatives no longer speak. But this conservatism had a negligible impact on the campaign.

Perhaps it was perceived indirectly insofar as the negative side -- the risks -- sometimes seemed to dominate over the positive side -- the alternatives. Everyone agreed on the risks, but about the alternatives -- or more precisely about that entire society in which the alternatives might be feasible -- there was no agreement.

### Right -- Left

There are many political commentators who say that environmental and energy issues are now in the process of erasing the traditional right-left axis on the political scale. They are then thinking of, among other things, alternative three with its cooperation between the Center Party, the VPK Left Party-Communists and many others.

But even quite limited knowledge of the modern history of political ideology says that at least as long as there has been any talk at all of right and left in politics, that is to say since the French Revolution, that is how long questions with similar impact have emerged again and again, on which groups on the right and the left have taken similar stands against a middle-of-the-road position.

It can also be said: Right and Left are often alike in the fact that they emphasize entities and relationships; their opinions are "organic" or "holistic" in contrast to the atomism or individualism of the center. Rousseau's ideas caught on with the far left and the far right. Hegel's ideas are found on the flanks of the political scale.

The energy and environmental issues are comprehensive issues; they are impossible to deal with for alternative one unless cut up into facts and for alternative two unless dispatched into the future.

#### Clear Alternative

But alternative three has come to be dominated by the left to an increasing extent. Where the alternatives were clearly formulated it was the left which formulated them. It is also the left which is now most likely to continue the popular campaign. It is the left -- again and again pronounced dead by our political commentators and experts on fashions in ideas -- which is capable of preventing the political test of strength from actually developing into a game of tactics or a matter for political commentators relegated from the sports pages.

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GSD: 4109



## READER SAYS HISTORIAN WRONG; LEFT WON'T TAKE OVER ISSUE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Nina Burton: "Reply to Sven-Eric Liedman: 'The Popular Campaign Cannot Be Bran'd as Leftist'"]

[Text] In an otherwise good analysis of the popular referendum (DAGENS NYHETER 27 March) Sven-Eric Liedman came to the conclusion that it is the left which is most likely to continue the Popular Campaign for No to Nuclear Power. As a "grass roots veteran" in the Popular Campaign, I, for my part, would like to submit a few reminders:

1) The Popular Campaign, as Liedman points out, is a popular movement. It is therefore not possible to immediately classify the opinions of these millions as is nowadays done with LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] members, but the directives must instead come from below. The fact that the mass media with their focusing on persons have only been interested in statements by the political leaders in the referendum clearly shows how serious the centralization tendencies have become in Sweden. It is precisely such things which many in the Popular Campaign want to combat.

2) The Popular Campaign consists partly of individually associated members in local groups, partly of about 30 organizations. My own local group includes for example people from most of the political movements plus a great many independents. About half of those who supported alternative three were neither VPK [Left Party-Communists] people nor Center Party voters! As for the organizations, they represent among others the environmental movement, the peace movement, the women's movement and various political parties.

The political organizations are thus only a part of the Popular Campaign. Various leftist groups are in turn only a part of this political part. If the ideology of the Popular Campaign were then further to be restricted to some special leftist group, as Liedman apparently wants to advocate, well, then the opposition to nuclear power has really been placed on a narrow foundation.

3) There is today widespread suspicion of politicians, which certainly hasn't been helped by the game around the popular referendum. Many of

those who work in the Popular Campaign have chosen the broad political co-operation which cuts across party lines as an honest alternative, unbound by prestige and party-political tactics. Just as there is cooperation on the most important issues in the UN and in the environmental groups, there is also cooperation in the Popular Campaign. We are more united around the alternatives than the nuclear power supporters are around their kind of society. We also know that there are no major chances for any alternatives at all as long as surplus electricity and expensive reactor construction force them out.

Opposition to reactor exportation, to the locking up of nuclear power such as district heating from Forsmark and unnecessary energy consumption, such as aluminum beer cans, are only a few examples of contributions necessary right now. Opposition to nuclear power consequently needs to grow rather than decrease.

That an organization that cuts across party lines such as the Popular Campaign, can also be a catalyst for switching parties and for changes in parties well, that is another story.

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CSO: 3109

## LIBERALS' LOCAL LEADER SEES DISASTER FOR PARTY IN NUCLEAR VOTE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Tord Melander, Liberal Party chairman of Ale county and secretary of LIFE: "Nuclear Power a Tragedy for Liberal Party; 'Many Now Turn Their Backs on the Party'"]

[Text] The nuclear power debate ruthlessly revealed that right now it is money and politics and not morality and ethics which are highly valued in the Liberal Party. That is what Tord Melander, chairman of the Ale county Liberal Party and secretary of LIFE, Liberals for an Energy Alternative, writes when he begins a debate in this paper about the future of the Liberal Party.

The popular referendum on nuclear power undeniably changed political life in Sweden. The cynical play around the referendum not only crushed many illusions -- if we had any left -- but also threw light upon many up to now unknown or underestimated mechanisms and power structures in society.

Just how badly wounded the parties came out of the struggle is perhaps too early to say, but it certainly does seem as if the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party gambled with the highest stakes and took the greatest risks.

For the Liberal Party, which is a comparatively small and vulnerable party at the center of the political battlefield, the referendum can mean that the party may be forced to play an obscure role in Swedish politics for a long time to come. The party will of course be able to hang on in Parliament, but from there to a central place in politics is quite a long way.

In what way can the nuclear power issue in the long run have undermined the position of the Liberal Party? Why will it become difficult for the Liberal Party to create credibility around the program to be adopted by its national convention in 1981?

In the general opinion the Liberal Party is now one of the three nuclear power parties. Potential nuances in the party's attitude have long since disappeared in the noise of accusations, figures, demagoguery and tactics.

Ola Ullsten, Carl Tham, Hans Blix and other important Liberal Party members who have become wholeheartedly involved in favor of nuclear power, to many people appear as superior, insensitive power people, with a fixation on the technological half-truths, the manipulated billion-crown calculations and the advanced nonsense regarding the liberation of the woman which was given such a large amount of space and such great importance in the debate before the referendum.

The nuclear power debate mercilessly revealed that right now it is money and politics and not morality and ethics which are most highly valued in the Liberal Party. Nothing in the comments after the referendum indicates that this would be an incorrect conclusion.

And now the Liberal Party is going to put together a new program. A program which is to deal with the party's social ambitions, the need for multiplicity and freedom of choice, the advantages of a small-scale, understandable society, the need for insight and participation and respect for individual human beings and their changing needs.

Won't it be difficult, against the background of what has happened, to maintain the earnestness that supports these sections of the new party program?

#### Technology Discussion

The debate before the referendum largely came to deal with safety analyses, radiation hazards, other environmental dangers, waste treatment, final storage, oil dependence, alternate sources of energy, electricity consumption, electricity prognoses, growth and whatnot.

This is why many got the impression that the entire energy complex is only a matter of technology and money. It is not unfair to state that leading Liberal Party politicians strongly contributed to such a simplified view of nuclear power.

Whoever did not accept such a limitation, however, could instead choose the following starting points in order to arrive at an opinion through reasoning:

The main issue is not energy supply but actually what kind of society we want. The result of the referendum is to a large extent decisive for our future in that respect. This is why the existence or nonexistence of nuclear power is beyond comparison the most important issue on which the Swedish people has ever had to take a stand.

For a party of concepts such as the Liberal Party it was almost a tragedy that this distinction was not made at an early stage!

#### Means Become Goals

In order to illustrate what I mean I want to quote just a single short passage from the Liberal Party's present program:

"We have profited greatly from the economic and technological development. The material standard has risen, economic gaps have been reduced and security has increased. It would be unjust to deny this progress. But it would be irresponsible not to notice how the development has a tendency to write its own laws. When that has occurred the means have turned into goals. The central values in life are then being threatened."

But isn't that exactly what has happened or is happening regarding nuclear power? The development writes its own laws and the means become goals with some sort of unsuspecting automation. It is obvious that many people experienced and are experiencing this as threatening and agonizing, above all those who have not yet completely abandoned the idea of shared influence and close democracy and who believe in politics as an instrument with a wide range of applications.

I believe that it is precisely on the nuclear power issue that the Liberal Party has abandoned its program on several vital points. Passively, blindly and apparently without resistance.

This is why many people now turn their backs on the Liberal Party. Many others did so as early as last fall's parliamentary election.

#### Centralization

In the long run the nuclear power society requires a tightly centralized, totally state-run organization. Special legislation could become necessary for control of it. Less overview and reduced insight contribute to greater estrangement in society. Many important functions are gathered in a few people with high technological and economic competence but perhaps with less feeling for social values.

But most people have a need for keeping the surrounding society within reach. Here, the concept of "reach" has not only a purely physical meaning but dimensions of knowledge and emotions as well. It concerns something as natural as opportunities for identification with the world and the technology which surrounds us.

It was this which the nuclear power debate should also have centered on.

And I don't hesitate to state that a society without nuclear power is more attuned to the fundamental evaluations of the Liberal Party's structure of ideas.

#### What Happens Now?

But can the damage be repaired (now that the Liberal Party, with its by now almost institutional suicidal instinct, just as the Social Democrats missed the opportunity that no doubt would have resulted in a clear majority in the referendum, that is to say no more than 10 reactors, to be dismantled by the year 2000 at the latest)?



This depends on the actions of the party leadership and Ola Ullsten in the near future. An honestly extended hand could become the most important expression of will and a precondition for the upcoming party and program work, the purpose of which, as far as I can understand, must be to once and for all return to modern liberalism its position as a credible alternative to both socialism and conservatism.

If, on the other hand, the party leadership coldly calculates that all "defectors" will obediently rejoin the ranks as soon as the storm has abated, they are making a serious mistake.

For the nuclear power issue has an entirely different dignity and explosive force than the prohibition issue once had!

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## PAPER LOOKS AT LIBERAL PARTY ROLE, FUTURE BEFORE CONGRESS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial by TWt: "Liberals -- Are They Needed?"]

[Text] The Liberal Party, the smallest but not necessarily the worst party in the government, will hold a national convention in a little more than a month. The atmosphere has to be affected by the unbroken series of disappointments in the last year on the voter level and the almost equally unbroken successes as regards what Parliament, government and voters have actually decided. Ola Ullsten and several other influential voices have spoken of the need for stronger emphasis on their liberal profile in the government, even if this were to mean trouble. When many people simultaneously feel the need for turning around a declining trend but have different prescriptions for how to do it, there is risk for schisms and for support of temporarily popular demands. This badly off the Liberal Party is not, however.

The bills before the national convention, which nowadays amount to several hundred each time, reflect approximately the same outlook and views as are usual for a Liberal Party. The subjects which have aroused interest in remarkably many -- alcohol politics and environmental questions -- are those on which the party has made an active impression from the outside as well. The presentation of current thoughts in the party this week by the party leader also did not give an impression of such adventurous things as have lately given rise to speculations on rather flimsy grounds, for example an exchange of partners from the Conservatives + the Center Party to the Social Democrats.

Ullsten seems aware that the emphasis in the election movement on general capability and willingness to cooperate are not enough, although from time to time this has been the Liberal Party's foremost sales argument. In his pleading for liberalism he often says that it stands on the side of the weak. This is fine as a basic attitude, although liberals are not alone in embracing it. They have often been excellent representatives of a relatively impartial attitude toward struggling power groups but with a certain leaning toward those who have been "underdogs," which in today's Swedish

society aren't always the so-called broad wage earner groups, to whom in the election mathematics it is most profitable to appeal. It can just as often apply to sacrifices or the assumption of responsibility from all of us "ordinary people" -- whom the Social Democrats usually contrast with one or another upper class -- in order to help minorities: immigrants, those who need care, underdeveloped countries and so on. Honesty and a certain rough absence of fuss are better than general benevolent jabber.

In looking back it can nevertheless be stated that much of what Swedish liberals have fought for is nowadays accepted, even by those who not so long ago were recalcitrant or hard of hearing. Constitutional issues and other questions of political principle have always interested liberals more than both the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, and the election system, the popular referendum institution we now have, would not have existed without the Liberal Party, which initially was alone with these curious ideas. Fertile ground for this type of reformism is a strong interest in the forms of the political play itself, that it must take place fairly and honestly. Everyone agrees in principle, of course, but those who strongly identify with certain groups and interests in society tend to put the content of the decisions before the rules of the game to such an extent that injustices which do not affect them personally are accepted with equanimity. This is history in our country, but in other places liberalism is in its fighting stage even in this field.

Parties must always fight, but for what? Ullsten quite often mentions market economy, which has to be strengthened and developed. In fact, it isn't really threatened under the present government. A little tougher opposition to mergers, more determined breakup of certain monopolies (Liber, the Telecommunications Agency), a study of the opportunities for foundations to exercise private power beyond what is warranted by ownership and responsibility, these are a few small areas in which to advance the positions. But defensively the Liberal Party has probably made a good contribution in a typically liberal style to consolidate opinion against collectivist types of wage earners' funds by offering an alternative with more spread-out and individual ownership and initiative-taking.

When the attention is turned to alcohol politics, the Liberal Party has a great deal less to regret than other parties. Liberal must have something to do with liberty, but not the liberty of destroying oneself. Dependence on substances known to be hazardous is scarcely liberty.

All parties are knowingly or unknowingly tactical. For a liberal party the best tactics ought to be to constantly search for a common denominator that is not too narrow -- for example exclusion of those who happen to have a different view of nuclear power -- or too wide, so that all of that which normal liberals feel strongly about is weeded out. Don't hesitate to stick your neck out even when your own view is unpopular, but don't make liberalism out of temporary technological solutions!

Internationally seen, liberalism often fights for a bright and optimistic view of society and the human being against opposite conservative positions. The other front, for individualism against collectivism, has played a relatively prominent role in Sweden. Both sides are needed, in the opinion of more people besides Ola Ullsten, and perhaps in the long run in the opinion of more than those eight percent who survived the ordeals of the last year.

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**ECONOMIST URGES WAGE FREEZE FOR ENTIRE 1980'S**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Mar 80 p 36

[Article by Jan Magnus Fahlstrom]

[Text] Hold wage increases down so our competitive power is strengthened. Let corporate profits rise so that industrial investments will increase. Put private and especially public consumption on the back burner. Put the debate over employee funds in mothballs and vote "yes" on 23 March.

These are some of the prescriptions for overcoming the imbalance in the Swedish economy given by Ragnar Bentsel, professor of national economy in Uppsala, in his opening speech at the Savings Bank Association's conference on "Our Economic Situation" in Stockholm's Folkets Hus last Wednesday.

We cannot simply blame oil price hikes, the unfortunate wage agreement of 1975, and international competition to explain the difficult situation we are in, Professor Bentsel stated.

**Overconsumption**

"To understand the current situation, it is important to see that for many years we have devoted ourselves to 'overconsumption' in the sense that we have allowed consumption's share of the national product to become much too large to permit balanced economic growth."

During the 1960's, 25 percent of the national product went for investments and 75 percent for consumption. But after the mid-seventies, investments dropped while at the same time the trade balance began to show large deficits. This means that savings have diminished their share even more than investments, to 17 and 19 percent, respectively.

**Thirty Billion**

"In the future, if we are to create a balanced annual growth of 2 to 2.5 percent, which is the most we can hope for, then it seems absolutely necessary to raise the investment and savings level again to 23-25 percent."



"If we accept that figure as normal, we must say that last year the Swedish people had a public and private "overconsumption" of 6 to 7 percent of the national product, i.e. 30 billion kronor or 10,000 kronor per household.

"For 1980, indications are that there will be an overconsumption of 8 or even 9 percent. On this background, it is a little difficult to understand wage-earners' demands for compensation for lost increases in real earnings during recent years. One cannot receive compensation for consuming too much!

"Public consumption, which has the remarkable ability to grow of its own accord, will increase by at least 2 percent annually. If the Swedish economy is to regain its balance during this decade, it does not seem possible to increase private consumption by more than a single percent annually, at the very greatest."

#### No Wage Increases

Since 0.7 percent comes from pensioners and employment will probably rise somewhat, this means, according to Ragnar Bentszel, that consumption per employee of the actively working generation will not be able to rise.

"This also means that there will be no room for increases in real wages. Note that this does not apply to individual years but to the entire decade of the eighties."

From the point of view of production, Bentszel described what happened with savings, investments, and consumption during the seventies as the "deindustrialization of Swedish industry."

#### Industry's Decadence

"This has had a completely destructive effect on our nation's economy. The deindustrialization began in the mid-seventies. It was then that industry's decadence began. In 1975 its production started to drop and this continued for 4 full years.

"Such a long period of decline in industrial production has not occurred previously in our country since the breakthrough of industrialization more than 100 years ago—not even during the two world wars."

If we are to increase our gross national product by 2.5 percent per year and eliminate the deficit in our trade balance in 10 years, then industrial production must increase by 6 to 7 percent annually. This, in turn, requires that investments in industry must increase by 13 percent annually, "a rate of increase that is completely unheard of and hardly likely," Ragnar Bentszel said.

Bentzel concluded that a program for developing the Swedish economy toward balanced growth in the long run must be based on two strategic objectives: first, strict restraint in the question of increased consumption and, secondly, large-scale industrial expansion.

#### Bluntness Needed

"This means that we must be very blunt in confronting expenditures for public consumption. This type of policy will arouse a violent storm of protest from the authorities. They will try to make it appear that it will be the most important of all services that will suffer--child care, care for the aged, etc., etc.

"But this is a well-known bureaucratic trick that politicians must not fall for."

In this connection, Ragnar Bentzel had harsh words for both those who dream of a society with "zero growth" and those who maintain that the public sector must grow at the expense of industry out of concern for full employment.

"This concept cannot be rationally justified, and it has no support in reality. It is simply wrong from start to finish. So please do not believe that unemployment would increase if employment in the public sector is limited. That ridiculous notion has already created enough misery in our country. Do not let it make the problem worse.

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## SOVIETS CUT OIL SALES AMOUNT, WORRY COUNTRY'S INDUSTRY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Mar 80 p 30

[Article by Staffan Teste]

[Text] Is Sweden in jeopardy of losing the approximately 15 percent of its total oil imports presently coming from the Soviet Union? Soviet industrial developments indicate that this may be the case. The oil industry in the Soviet Union is one of the problems.

Instead of a Soviet oil production for 1980 of 640 million tons, the five-year plan has now been adjusted downward to 605 million tons. The 1979 production was only 586 million tons compared to a planned 593 million.

At the same time, the oil needs in the SEV countries (the Eastern block) will rise drastically in the coming years. At present, the Soviet Union is responsible for about 80 to 85 percent of the 100 million tons the Eastern countries need. It is estimated that their needs will double in the future to 175-200 million tons per year.

The Soviet Union has promised to increase exports to SEV countries by around 20 percent, which does not correspond to the increased needs of its neighboring countries. The GDR, for example, has already complained that it receives too little oil from the Soviet Union.

## Western Currency

So far, the Soviet Union has considered it necessary to export oil to obtain money for imports requiring Western currency. During 1978, around 52 percent of the country's total hard-currency receipts came from oil sales to the West. During 1979 the figure was somewhat lower.

Many countries have received a decreased share of the Soviet oil during recent years. So far, however, this has affected primarily NATO countries such as Italy, West Germany, France, and Holland.

Finland, which has long-term contracts with the Soviet Union, has consistently managed to cover 70 percent of its total oil needs, although at steadily rising prices.

The Swedish Johnsonkoncernen has also had to reckon with higher and higher Soviet oil prices, up to the level of the world market. However, Sweden, like Denmark, has maintained its oil imports from the Soviet Union at a level corresponding to 15 percent of total oil imports.

American reports on Soviet oil have predicted that by the mid-eighties the Soviet Union, although it is presently the world's largest oil producer, will need so much of its own oil for itself that the country will have to become an oil importer.

All along, Soviet oil experts have rejected these statements as absurd. However, the Soviet oil industry has been strongly criticized in the domestic press for not keeping up with the planned production pace. Among other things, there have been shortages of pipes, drilling machinery, and advanced technical equipment. Transportation problems are also more and more difficult from deposits that are more and more inaccessible, for example in Siberia.

#### Savings Campaign

There have also been attempts to run energy savings campaigns, but so far the results have been meager. The valuable oil must be saved for purposes other than burning, according to statements. Despite a rapid development of nuclear and other forms of power, many central heating plants throughout the Soviet Union still burn oil.

During the eighties the Soviet Union will find itself at a fork in the road. If its energy deliveries to the Eastern countries are not increased, the economies of these countries will decline steadily due to their struggle for oil purchases on the world market. On the other hand, with decreased receipts of Western currency from oil exports, the Soviet Union will find it more difficult to purchase needed technological equipment.

At present, Soviet authorities consider all figures on future oil reserves and the extent of new finds to be secret information, not to be revealed for strategic and economic reasons. So far, however, there are no signs that restrictions will be placed on oil consumption.

#### Cheap Gasoline

At present, the Soviet Union has the lowest gas prices in Europe for foreign cars that require high octane gasoline--around 1.30 kronor per liter. No price increases have been indicated, nor has it been said that private automobiles, which are increasing in number slowly but surely by around 900,000 cars per year, will be hit by gas price hikes.

The political situation in the world does not exactly make it easier to do business with the Soviet Union, a Swedish businessman says.

He believes, however, that NATO countries can have an even more difficult time in the future.

"I do not believe we will lose our oil imports from the Soviet Union in the near future," says Jan Kronholm, trade attache at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow. "Our oil import volume has remained unchanged for many years but, like everywhere in the world, prices have been going up.

#### Nynas Oil Purchases Down

Nynas, the foremost importer of Soviet oil to Sweden, has felt the effects of increased demand for Soviet oil. This year the company must buy somewhat less than last year.

In negotiations for 1980 deliveries, which were concluded a week or so ago, Nynas had to accept a decrease, primarily with respect to petroleum products. The quantity of crude oil imported, on the other hand, will remain almost unchanged compared to last year.

For many years Nynas has been a large customer in the Soviet Union, but this does not yield results in the form of lower prices. Prices for Soviet petroleum products are on a strict market basis and are tied to the so-called Rotterdam notations on the free market. Around 40 percent of Nynas' oil comes from the Soviet Union. The other large suppliers are Libya and Venezuela.

Sweden bought a total of just under 4 million tons of oil and petroleum products from the Soviet Union through November of last year at a cost of 3 billion kronor.

The overall Swedish oil import for the first 11 months of last year was just over 30 million tons at a cost of 22.5 billion kronor.

The Soviet share totaled 13 percent, which breaks down to 7.5 percent of the crude oil and 18 percent of the petroleum products.

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## INCREASE IN INTEREST RATE HITS FARMERS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Mar 80 p 24

[Article by Lars Herlin]

[Text] Swedish agriculture is not in a crisis. But more and more individual farmers are. It is mostly the newly established farmers who cannot keep up with rising interest rates. The bankruptcy claims have already begun to come in.

However, farmers with low debts have better times before them.

The old rules are no longer in effect in high-interest Sweden. Farms with high mortgages do not bring increased wealth and prosperity when interest rates demanded by banks and credit institutions are higher than the inflation rate.

Among farmers, two groups with different profitability are beginning to take shape: 1) older farmers with small loans and hardly any interest costs and 2) newly established farmers with loans in the millions, which have become 3.5 percent more expensive during the past 6 months of interest hikes alone. Hardest hit are farmers who during recent years have invested millions in more efficient milk production.

## Bankruptcies in the North

Currently in Norrbotten, bankruptcy claims are being examined for two newly established farms, and more bankruptcies are to be expected.

"From 30 to 40 family farmers are in the danger zone," says farm consultant Lars Ullberg in Lulea. It is believed that additional bankruptcies will be forthcoming if the situation does not improve rapidly for milk producers.

There are a total of 1,500 active, full-time farmers in Norrbotten.

So far in Vasterbotten only one farmer is on the brink of immediate bankruptcy, according to Steffen Enquist of the Agricultural Commission.

During the past 3 years around 150 farmers have invested with state loan guarantees and of this number 15-20 are in great difficulties.

There are serious problems even in good farming communities such as Gotland.

Head of the Agricultural Commission on Gotland, Bengt Riets, says he has a list of 50 to 60 farmers who have requested delays in paying their mortgage and interest. Some of these farmers are behind by such large sums as 100,000 to 130,000 kronor. For five farmers business is so bad that their suppliers refuse to deliver anything without cash payments.

Bengt Riets anticipates 5-10 bankruptcies among farmers on Gotland because debts are too high compared to incomes.

Bengt Riets maintains that it is not only newly established farmers who have problems. There is also a group of bad farming entrepreneurs who managed to get by during the seventies, since interest rates were lower than inflation at that time. But with higher interest and stagnating farm prices, they are now in a crisis.

#### Mismanagement

Bankruptcies among farmers for reasons other than purely personal mismanagement of farms have been very rare in Sweden.

Birger Isacson, association spokesman of the National Farmers Association, says that the situation is the worst in Norrland Province.

There, during the late seventies, large investments were made for increased milk production. Building a stall for 25 cows with a fodder handling system, etc., is a million kronor investment. Each place costs 40,000 kronor.

Farmers who made new investments during the late seventies invested when construction costs had already begun to run away. It estimates that the Agricultural Commission, among others, helped establish, interest rates were expected to be around 9 percent.

Today, farmers are forced to pay 12.25 to 16 percent, depending on whether or not they managed to obtain the loan from the Rural Mortgage Institution.

It is not just high investment costs that are the root of the problem in agriculture. The cost of farm property quadrupled during the last half of the seventies.

The high property costs prevent acquisition of neighboring land. On the other hand, relatives who take over a family farm receive great reductions and, according to statistics, have only paid twice the 1975 tax value. Now farm property costs have begun to stagnate. In 1979, land costs were steady, which means an actual drop. But prices must go down more, according to Birger Isacson.

The wave of speculation is also being checked by the new land acquisition law, which amounts to an administrative price control by which the agricultural commissions can stop farm property transactions if they believe the price is too high compared to the possible yield.

Of course farmers, who are automatically compensated for their increased production costs in farm price negotiations, also receive compensation for rising interest rates in these negotiations. The problem is that the agricultural debt of 17 billion kroner (only 37 percent of agriculture's assets) is so unequally divided among the individual farmers.

Through higher prices for their production, farmers with low debts receive compensation for interest they never had to pay, while the price compensation fails to cover increased interest costs for newly established farmers and those with heavy debts.

The LRF (National Farmers Association) is now developing a formula that would mean that only debt-ridden farmers would be compensated for interest costs. But association spokesman Birger Isacson is aware that such a proposal will be strongly criticized by the older generation of debt-free farmers.

The problem of capital acquisition in agriculture is currently being urgently studied by a state commission.

The LRF has already presented a concrete proposal for relief.

The Rural Mortgage Institutions, which currently lend money at an interest rate of 12.25 percent for 30 years, should receive greater resources. At present, it takes about 4 years for a farmer to transfer his bank loan to a mortgage institution.

But increased opportunities for loans will not settle the conflict between farmers who are in debt and those who are not.

#### Lack of Land a Problem in North

Agriculture and regional policies were the theme when this year's Farm Week opened in Stockholm on Monday.

Province Governor Ragnar Lassinantti said in his introductory speech that the competition for farm land has been unnecessarily hard. This has been because agricultural policy has guided land policy in a stubborn manner. New land has not been permitted to be tilled even to replace farm land that has been used for other purposes.

"This principle is untenable," Lassinantti emphasized. "In my opinion, the land must be farmed, at least in Norrland, to create rational family farming."

"The lack of land is a serious obstacle to the development of farming and forestry in sparsely populated areas of Norrbotten. Part of the problem is that many who have gotten out of the business have retained their land. In certain areas over 50 percent of the land is owned by so-called passive owners."

The national association (SMR) stated that the seventies were relatively successful for the dairy industry and for milk production. Unlike the EC countries, among others, we in Sweden managed to maintain a good balance between production and consumption.

At the start of the eighties, the production balance will be one of the major problems for the SMR. At the same time, the harsh economic situation is especially severe on newly beginning dairy farmers.

"Our production efforts have been well received by consumers," Bengt Dock emphasized. "The high quality of the raw milk product has been one of the main prerequisites for this."

Overall, only a very small amount of milk is given a low classification. In 1979, for example, 99 percent of the milk that was weighed in was placed in the highest quality classification.

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## BRIEFS

**SOUTH AFRICA SHARE CUT**--During 1979 Asea decreased its share in the South African company Asea Electric South Africa Ltd. from 47 to 44 percent. The move is seen as part of a long-range strategy to decrease Asea's direct influence and soothe the conscience of the company leadership in Vasteras. Asea already claims it is not involved in a conglomerate relationship. According to the company's own understanding, Asea does not need to consult with the Swedish government when the South African Asea company makes new investments. Otherwise, investments by Swedish companies in South Africa can be examined by the government. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Mar 80 p 1] 9336

**MORE GRAIN TO USSR**--Swedish grain exports to the Soviet Union have already tripled during 1979/80. So far Sweden has sold 65,000 tons of grain which went to Soviet ports. In comparison with the 17 million tons of grain which due to President Carter's embargo the Soviet Union now has to buy from countries other than the United States, the Swedish contribution is small. But it can be interpreted as an example of the fact that the Soviet Union today buys all it can get hold of. The Swedish grain surplus this year amounts to not quite 1 million tons. Eastern European countries have traditionally been among the largest buyers. Swedish Grain Trade, as the Swedish export organization is called, calculates exports over so-called regulation years, which means in half-yearly periods. In the last 5 years deliveries to the Soviet Union amounted to only about 20,000 tons. During the last 6 months the Soviet Union received 65,000 tons of Swedish grain. The Soviet deliveries took place with international trading companies as agents but were shipped from Sweden to Soviet ports. The value of the export so far is 40 million crowns. The main part of the contracts with the trading companies were signed before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The issue of whether Sweden should comply with Carter's call for an embargo has never been seriously discussed. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Mar 80 p 32] 11949

**FOREST WASTE INTO ENERGY**--Uddeholm and Billerud have decided to form a joint fuel company which is to refine and sell forest waste to energy consumers in Varmland. The company will also develop and offer equipment for facilities fueled by chips. The raw material for the fuel is primarily timber waste which cannot be used for products by the forest industry. Peat may also become important in the future. A first facility for storage and refining is planned for the Hagfors region. Operation will begin in 1981 and contribute to new employment primarily in northern Varmland. The rate of construction will depend on, among other things, the support of the municipal regions and the incentives for facilities using forms of energy other than oil. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Apr 80 p 34] 11949



## MONEY TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM CIRCULATION

Istanbul AKSAM in Turkish 7 Apr 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] It is reported that banknotes circulating in Turkey are badly mishandled and wear out in a short time. It is asked that "special care be given to the proper handling of banknotes." It is also reported that in the last year 146 million banknotes have been pulled from circulation for wear.

According to information from Central Bank officials, there recently has been a marked increase in old and worn-out banknotes circulating in various parts of the country as the result of citizens' inadequate physical protection of their money.

Central Bank officials said that "after inspection, the banknotes pulled from circulation for age and wear as well as those partially or completely torn, or with writing and drawing on them are to be burned with attention paid to objections regarding respect for Turkish money and the peoples' health."

Officials pointed to the continual outside purchase with foreign exchange of the special paper on which the banknotes destined for destruction are printed, the special printing ink used, printing machines, and spare parts for them. They said that because of improper handling of banknotes--whose printing results in this foreign exchange drain--45 of every 100 of the 5, 10, 20 and 50 lira banknotes, 63 of every 10 [sic] of the 100 lira banknotes, and 5 of every 100 of the 500 and 1,000 lira banknotes put into circulation in 1979 are to be withdrawn for burning.

The printing cost alone for the banknotes to be pulled from circulation was 80 million lira in 1976 and 101 million lira in 1979. In light of rising costs in the past, these amounts could easily reach 150-200 lira a year.

Central Bank officials ask that citizens guard against the improper handling of banknotes and that citizens always use wallets. They said that "our people do not use wallets to protect banknotes; instead, they

carry their banknotes in their pockets, on their chests, in purses, even in their hats, shoes and socks. Market places and vendors who carry on a very brisk business show no care in the handling of money. Vendors use pockets on their aprons that are in the shape of pouches--a method that wears heavily on money--and some buckets. Writing and drawing appear on our banknotes. As a result of this abuse, the money is in shreds or all crushed up.

Officials want our citizens to exchange their old money for new by taking it either to the Central Bank or branches of the Agriculture Bank.

CSO: 4907

## BRIEFS

TEACHERS SEEK BACK WAGES--It has been learned that thousands of teachers have been unable to get their regular wages and pay for additional classes. It has been learned that most teachers in Istanbul have been unable to get their regular wages and pay for additional classes for 1-2 months. The teachers applied to the Property Directorates in the districts to get their wages and were notified that "the Ministry of Finance has not issued the payment order." The teachers, who state that their regular wage is roughly 1500 lira while pay for additional classes averages 1600-1700 lira, say that this money is important to them given the high cost of living. In fact, the teachers say they are straining by the first of the month on what they make. The teachers want their regular wages and additional class pay turned over right away. [Text] [Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 17 Apr 80 p 6]

CSO: 4907

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